

MAGAZINE

# RAZVEDCHIK

We search for knowledge not for glory's sake — But to learn the truth for the good of our State! №4 (9) DECEMBER 2024



**“INTELLIGENCE  
IS LIFE ITSELF”**

**S. Y. NARYSHKIN**

**N. I. KASPERSKAYA:**  
“WE STILL ARE NOT AWARE OF  
MANY RISKS OF DIGITALIZATION”

**THE DULTSEVS:**  
“ILLEGALS ALWAYS WALK THE LINE.  
IT IS A CONSCIOUS RISK”

**THE TRUTH ABOUT THE  
WINTER WAR. DECLASSIFIED  
ARCHIVES OF THE SVR**

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THE WHOLE WORLD IS GOING THROUGH  
A TURNING POINT NOW, AND THE LEADER  
WILL BE THE ONE WHO IS WILLING AND  
ABLE TO BRING CHANGE, THE ONE WHO  
ACTS, WHO MOVES FORWARD

## Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia Sergey Naryshkin:

# “Intelligence is life itself”

Dear Sergey Yevgenievich! At the end of last year, your article dedicated to the trends in the development of the international situation in the now outgoing year 2024, was published in the Razvedchik magazine. Have the forecasts been confirmed and what new processes have been outlined? What should Russia and the world community hope for and fear in the coming year?

The main forecast about the growing crisis of the American-centric world and the multipolarity that is replacing it has certainly been confirmed. We have been observing manifestations of this process throughout the year. Take, for example, the failure of the American “summit for democracy.” Let me remind you that this revisionist forum was created by J. Biden’s team to record the redivision of the world according to Washington’s patterns, to establish the notorious “rules-based order” and to ostracize all those who refuse to pledge allegiance to these “rules.” It was conceived as a

global event, but in the end, it turned into an unremarkable ministerial meeting, to which the White House barely managed to drive several dozen of its closest allies.

The Americans and their satellites received another painful slap in the face at the so-called peace summit in Bürgenstock. The leaders of the largest non-Western countries simply refused to take part in this farce, and many of those who came to Switzerland did not sign the final communiqué. The entire world is well aware of the absurdity of attempts to resolve the Ukrainian crisis without Russia’s participation, especially given the developments on the front line. The peacekeeping and mediation activities of Brazil, India, Indonesia, China, Turkey, Arab and African states are based on this understanding. And only the West continues to live in an absolutely artificial reality, divorced from life, in which it has already “isolated” Moscow, and if we take into account the odious ICC warrants, it has also inflicted a “strategic defeat” on us.





a fundamental difference between them. The “Seven” is Washington and its satellites, that is, a direct product of a unipolar world based on the dollar and the tyranny of the United States. And BRICS, especially in its current expanded form, is an alliance of equal powers, or rather civilizations, striving to jointly find answers to the most pressing challenges of our time, taking into account national interests. The G7 is the past, BRICS is the future.

Of course, the enemy, as they said in a wonderful Soviet film, “doesn’t want to give up the sky,” that is, refuses to admit that the era of its undivided dominance is over. It is not that Washington and London do not understand the essence of what is happening, but the inertia of their colonial thinking and deep-rooted racism are having an effect. Although at times, the Anglo-Saxons, as they say, lose their nerve. This is indicated, in particular, by their transition to open terror and attempts to physically eliminate opponents. In other words, in their favorite formula “buy or kill” the second ingredient has clearly begun to prevail. For example, the high-profile assassination attempt on the Prime Minister of Slovakia Fico, who has the courage to speak out in defense of the national interests of his country, says a lot. And this is just one episode. Let us recall the reports of threats of physical violence against the President of Serbia Vucic and the Prime Minister of Hungary Orban. It is obvious that literally all the bright leaders of the emerging multipolar world are under attack.

#### So, the West is ready to take extreme measures?

I think so. One of the possible scenarios for the development of events in the mid-term is an attempt by Westerners to unleash a global armed conflict with its epicenter in Eurasia. This, you know, is a proven way for global capital to get out of the crisis. It is encouraging, however, that Washington and London are far from the only ones who, as they themselves say, are bound by common values. New, no less stable groups of countries have appeared in the world. Other, more responsible players who, having united, are capable of resisting Anglo-Saxon adventures and of resolving any problems independently, while keeping the planet from sliding into World War III.

Before the beginning of the first session of the new RF State Duma. October 5, 2016

But the world, thank God, is not a laboratory or a computer game, it cannot be constructed using information and political technologies. We had the opportunity to see for ourselves the “effectiveness” of Western efforts to “isolate” Russia during the triumphant BRICS summit in Kazan. Without exaggeration, this event became a milestone on the path to establishing genuine multipolarity — in terms of the composition of its participants, its agenda, and the general atmosphere in which it took place. In the Western press, one can often find comparisons between BRICS and the “Seven”. However, as I have said many times, there is

« BRICS is an alliance of equal powers, or rather civilizations, striving to jointly find answers to the most pressing challenges of our time, taking into account national interests.

#### How might the aforesaid processes impact the Ukrainian conflict?

The West’s strategic planning in the Ukrainian crisis is extremely clear: to impose a protracted war of attrition on us in order to split Russian society and create conditions for a “color revolution.” They will fight, as they say, “to the last Ukrainian,” and when there are none left, the Balts, Eastern Europeans, and, in the long term, the Germans will be forced to come out to fight the “terrible Russian bear”. The globalists have the necessary technologies for brainwashing the population and putting pressure on local elites.

However, I can confidently state that further escalation will not only fail to lead to Russia’s exhaustion, as Washington and London expect, but will bring the strategic defeat of the West itself closer. Despite sanctions and the theft of our sovereign assets, the Russian economy is showing growth, import substitution is developing at an accelerated pace, including in high-tech industries. New logistics chains are emerging, economic ties with non-Western countries are strengthening, primarily in the Greater Eurasia space.

All attempts to “destabilize” the situation in Russia have been unsuccessful. People realize that we are not fighting the Kyiv junta, but the collective West, and the price of this confrontation is our freedom and sovereignty. And the situation at the front is not in Kyiv’s favor. The strategic initiative in all areas belongs to us, we are close to achieving our goals, while the Armed Forces of Ukraine are on the verge of collapse, and Zelensky’s regime has completely lost legitimacy and, as a result, the ability to negotiate.

#### What can you say about the situation in the post-Soviet space in general?

The analysis of the data available to the Service allows us to conclude that the post-Soviet space remains a priority area of attack from American and British intelligence services. The West has set itself the ambitious goal of breaking not only economic and political ties, but also deep historical and humanitarian ties between our countries. This approach follows from the well-known maxim of the Anglo-Sax-

« All attempts to “destabilize” the situation in Russia have been unsuccessful. People realize that we are not fighting the Kyiv junta, but the collective West.

ons: “Whoever rules Eurasia rules the world.” Although “to rule” for them means “to divide”, “to wreak havoc,” and then to offer themselves to the exhausted nations as “impartial guarantors of security.” How this happens is clearly seen in the Ukrainian example.

At the same time, the American “obsession” with Ukraine is beginning to have a destructive effect on the entire global financial and military-political system built by Washington. The US is losing the initiative on all fronts: from the Middle East to Asia and Africa. And in the post-Soviet space, they are even fail-

Shortly before the beginning of a working meeting in the Kremlin. October 2, 2018



« A multipolar world should certainly include both the US and Europe, provided they have equal rights with others.

ing. Look, in Georgia, where the puppet-like Saakashvili was recently snacking on ties, the Westerners failed to prevent the ruling party “Georgian Dream” from winning the elections. Having realized the perniciousness of blind orientation towards the West, the Georgian authorities decided to act in their own interests and are now consciously moving away from the ultra-liberal transhumanist agenda imposed from outside, which is infinitely alien to traditional Georgian values. In Moldova, the Maia Sandu regime barely managed to pull off the desired result in the elections, de facto illustrating a deep split in Moldovan society. Azerbaijan and Armenia are also not very attentive to the recommendations of the US and the EU for a peace settlement, preferring to resolve all issues on their own.

This summer, President Vladimir Putin put forward an initiative to create a new system of collective security in Eurasia to replace the

clearly bankrupt Euro-Atlantic model. Today, the topic of creating an equal and indivisible security contour on the Eurasian continent without the military presence of external powers has already firmly entered the international discourse. It was also raised on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan.

At one time we proposed to the Westerners to build a common security space from Lisbon to Vladivostok, they did not want it. Well, we will build a new architecture without them — say, from Minsk to Pyongyang.

**Do you think the West can play a constructive role in building a new world order? Is it possible to reach an agreement with it or is direct conflict inevitable? And what place do you assign to Western countries in the future system of international relations?**

Places will be distributed by history. A multipolar world should certainly include both the US and Europe, provided they have equal rights with others. Today, humanity faces a large number of truly serious common challenges, such as pandemics, climate change and the associated global migration, and the uncontrolled development of artificial intelligence technologies. Leading regional and global powers need to work together to find ways to respond to them. The American and European “poles” with their spirit of entrepreneurship and innovation can and should play an important role in these processes.

But I am afraid that the Americans and Europeans are still far from returning to their identity. They are likely to face a difficult, dramatic period of internal strife, which will be habitually attributed to “Moscow’s hand.” It is difficult for the West to admit the decline of its power. The US still has powerful technological potential, the dollar, along with the euro, remains the world’s reserve currency, McDonald’s and MacBook are present in many corners of the planet, as are American aircraft carrier groups.

Nevertheless, Washington’s authority in the world is increasingly “sagging”. Even the closest allies of the Americans are increasingly less likely to look back at the opinion of the White House and are trying to expand their own



At the meeting of heads of security bodies and intelligence services of the CIS states. Moscow. November 26, 2024

boundaries of what is possible in politics and economics. You cannot imagine how many US partners from Asian, African, and Latin American countries, in their contacts with us, are asking us, as they say, not to stop in the Ukrainian conflict halfway. In addition, the West is literally slaughtering its own “sacred cows”, including the principle of the inviolability of private property. It is obvious to everyone that any country could end up in Russia’s place.

Ultimately, all of this is pushing the global majority toward greater independence. We are witnessing a genuine decolonization of the Global South, which has begun to perceive itself as a full-fledged geopolitical entity, and not as someone’s “backyard.” You may have noticed that the Kazan summit coincided with a rather dull British Commonwealth forum in Samoa. During it, former colonies raised the issue of compensation from England for the damage caused. And this is only the beginning. The Irish, Scots, and Welsh also have their own grievances against London. In the United States, the movement for the decolonization of Texas and California is gaining popularity. Some may find such aspirations naive, but they reflect a general, and growing, trend.

**Sergey Yevgenievich, if you allow, a few personal questions. Let me remind the readers that you are no stranger to intelligence: in the 1980s you served in the First Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, successfully worked in Europe. Do you remember your feelings from your first assignment?**

In 1980, after graduating from the Higher Red Banner School of the KGB of the USSR, I returned to Leningrad, from where I had been sent to study. I was incredibly happy that I was accepted into the intelligence department, into the scientific and technical intelligence sector. After working for four years, including under the “cover” of one of Leningrad institutions that had extensive foreign connections, and having gained some operational experience, I was sent to the one-year faculty of the Red Banner Institute of the KGB (now the Foreign Intelligence Academy). After graduation, I was left in Moscow to prepare for a foreign assignment.

Overall, I repeat, I was both happy and felt a special responsibility for the fact that I was sent specifically to intelligence. This sense of responsibility for the great task entrusted to me and my colleagues did not leave me through-

On the opening of an exhibition in the Central Museum of Modern History. Moscow. December 17, 2020



« The technological progress has most seriously affected the SVR of Russia, and, as it seems to me, all these years the Service has not only kept up with progress, but has sometimes been one step ahead.

out the four years that I worked in the Soviet foreign intelligence station in one of the European countries.

When do you think it was easier to work: then or now?

Since the Razvedchik magazine is a public edition, I will not analyze and compare operational and other special moments: how it was then, 30 years ago, and how it is now. But, speaking about the general background, I want to note

At a meeting of the constant members of the RF Security Council. June 21, 2018



that now, perhaps, it is more difficult, and here are the reasons. In the mid-1980s, the Cold War continued, the confrontation between two systems and the two main countries representing these systems — the USSR and the USA. At the same time, the general atmosphere of contacts between Soviet citizens and representatives of the West was generally favorable, it was not felt that something strongly separated us in a general human sense.

Now the situation is fundamentally different. Unfortunately, the degrading Western system, the totalitarian-liberal Western bloc is strongly fueling the atmosphere of Russophobia in the Western society. We see that in the last two to two and a half years the level of Russophobia has simply gone overboard. Of course, this leaves its mark on the work of our foreign offices in Europe and North America. This is, perhaps, the main difference.

You returned to intelligence after almost twenty years. How much did the forms and methods of work, as well as the people themselves, the intelligence officers, change during this time?

I will say right away that the fundamental principles of the activities of the domestic foreign intelligence did not change. Of course, all these years the methodological techniques and technologies in various aspects of intelligence, information and analytical work were being improved. In addition, there was a noticeable redistribution of roles between individual areas of the Service's activities. First of all, I mean that the technological progress seriously affected the SVR of Russia, and, as it seems to me, all these years the Service was not only keeping up with the progress, but sometimes was a step ahead.

In this regard, new technologies were most actively and creatively introduced into operational activities — primarily communication systems, information processing. I saw that over the years the level of the Service's work had grown significantly, operational methods had become more refined... The framework of a public journal does not allow me to expand on this topic, but it is obvious that intelligence is growing and improving. Naturally, this requires

a higher level of training of employees, and this is exactly what is happening today.

In addition to heading intelligence, you head the Russian Historical Society and are involved in educational activities. Tell me, how do you manage to do everything? Do you have time for friends, family, sports?

I don't think that I am some kind of top performer here, I am just used to working a lot. Both when I worked in St. Petersburg in various positions, and when I moved to Moscow, where the workload increased even more. Of course, responsible, managerial work has always required and continues to require full concentration of strength and attention.

At the same time, of course, I enjoy communicating with my family, with friends, I find time to do physical exercise and sports. By the way, if we talk about this component, it is the duty of a foreign intelligence officer to be in good physical shape. And there is nothing that would distinguish me from others. Moreover, the SVR of Russia has created unique opportunities for sports. Perhaps no other agency in Moscow or in the regions has such opportunities. Therefore, dear colleagues, take advantage, take advantage of them 100%.

What would you wish to the young officers of the Service who are now preparing to go abroad on their first mission?

I would say the following. My dear young colleagues! The status of an officer of the SVR of Russia obliges you to many things. You must be ready to always defend the interests of our cause, put them above your own ones and sometimes even make personal sacrifices.

I advise you to follow the three-fold rule throughout your entire period of service in intelligence, whether you work in the central office or abroad: master, implement and creatively develop. This algorithm of actions has been tested by many generations of officers of the domestic foreign intelligence.

Colleagues! You are young, energetic, have undergone good specialized training, and have accumulated certain professional knowledge.



Use this baggage creatively both in your work at the Center and during your foreign missions. The main thing is to fear nothing. But at the same time, keep a cool head and remember: the future of our country, our beloved Russia, its security, prosperity, and well-being largely depend on the effective work of each foreign intelligence officer, including you.

In the portrait gallery of heads of the domestic foreign intelligence. Yasenevo. November 22, 2024

And finally. Sergey Evgenievich, what is intelligence for you?

I'll give you a short answer. For me, as an intelligence officer, intelligence is life itself. 🚩

Interviewed by Mikhail Pogudin

« The status of an officer of the SVR of Russia obliges you to many things. You must be ready to always defend the interests of our cause, put them above your own ones and sometimes even make personal sacrifices.

# Professional

Text: Mikhail Vitalievich Pogudin,  
Chairman of the Council of Veterans of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia, retired lieutenant general

**On October 27, 2024, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation Sergey Yevgenievich Naryshkin celebrated his 70<sup>th</sup> birthday. Congratulations to the hero of the anniversary were sent not only by colleagues — heads of partner special services and members of the government, but also by many politicians, figures in the fields of science and art, as well as heads of several states. The editorial board of "Razvedchik" joins in all the warm words addressed to Sergey Yevgenievich, and for its part would like to remind the readers of the amazing way he has gone over these years.**

The future intelligence officer was born in Leningrad to an intellectual family. Like most of those who survived the siege of Leningrad, the Naryshkins lived modestly, if not ascetically. They had a small flat in an old house near the Fontanka river opposite the Mikhailovsky Castle, where, besides Sergey's parents and elder brother, his grandmother lived. He studied at Leningrad School N°190 with an artistic and aesthetic focus, which he graduated from with honors in 1972.

At school, he was keen on mathematics. His classmates recall that he could sometimes devote the whole evening to analyzing some com-

plex task. At the same time, he was not a swot. On the contrary, he was considered the life and soul of the class and even a ringleader in some ways. They say that he could unexpectedly come in bright socks and a bow tie, and when he passed all his final exams, he jumped into the Fontanka river right in his school uniform. He was actively involved in sports — hockey, swimming, skiing. He performed in the school theater and played the guitar well, he was even going to create his own band with his friends.

On his first attempt, he entered the Leningrad Mechanical Institute (now the Baltic State Technical University "Voenmekh" named af-

ter D.F. Ustinov), from which he graduated in 1978 with a degree in engineering — radio mechanics. He demonstrated his activity and outstanding leadership qualities while still a student: he headed a student construction team, and in his senior years he was elected secretary of the institute's Komsomol committee. There, at the university, he also met his future wife Tatyana, they studied in the same group, and in their sixth year of education they got married.

According to the recollections of teachers, Naryshkin was a serious, thoughtful student, deeply delving into all the details, and considered it beneath his dignity to use cheat sheets. At the institute he developed a special type of well-structured thinking, which subsequently helped him to master quickly any area of work. It is not surprising that such a gifted young man was immediately noticed and offered to serve in intelligence, to which he agreed without hesitation. After graduating from the university, he was sent to courses at the Higher School of the KGB (now the FSB Academy of Russia), and in 1980 he was accepted into the intelligence department of the Leningrad Directorate of the KGB, where, by the way, he met Vladimir Putin.

In 1982, Sergey Yevgenievich was appointed assistant to the vice-rector for international relations at the Leningrad Polytechnic Institute (now the Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University). And in the mid-1980s, he went to Belgium, where he successfully worked for four years as an expert for the State

**"I remember how my grandmother, who was there for all the 900 days of the siege, in my school years told me about those events every day. I also have all of this in my memory and my heart."**

S.Y. Naryshkin

Committee for Science and Technology as part of the economic department of the USSR Embassy. Perhaps it was there that his multifaceted talent was first revealed, a synergy of the best qualities of a "techie" and a "humanitarian": a mathematical mindset, developed analytical skills and innate linguistic abilities.

Also there, abroad, that very artistic streak, which is apparently inherent in him, showed itself. Colleagues recollect how in the Soviet Embassy in Brussels Sergey Yevgenievich together with a group of young diplomats performed brilliantly in Leonid Filatov's play "The Tale of Fedot the Strelets."

After the collapse of the USSR, Sergey Yevgenievich returned to his native St. Petersburg, where he headed the Department of Foreign Economic Relations of the Committee of Economy and Finance of the St. Petersburg City Administration. In 1995, Naryshkin was invited to Promstroibank (acquired by VTB structures in 2005) to the post of head of the foreign investment department, and two years later he headed the investment department, then the Committee for Foreign Economic and International Relations of the Government of the Leningrad



The future intelligence officer. 1960  
With his mother Zoya Nikolayevna and elder brother Yura  
Brothers. Leningrad. 1973

Student, Komsomol member. 1976  
Activist of a student labour detachment. 1976  
The birth of a family. September 10, 1977



With his senior colleague, intelligence officer and poet A.G. Pshenichny. Brussels. 1980s

Venezuela. Caracas. April 18, 2013  
At an exhibition in the Russian Historical Society. February 21, 2019

his doctoral thesis (subject — “Foreign Investments and Development of the Russian Economy”). It should be noted that in all the positions he held, Sergey Yevgenievich remained exceptionally modest and easy to communicate with. A true intellectual: attentive, but demanding, first of all of himself, and also incredibly hard-working.

In 2016, Vladimir Putin, expressing special trust, offered Sergey Yevgenievich to head foreign intelligence. He gladly accepted this offer and has confidently led the SVR of Russia for eight years now. By his order, the process of technical re-equipment of the Service, the introduction of the latest, breakthrough technologies into intelligence activities has accelerated. Such an important area of work as interaction with foreign intelligence services has also received a powerful impetus. Today, largely due to his authority, the SVR maintains contacts with more than 100 partner structures, including Western ones. Moreover, this professional dialogue is not interrupted even at the peak of political tension, which allows us to solve the most pressing urgent tasks.

Given Sergey Yevgenievich's long-standing passion for history (since 2012 he has been the Chairman of the Russian Historical Society, and before that he headed the Commission under the President of Russia for Combating

Region, having worked there for more than seven years and achieved impressive success. Under his management, the region became one of the leaders in attracting foreign investment, their volume doubled from 1997 to 2003.

In 2004, Sergey Yevgenievich was invited to Moscow, after which his career rapidly took off: head of the Apparatus of the Government of Russia and Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office, deputy and then Chairman of the State Duma, permanent member of the Security Council of Russia. In the same 2004, he defended his Ph. D. thesis, and in 2010,



A present from friends during his operational youth

the Falsification of History for many years), it is not surprising that under his leadership the Service has stepped up its work on declassifying archival materials. Based on them, scientific works and documentary books are published, and new films about intelligence are released.

"It's good when there's a lot of work. I like this regime, it's the only way I feel like I'm alive."

S.Y. Naryshkin

In his free time (yes, it happens!) Sergey Yevgenievich still goes swimming, in winter he practises ice swimming and goes skiing. He is an avid theatergoer, loves jazz and bard songs (Vizbor, Vysotsky, Okudzhava). He prefers to relax with his family.

Considering Sergey Yevgenievich's vast work experience in various positions and in completely different structures, where he consistently demonstrated the highest results and the ability to achieve all the set goals, he can be called a Universal Soldier. But for us, SVR veterans, he is first and foremost a Professional. Exactly what a real intelligence officer should be: intellectual, attentive, sensitive, comprehensively developed, ready to master any profession and specialty if it is necessary for the cause. And everywhere, at every post, selflessly serving the Fatherland, giving all his self for the good of his beloved Russia.

Once again, Happy Anniversary, dear Sergey Yevgenievich! And only forward — to new Victories! 🇷🇺

At work, even in the sky  
Swimming — favourite sport





**29**  
October  
1929

On October 29, 1929, Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov, the first director of the SVR of Russia (1991-1996), was born in Kiev. In 1953 he graduated from the Arabic Department of the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies. In the 1960s, he worked as a journalist in the Middle East. In 1989 he became a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. As the head of the intelligence service in difficult years, he managed to preserve its traditions and combat potential, and expand its scope of activity. In 1996–1998 — Head of the Russian Foreign Ministry. From September 1998 to May 1999 — Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation. From 2001 to 2011 — Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Russian Federation. He was awarded the Order "For Merit to the Fatherland" I, II and III class, the Order of the Red Banner of Labor, the Order of the Badge of Honor, the Order of Friendship of Peoples, and many other awards, including foreign ones.



**24**  
November  
1949

On November 24, 1949, Vladimir Ivanovich Zavershinsky, one of the heads of foreign intelligence, Colonel-General, was born in the village of Tarutino, Chelyabinsk region. He joined the KGB of the USSR in 1970, graduated from the KGB Higher School in Minsk in 1971, and from the Red Banner Institute of the KGB of the USSR in 1977. He spent more than 10 years in foreign missions. He worked in the KGB of the USSR representative office at the Ministry for State Security of the GDR since 1989. In 1994 he became the head of illegal intelligence. From 2000 to 2008, he was the First Deputy Director of the SVR of Russia. In 2008–2013 — Assistant Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. He is a holder of many Soviet and Russian orders and medals, as well as state awards of the GDR and Afghanistan.



**31**  
October  
1924

On October 31, 1924, Boris Alexandrovich Solomatina, an outstanding intelligence officer, Major General, was born in Odessa. In 1942, he voluntarily joined the ranks of the Red Army, took part in the Battle of Kursk and the battles for East Prussia. In 1951, after graduating from MGIMO, he joined the Foreign Intelligence Service. He was sent on long-term missions to the USA, India, and Italy. He acquired a number of particularly valuable sources for cooperation. He was Deputy head of the Foreign Intelligence twice. He was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, the Order of the Red Banner of Labor, the Order of the Patriotic War I class, two Orders of the Red Star, and the badge "Honorary State Security Officer".



**6**  
December  
1899

On December 6, 1899, Naum Isaakovich Eitingon, a prominent Soviet intelligence officer of the first "wave", was born in the town of Shklov, Mogilev province. He joined the foreign department of the Cheka in 1920, worked as a deepcover agent in the USA, China, Turkey and France. Since 1932, he was the head of the undercover operations section of the INO OGPU. In 1936–1939 — Deputy chief of station, chief of station in Spain. Since July 1941, he was deputy chief of the Special Group of the NKVD of the USSR for organizing reconnaissance and sabotage work behind enemy lines. Under his leadership, the brilliant operative games "Monastery" and "Berezino" were held. In the post-war years, he led the fight against the nationalist underground in Lithuania and Western Belarus. He was awarded many orders and medals, including the commander's Order of Suvarov II class.

**31**  
October  
2009

On October 31, 2009, Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1233 "On the establishment of the heraldic sign — the emblem, flag and banner of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation" was signed. On December 15 of the same year, the President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev presented the Service Banner and the Standard of the Director of the Service to the Director of the SVR M.E. Fradkov in the Hall of the Order of St. George of the Grand Kremlin Palace (see photo).



**9**  
December  
1909

On December 9, 1909, Nikolay Petrovich Lysenkov, a Soviet intelligence officer, was born in the town of Balakovo, Saratov region. He joined the Foreign Intelligence Service in 1939, worked in Latvia and Finland. During the war, he worked in Iran, taking part in providing security for the participants of the Tehran Conference. In 1945–1950 — deputy chief of station, chief of station in Paris. Under his leadership, important documents were obtained, including the Marshall Plan. Since 1952, he was chief of station in New York. He recruited a number of valuable sources who provided strategic information about the US plans concerning the USSR. He was awarded the Orders of the Red Star and the Badge of Honor.



**6**  
November  
1904

On November 6, 1904, Mikhail Matveyevich Baturin, a prominent Soviet wartime intelligence officer, was born in Taganrog. In 1920, he joined the Red Army and served at the regimental headquarters, in the Special Department of the 11<sup>th</sup> Army. In 1929, after graduating from the Higher Border School, he joined the staff of the Border Guard Department of the Transcaucasian GPU. In 1937–1939, he studied at the Institute of Oriental Studies, then joined the Foreign Intelligence Service. In 1940, he went to Turkey, where he worked for seven years, including as a chief of station. He recruited about ten valuable sources. It was largely thanks to his efforts, that Ankara was prevented from entering into the war on the German side. He was awarded the Order of Lenin, two Orders of the Red Banner, Orders of the Red Banner of Labor, the Order of the Patriotic War I class and the Order of the Red Star.




**21**  
December  
1934

On December 21, 1934, Alexey Mikhailovich Kozlov, a talented deepcover intelligence officer, was born in the village of Oparino, Kirov region. He excelled in German at school. In 1959, after graduating from MGIMO, he was invited to join the Foreign Intelligence Service. From 1962, he worked as a deepcover agent, carrying out missions in 86 countries around the world. He obtained information about South Africa's nuclear programme. In 1980, as a result of betrayal, he was arrested, tortured and spent six months on death row in Pretoria. In 1982, he was exchanged for ten West German secret service agents and a South African officer. In 1987, he was sent on combat task back to NATO countries, where he remained for another ten years. In 2000, he was awarded the title Hero of the Russian Federation for his courage and heroism during special missions.

**22**  
November  
1909

On November 22, 1909, Alexander Mikhailovich Korotkov, a deepcover intelligence officer, Major General, was born in Moscow. He worked for the state security services since 1928. As a deepcover intelligence officer, he traveled to Paris, where he cultivated the Second Bureau of the French General Staff, and achieved concrete results. Before the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, he was deputy chief of station in Berlin. He was in contact with the leaders of the German anti-fascist underground ("Red Chapel"), from whom he received valuable information on Germany's preparations for an attack on the USSR. Since 1946 — Deputy head of the Foreign Intelligence Service, head of the illegal intelligence. In 1957–1961, he was a representative of the KGB of the USSR at the Ministry for State Security of the GDR. He was awarded the Order of Lenin, six Orders of the Red Banner, two Orders of the Red Star and other awards.



**22**  
December  
1924

On December 22, 1924, Vladimir Iosifovich Lkhov, a deepcover intelligence officer, was born in the village of Pichigviny in the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast of the Georgian SSR. In 1953 he graduated from the Faculty of Law at the Azerbaijan State University, and in 1957 he joined the special reserve of the KGB PGU. From 1962 he worked in a number of countries in Europe, Asia, and the East, heading an illegal station. He had valuable agents in touch and regularly received classified documentary information. On his return, he worked in the PGU's headquarters in senior positions. For his achievements he was awarded the Order of the Red Star, the Order of the Red Banner of Labor, the medal "For Military Merit", the badge "Honorary State Security Officer".



# The Korean nuclear issue: historical lessons

## On the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the 1994 Agreed Framework

Text by Konstantin Valerianovich Asmolov, Leading Researcher, Center for Korean Studies of Institute of China and Contemporary Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences

**Today, the development of the DPRK's nuclear potential is irreversible, but sometimes a question arises: was there any chance to prevent such developments? Only few remember that the current round of the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula is not the first, but the second. 30 years ago, the US and the DPRK had a chance to resolve this issue peacefully.**

### What preceded the conclusion of the Framework

In the late 1980s, “sensational” statements appeared in the American media that North Korea possessed a gas-cooled reactor of its own design, as well as a radiochemical plant capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium. These “revelations” coincided with negotiations on the construction of the first nuclear power plant in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) with the assistance of the USSR. In December 1985, Pyongyang joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), thereby removing the main obstacle to the implementation of the project.

In September 1988, the US authorities announced that, according to space intelligence reports, a nuclear facility was being built in the DPRK, presumably intended for processing nuclear fuel and extracting plutonium. Later, the IAEA confirmed the existence of such facilities and proposed opening them up for inspection. Pyongyang refused, and Moscow decided not to take risks and in 1990 recalled its specialists working at the construction.

In the early 1990s, against the backdrop of the invasion of Iraq, discussions began in the United States about whether North Korea had a military nuclear program and, if so, how

successful it was. CIA analysts were already claiming that Pyongyang had one or two atomic bombs, but satellite data and defectors' testimony remained the main sources of information. The North Koreans, however, took a dual position: on the one hand, they denied having their own nuclear program, on the other hand, they made several hints that the USSR's recognition of South Korea had effectively put an end to previous agreements in the defense sphere, and they were forced to seek an alternative to the Soviet “nuclear umbrella”.

A series of articles appeared in the Western press describing North Korea as “the next Iraq”. The CIA's view-

point was taken on trust, and calls for a preemptive attack began. The US claimed that the IAEA inspections of 1992–1994 had revealed “major discrepancies” with the data provided by the DPRK, and that the country allegedly had hidden stockpiles of irradiated uranium and plutonium extracted from it.

In February 1993, it was announced that some of the US strategic nuclear missiles had been redirected from the former Soviet Union to North Korea. And when in March of that year the DPRK declared its intention to withdraw from the NPT, it was immediately listed as a threat to American security. And this despite the fact that Part 1 of Article X of the NPT allowed Pyongyang to withdraw from the treaty if continued membership in it “jeopardized the supreme interests of the country”. The permanent threat of a nuclear strike from the US — what is that but a reasonable cause for withdrawal? Then followed a series of sharp exchanges that unleashed a spiral of escalation.

When the then head of the White House Bill Clinton was already preparing to start a military conflict, he was presented with a forecast of possible losses, which in the first three months of the war alone could amount to over 50 thousand killed and wounded among American soldiers and up to half a million among South Korean servicemen. And this did not include the casualties of North Korea, which would have been colossal. The financial damage was estimated at more than 60 billion dollars with no prospects for restoring what would have been destroyed.

Having visited the demilitarized zone on the border between two Koreas in July 1993, Clinton called it “the scariest place on Earth”. After that, the military scenario was revised and the first steps towards solving the prob-

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lem began. That same month, former US President Jimmy Carter flew to Pyongyang; his negotiations with the North Korean leadership resulted in the signing of the so-called Agreed Framework on October 21, 1994. Then the DPRK was “forgotten”, and its nuclear issue disappeared from the pages of the Western media for some time.

### The essence of the 1994 Agreed Framework

It should be noted right away that the Agreed Framework is not an international treaty with all the ensuing legal consequences. The word “agreed” gives a false idea of its status, though in essence, it is nothing more than a protocol of intent. Article 2 of the



“Look – the White House!” poster by the artist Park Ha-len (DPRK), 1982

The word “agreed” gives a false idea of its status, though in essence, it is nothing more than a protocol of intent. Article 2 of the Framework stated that the parties “would move” toward full normalization of relations, and under Article 3, the United States gave the DPRK guarantees of non-use of nuclear weapons.

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The Western public saw the Framework as a document according to which the North Koreans were to stop all work leading to the creation of nuclear weapons, but this interpretation is incorrect. North Korea froze its nuclear facilities in exchange for deliveries of fuel oil and a promise to build two 2,000 MW light water reactors in the DPRK, which could not serve as a source for obtaining

weapons-grade plutonium. The commissioning of the first reactor was scheduled for 2003, until that moment the Americans were obliged to annually supply North Korea with 500 thousand tons of fuel oil for conventional power plants.

The implementation of the agreements was entrusted to an international (consisting of representatives from the USA, South Korea and Japan) organization for the development of North Korean energy — KEDO (Korea Energy Development Organization), specially created in March 1995. The budget of KEDO was established at 3.6 billion dollars,

with Seoul taking on more than half of the costs, another billion allocated by the Japanese, and the USA securing general leadership. Theoretically, Russia had a chance to enter the project and significantly change its status, but Kozyrev’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs preferred not to interfere.

Overall the proposed concept seemed like a good way out of the crisis: the DPRK retained the right to peaceful nuclear energy and received the guarantees needed for integration into the international community. But the devil, as always, was in the details. Firstly, the Agreed Framework was never ratified by the US Senate, which formally allowed Washington to shirk its obligations, but to demand compliance with it from Pyongyang, for which no such “loopholes” were provided.

Secondly, the wording of the English text could be interpreted in two ways if necessary. Phrases such as “we will take all possible measures”, “we will move towards...”, “we will provide guarantees” did not contain specifics, and there were no sanctions for the non-fulfilment. Even the reactors were not to be built by the United States, but by an international consortium, for whose failures Washington did not bear direct responsibility. There was no mechanism for settling disputes in case the reactors were built too slowly or not at all. But it was assumed that the DPRK would receive fuel regularly all this time.

Thirdly, on July 8, 1994, i. e. even before the signing of the Framework, the founder and first leader of the DPRK Kim Il Sung passed away, as a result many in the West had a strong idea of the imminent collapse of the

Near the Atomic Energy pavillion at the Exhibition of achievements of national economy in Pyongyang. 2002



North Korean state, which urged Washington and its allies not to rush to fulfill their obligations. If North Korea was going to fall soon, what was the point in investing in it?

### Between 1994 and 2002

Taking into account that the US and Japan were not going to spend much right away and almost all the expenses for financing KEDO fell on the shoulders of South Korea, the implementation of the project looked doubtful from the very beginning. And after Seoul’s capabilities were undermined by the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the collapse of this venture was only a matter of time. Add to this the rumors that a significant part of KEDO’s budget was simply stolen. Anyway, the deadline for launching the light water reactor (2003) was missed: at the end of 2002, there was only a concrete foundation on the site.

In the West, there are two versions of what happened. According to the first version, objective difficulties, confusion in KEDO and the consequences of the default in the Republic of Korea played a role in it. According to the second, as noted above, the Americans did not intend to fulfill their obligations at all, expecting the imminent collapse of the DPRK. I would add that under Clinton there really could have been technical difficulties with the execution of the project, but when George W. Bush came to power, the policy line changed, and the United States started to boycott the implementation of the Agreed Framework.

This is evidenced, in particular, by the fact that during the first 20 months after the change of administration in Washington, there were practically no contacts between the US and the DPRK: the promised security guarantees “hung” in the air, and establish-

ing a dialogue at the diplomatic level was totally out of the question.

In addition, the Americans decided to unilaterally change the rules of the game by revising one of the key conditions of the deal. In particular, it was stated that in the current situation, fuel oil supplies to North Korea looked like sponsorship of a “rogue state”, and the fuel would be sent to the DPRK only in response to a change in the political situation and the implementation of democratic reforms. Pyongyang predictably refused and the US “cut off the pipe”. This is a crucial point. Before, the North Koreans were not concerned about delays in the construction of reactors, receiving the agreed volumes of fuel, but now they were left without both fuel oil or a nuclear power plant.

### The second round of the crisis

The story that Western audiences are accustomed to about the beginning of the second round of the nuclear crisis usually goes like this: “In 2003, against the backdrop of the US military’s successes in Iraq, North Korea announced that it had nuclear weapons, after which it expelled IAEA officials from the country, removed the seals from the nuclear reactor, and withdrew from the NPT”.

It is clear that the answer to the question “Who is to blame?” depends to a large extent on the “correct” choice of the date of the crisis’ beginning.

I propose to start counting from the moment when the special envoy of the US President J. Kelly accused Pyongyang of secretly conducting nuclear research and its representative allegedly openly admitted this to him. I would also like to remind readers of what preceded this event.

So, in the early 2000s, it was obvious that the nuclear power plant construction deadlines were being missed, and the closer the deadline, the higher the likelihood that the issue of violating the agreements would be raised by the North Koreans in a context unpleasant for their counterparties. Meanwhile, against the background of the successes of the second campaign in Iraq, hawks in the United States again began to think that the DPRK could well become the next target.

In the summer of 2002, US Secretary of State M. Albright announced that Washington supposedly was ready for serious negotiations with Pyongyang, but “new alarming information” was coming in that the DPRK was enriching uranium to create nuclear weapons. In October of the same year the already mentioned special envoy J. Kelly accused the North Koreans of violations of the Agreed Framework, and they allegedly acknowledged their validity.

According to J. Kelly himself, the North Korean authorities first denied having a uranium enrichment program, then admitted to it. However, the text of this “admission” is well

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**On February 10, 2005, North Korea admitted for the first time that it had nuclear weapons of its own, and on March 3, said it no longer considered itself bound by a moratorium on ballistic missile testing.**

known. Deputy Foreign Minister of the DPRK Kang Sok-ju literally told J. Kelly the following: “North Korea has the right to possess not only nuclear weapons, but also any other types of weapons, including more powerful ones, in order to protect its sovereignty and its right to exist from the ever-increasing nuclear threat from the United States”.

In these words I see neither direct indications that North Korea already had a nuclear bomb by that time, nor hints that work on its creation was then being carried out. Add to this that no one has ever presented any evidence showing that the DPRK enriched uranium and/or tried to obtain weapons-grade plutonium while the

Agreement was in force. This is important. If the Americans had had at least some facts that could be presented as evidence, then, by analogy with the Iraq War Logs, Western propaganda would have actively used them both then and much later.

In the wake of accusations against the North Koreans of violating the “spirit of the Framework” (the text contains no mention of the ban on uranium enrichment), the US “forgot” that the Bush administration did not consider it a document with legal force. Now the White House saw it as a full-fledged treaty violated by the “regime of Kim Jong II”. The response was not long to arrive. North Korea warned that they would

abandon the moratorium on ballistic missile tests and denounce the 1953 Armistice Agreement, as well as attack American military facilities “anywhere in the world” if Washington decided to launch a preemptive strike. Then, as already mentioned, North Korea expelled IAEA officials from the country and withdrew from the NPT.

In retaliation for these actions of Pyongyang, presented in the media as sudden and irrational, the KEDO Board of Directors announced the termination of its obligations to North Korea, after which the organization’s work was curtailed. Later, KEDO even tried to make the DPRK pay it a penalty for the disruption of such an important construction project, “on which significant sums had been spent”. So the answer to the question “Who is to blame?” does not really fit into the framework of Western propaganda. The fact that the DPRK’s counterparties violated their obligations is indisputable, and the extent of these violations (in fact, complete non-fulfillment) gave Pyongyang the moral right to refuse to uphold its part of the deal.

### The 2005 Joint Statement

Here we come to the second round of the crisis, which continues to this day and initially involved six-party talks with representatives of the DPRK, the USA, China, the Republic of Korea, Russia and Japan. Although this story is beyond the scope of the publication, it should be noted that in 2005 the parties could have reached a compromise on similar terms, but the new agreements were also torpedoed by Washington.

Korean People’s Army’s launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles during a parade in Pyongyang. 2017



RF President Vladimir Putin and DPRK President of the State Affairs Kim Jong Un. Pyongyang. June 19, 2024



On February 10, 2005, North Korea admitted for the first time that it had nuclear weapons of its own, and on March 3, said it no longer considered itself bound by a moratorium on ballistic missile testing. “Dialogue with the United States ceased in 2001 with the coming to power of the Bush administration, which means that we have the right to resume the tests”. This compelled the White House to develop a new strategy. They decided to concentrate efforts not on direct pressure (by this time the six-party talks had reached a dead end after three rounds), but on forcing Pyongyang to “lay its cards on the table” and provide real evidence of how far its nuclear program had advanced.

The change in approach bore fruit. The new, fourth, round of the “six-party talks” ended on September 19, 2005, with the signing of a joint statement recognizing North Korea’s right to peaceful use of nuclear energy. At the same time, Pyongyang confirmed its commitment to renounce nuclear weapons, pledged to curtail nuclear weapons programs, return to the NPT and accept IAEA inspections. In exchange, the other participants promised to provide the DPRK with energy assistance. The text contained another important point: the United States and North Korea declared their intention to respect each other’s sovereignty, peacefully coexist and strive to normalize relations. As the head of the Chinese delegation stated, the adoption of this statement was the most significant result in more than two years of negotiations in the six-party format.

However, already in the fifth round of talks (November 9–11, 2005), when Pyongyang promised to postpone nuclear weapons tests as part of efforts to turn the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, the United States announced sanctions against the DPRK, freezing the accounts of eight of its companies, and emphasized that even in the event of North Korea’s nuclear disarmament, normalization of relations with it would remain impossible due to the country’s failure to respect human rights and the absence of democracy.

In retaliation, the North Koreans “slammed the door” and a pause in the negotiations ensued that has lasted for almost 20 years. During this time, Pyongyang has conducted a series of nuclear tests, firmly securing its place in the “nuclear club”. Today, the development of its nuclear program has reached such a level that the Western rhetoric about the “complete, verifiable and irreversible” denuclearization of the DPRK looks an absolute fantasy. Well, that’s the reality, but, as they say, there was a chance. And it’s certainly not North Korea that should be blamed for missing it. ❖

**Today, the development of its nuclear program has reached such a level that the Western rhetoric about the “complete, verifiable and irreversible” denuclearization of the DPRK looks an absolute fantasy.**

# Digital currencies

## Classification, risks and prospects

Text by Sergey Anatolyevich Andryushin,  
Chief Researcher, Institute of Economics, Russian Academy of Sciences

At the recent BRICS summit in Kazan, the member countries of the association agreed to accelerate work on the creation of an independent financial system which will be alternative to the Western system and based on digital financial assets (DFA) and digital currencies. India, China and many other members of the union are conducting test operations with digital currencies, and Russia is preparing to introduce them into mass circulation from July 1, 2025. So what are digital currencies, what are their advantages over conventional money and what are the risks associated with their introduction?

### Classification of digital currencies

First, a little theory. Digital currencies can be state-owned or private, based on tokens (digital codes) or digital units of account (digital records) designed to measure the value (imputed value) of a digital monetary asset. State-owned digital currencies are central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), private ones are tokenized deposits of commercial banks and virtual currencies<sup>1</sup> (cryptocurrencies and stablecoins). The latter are cre-

ated in a distributed network (distributed ledger technology, public and private blockchains)<sup>2</sup> on programmable digital platforms using smart contracts<sup>3</sup> and cryptographic methods. At the same time, the features of digital currencies are determined by the corresponding financial infrastructure (traditional or new), with the help of which they are issued, circulated and withdrawn.

A tokenized deposit is a digital analogue of a bank deposit, which is converted into a tokenized cur-

rency at par value in a 1:1 ratio. The purpose of its issuance is to expand the accessibility of the retail payment and settlement system for the population and businesses. Such deposits can be put into circulation by financial intermediaries (commercial banks) through applications and services of their programmable platforms. Using smart contracts, tokenized deposits allow to regulate the balance of aggregate demand and money supply in the real economy more flexibly than fiat currencies.

Cryptocurrencies are private digital currencies created and recorded in a distributed network by unidentifiable issuers of programmable platforms through a network of public/

private blockchains. When generating a storage address (crypto wallet) and verifying the authority to conduct transactions with it, asymmetric cryptography algorithms are used,

including ring signatures or the zero-knowledge proof. At the same time, the system itself does not contain information about wallet owners (addresses or accounts can be generat-



<sup>1</sup> A virtual currency is a digital representation of an imputed value that can be used as a means of payment, a unit of account, or a means of saving, but does not have the status of legal tender at the national level.

<sup>2</sup> Distributed ledger technology (DLT) and blockchain are decentralized forms of receiving, exchanging and storing information, within which each participant in a distributed network can own a full copy of the registry, has the ability to synchronize it based on a consensus protocol and to gain access to the history of all transactions. At the same time, the main difference between DLT and blockchain is that with DLT, a situation is possible when one governing body manages the work of all nodes and controls all transactions generated in the distributed network.

<sup>3</sup> A smart contract is a self-executing application on a programmable platform that can initiate certain actions when the parties to the contract fulfill certain pre-agreed conditions.

**Payments in cryptocurrency are made without intermediaries and are irreversible – there is no mechanism for returning funds from an already completed transaction. At the same time, accounts (crypto wallets) cannot be blocked or seized.**

ed autonomously without an Internet connection), which makes cryptocurrencies more similar to cash than to a non-cash payment instrument.

Payments in cryptocurrency are made without intermediaries and are irreversible – there is no mechanism for returning funds from an already completed transaction. At the same time, accounts (crypto wallets) cannot be blocked or seized. However, cryptocurrencies are not backed by anything and are extremely volatile, their value is determined by supply and demand from market participants. Another obstacle to the legalization of cryptocurrencies is their fragmentation, which does not allow them to be quickly scaled without compromising the security of the system. All these form a serious obstacle to the use of cryptocurrencies as a means of payment.

Unlike cryptocurrencies, which typically do not have an identifiable issuer, a relatively recent development is a special type of virtual currency called stablecoins, which represent a claim on the underlying assets (funds or other rights) of a specific issuer. To maintain a stable value of such digital currencies, they can be tied to the price of any liquid underlying asset (fiat money, securities, precious

metals, commodity or raw material stocks, and even other cryptocurrencies)<sup>4</sup>, as well as to algorithmic technologies that regulate the volume of their market supply.

Today, stablecoins backed by underlying assets are the most common form of private digital currencies, claiming to be the leader in this segment. Their issuers manage the underlying collateral, coordinate the creation and repayment of such payment obligations. At the same time, stablecoins do not have the support of central banks as lenders of last resort, and not all of them are subject to the loss-covering measures applied to bank deposits. Naturally, trust in such financial instruments is not absolute.

However, in recent years, virtual currencies (cryptocurrencies and stablecoins) have been actively penetrating modern payment and financial systems, due to their use to perform individual monetary functions, the development of P2P services, custodial storage services, payment services, derivative instruments on virtual currencies (futures, options, swaps), as evidenced by the growing number of verified users of virtual currencies and the existing positive expectations in this market.

<sup>4</sup> The most famous stablecoins are Tether (USDT) and TrueUSD (TUSD). These digital coins are backed by fiat money, and the mechanism of their emission is quite simple: an intermediary (third party) accepts a deposit in dollars or another agreed fiat currency and issues into circulation as many cryptocurrency tokens as were received on deposit. When cashing out a token, the third party, sending dollars to the new owner, “burns” the token, withdrawing it from circulation.

## Central Bank Digital Currencies

CBDCs are direct obligations of issuing central banks, presented in digital form and denominated in national currency units. They can be retail or wholesale. If the former, considered as digital banknotes, are aimed at conducting transactions between individuals, the latter are tokenized reserves of central banks intended for wholesale/retail settlements with commercial banks and other financial market entities, including treasuries.

In essence, the CBDC is a third form of money that will be fully equivalent to cash and non-cash money, ensuring equal coexistence with them. At the same time, this new form of money will also be backed by gold and foreign exchange reserves and other real and financial assets of the central bank, which makes it as reliable and familiar as other central bank money (coins, banknotes and reserves), and the rate predictable.

The CBDC has a number of advantages. They include lower costs for system administration, which for ordinary users will result in cheaper payments, and the ability to conduct transactions without an Internet connection (offline). Increased reliability is also guaranteed, since all transactions are carried out using distributed ledger technology and if technical failures occur in a single node of the distributed network, information about transactions will not be lost, and payments will not disappear.

In addition, the introduction of the CBDC will allow central banks to regain control over the money supply, which is actively increased by commercial banks as the result of lending. Therefore, the flow of non-cash money into private digital currencies can provoke inflation risks and a weakening of the national currency.

The creation of a single centralized system based on the CBDC, to which all private digital currencies will be tied, on the contrary, will allow to promptly eliminate inflation, to stabilize the exchange rate, and to attract new investments into the real economy.

Another important point. Given that the CBDC can be coded for specific expenses or categories, mass use of such currencies will significantly increase transparency and stability in the financial sector, improve the effectiveness of the fight against corruption, money laundering and terrorist financing. Within a CBDC financial system, it is possible to more effectively solve problems with scalability and technological failures, as well as issues related to the integration and compatibility of sovereign and international financial systems. The main thing is to give the CBDC the function of a unit of cross-border settlements, which will eliminate such significant shortcomings of existing cross-border payment mechanisms as low transaction processing speed, high fees, limited access and insufficient transaction transparency.

Currently, more than 100 countries are working on launching their own CBDCs; pilot projects are underway in over thirty countries, including Russia; and CBDCs have already been put into operation in four countries – Nigeria, Zimbabwe, the Bahamas and Jamaica.

Among BRICS members and partner countries, India, China, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have launched their pilot CBDC projects. Brazil, Iran, Kazakhstan and Turkey are close to this.

Russia is among the leaders in this area. The digital ruble project launched by the Bank of Russia in 2020 has been in the active pilot stage for several years. In August




2023, our country adopted laws related to the introduction of the digital ruble and began testing operations with real digital rubles on a limited circle of users. This year, new operations became available to pilot participants: payment by dynamic QR-code and transfers between legal entities. Currently, about nine thousand Russian citizens, more than 1,200 companies, as well as 12 banks, including such large ones as VTB Bank, Promsvyazbank and others, are participating in the Central Bank's pilot.

## Potential risks

Considering that work with the CBDC directly depends on modern information technologies (distributed ledgers, smart contracts, decentralized applications and cryptography), their mass implementation may create risks that can undermine the functioning of payment and settlement mechanisms and financial systems. Let us note only some of these risks that deserve special attention from regulators. These are possible technological failures that occur at both the hardware

“The era of decentralization is coming; the world is moving in this direction. In addition to new opportunities for managing corporate and personal finances, the introduction of digital currencies is a qualitative shift in the field of global payments. We are on the threshold of creating an international decentralized system of settlements in digital currencies, where there will be no monopolists.”

Vadim Kulik,  
Deputy President-Chairman of the Board of VTB Bank



harmonization of the legislation are converging standards for the identification and verification of owners or recipients of digital currencies, and recognizing the identification results in order to combat the legalization of criminal proceeds and the financing of terrorism. At the same time, the identification standards should include the requirements of the Unified Biometric System (UBS), the Digital Profile and the Open Data model with recommended application.

Given the growing distrust in the reliability of the existing global financial system based on the US dollar, the initiative of the BRICS member countries related to the creation of an independent settlement and payment infrastructure is currently becoming more than relevant.

Thirdly, implementation of the CBDC both in the country and within the BRICS Bridge must be accompanied by transfer compatibility of BRICS digital currencies between internal

platforms, as well as within the common transnational network. Only under these conditions will participants of the new independent payment system be guaranteed more efficient cross-border settlements, achieved through low fees, high transaction processing speed, expanded user access to a single multicurrency platform coupled with increased transparency of transactions carried out in the network. 🚀



and software, network or consensus levels, as well as problems related to the scalability of the system, compatibility of technological standards and financial infrastructure.

Thus, the incompatibility of technological standards used, for example, in the EAEU or BRICS countries may complicate cross-border payment transactions. Moreover, it is highly undesirable to resort to intermediaries or use technologies that are poorly compatible with the financial infrastructure of central banks. This may result in dependence on technological companies that provide payment services, which in turn will lead to the fact that payment and settlement processes will again become very expensive, slow and non-transparent.


### Summing up

Given the growing distrust in the reliability of the existing global financial system based on the US dollar, the initiative of the BRICS member countries related to the creation of an independent settlement and payment infrastructure and a single (or multilateral) multicurrency platform for cross-border payments (BRICS Bridge) is currently becoming more than relevant. At the same time, there are many pitfalls in the implementation of this project, which the Bank of Russia and other specialized structures should actively work on eliminating with all their foreign partners.

Firstly, when introducing technologies, supporting operations in sovereign CBDCs, it is important to lay

down comparable, or better yet, single technological standards, a coordinated design of the payment infrastructure, a uniform transaction register, as well as unified packages of legal documents (rules, regulations) and common approaches to management, regulation and supervision of payment systems. In the future, this will ensure not only the “seamless” conduct of cross-border transfers, but also rapid bilateral and multilateral clearing of CBDCs issued by the central banks of the BRICS member countries.

Secondly, it is necessary to harmonize the regulatory and legislative requirements of the participating countries regarding the functioning of the CBDC in the cross-border settlement system. The key elements of the



**President of InfoWatch Group  
Natalia Kasperskaya:**

**“We still are not  
aware of many risks  
of digitalization”**

**On January 1, 2025, Decree of the President of Russia No. 166 “On measures to ensure technological independence and security of the critical information infrastructure of the Russian Federation” comes into force, introducing a ban on the use of foreign software (SW) at significant critical information infrastructure (CII) facilities. “Razvedchik” asked the Chairperson of the Board of the Association of Software Developers “Domestic Software”, President of InfoWatch group of companies Natalia Kasperskaya whether the IT industry is ready to switch to Russian products.**

**Natalia Ivanovna, tell us about the situation with import substitution in the InfoWatch company. Are you ready to work in the new context?**

Decree No. 166 concerns critical information infrastructure facilities, and we are not one of them yet. InfoWatch is a relatively small company, with only 500 people on staff, and we do not do any top-secret things. This means that for us the rules are somewhat relaxed.

But let me remind you that in addition to Decree No. 166, the President signed Decree No. 250, which introduces a ban on the use of foreign-made information security tools for federal government bodies, state-owned companies, strategic and backbone enterprises (the list approved by the Government currently includes

more than 1,300 such organizations). This ban also comes into force on January 1, 2025.

And since we develop information security tools, we are also actively substituting imports. In particular, we have already supported national operating systems in our products (mainly RED OS, ALT Linux and Astra Linux), built on the open source Linux OS, and are now expanding the functionality to the level that was in our products for Microsoft Windows. Considering that we were writing modules for Windows for over twenty years, it is very difficult to transfer everything to Linux quickly. We started this work even before SVO, then sped up and somewhere around mid-2022 we released the first version of our products on Linux. Now the fifth version is already coming out, so we are quickly catching up.

#### **Natalya Ivanovna Kasperskaya**

Was born on February 5, 1966 in Moscow to a family of engineers. She graduated from the Faculty of Applied Mathematics of the Moscow Institute of Electronic Engineering. During her studies, she met her future husband, Eugene Kaspersky, with whom she founded the company Kaspersky Lab in 1997. She served as its CEO for over 10 years (1997-2007). In 2007, she left the business, sold her stake in the Lab, and bought out the subsidiary InfoWatch, which she has been successfully running for over 20 years.





Today we are talking not about hacker attacks, but about vendor attacks, that is, attacks by the manufacturer. A striking example of such an attack was the explosives placed in pagers that had been delivered to Lebanon.

How would you characterize the situation with import substitution in the IT industry as a whole and which areas are facing the most difficulties?

Our weakest point is hardware, which is quite understandable. Processors, motherboards, and video cards are not produced in Russia, so here we are mainly talking about domestic assembly, similar to car assembly. The Ministry of Industry and Trade has even come up with a similar rating system.

However, even if almost everything except the processor is made in Russia, such equipment, strictly speaking, cannot be considered domestic. Because the entire “brain” of a computer or any other “smart” device is in the processor. Consequently, the presence of undeclared functions, in other words, backdoors, cannot be ruled out.

Moreover, today we are talking not about hacker attacks, but about vendor attacks, that is, attacks by the manufacturer. A striking example of such an attack was the explosives placed in pagers that had been delivered to Lebanon. This is not a computer backdoor, but a physical one, but computer ones can now be no less malicious. For example, they can turn off the device at the right moment or provoke its failure, put it into resonance. In addition, if there is an Internet connection, the device is guaranteed to transmit information somewhere to the side.

This is a completely new level of threats, and few people are talking about it yet, since it is unclear how to import-substitute all the hardware. So far, processors for mass-market computers and high-performance equipment are not made in our country.

#### What about software?

As for software, things are much better. When Russia started working on import substitution systematically, the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media created industrial competence centers for import substitution in various fields: mechanical engineering, metallurgy, transport, communications and media, finance, education, and so on — a total of 16 centers. Subject matter experts were invited to each, who compiled large tables comparing foreign solutions and the presence or absence of Russian analogues. Then, enterprises could receive a subsidy from the state for the purchase and modification of the required software.

Over two years, the register of national products has grown from nine thousand to 22 thousand items. Now, there are domestic solutions in almost all software classes. The issue is not so much the availability of products as their refinement to meet the needs of end users. From this point of view, I would divide all software into four readiness levels. The first is Russian software equals the world level or even surpasses it. And we have quite a few such products. For example, the Yandex search engine, CFT or Diasoft financial technologies, as well as the Kaspersky antivirus, InfoWatch information protection systems and Positive Technologies code analysis. In general, in Russia, all information security is very strong. Since the times of the USSR, there has been a strong cryptography school.

The second level is when the functionality of the analogues is slightly less than the original and requires some refinement. This category includes most software available on the market (for example, office systems like NOT or R7), and the situation here can basically be amended.

The third level is products that require significant improvements. As a rule, these are the areas where foreign software has traditionally dominated, and our developers either made some additions to it or solved narrow problems. This category includes design systems (CAD, CAE), engineering project management systems and other engineering software, as well as large ERP systems (*note: automated*

*enterprise management systems*). To bring them up to the level of global brands, you'll need several years; it is very difficult to speed up here. By the way, in the field of information security this category includes firewalls.

And the fourth level is when we have no analogues at all. These are either areas where there is no commercial interest, i. e. the software is mostly distributed free of charge (for example, programming languages, compilers), or these are highly specialized products, for example, for agriculture or the aviation industry.

That is, common users should not expect significant changes after the Presidential decree comes into force, should they?

You could say so. Ordinary citizens face no requirements to switch to national software, but you can't buy foreign software now either. That is, the familiar Western programs will be used inertially for some time. But gradually, we will all switch to national software on our home computers, to more or less acceptable analogues of Windows, MS Office and so on.

InfoWatch is one of the industry leaders. What development areas are your priorities today?

Our company, like a two-headed eagle, has two main areas. Now, however, a third head has begun to grow (*laughs*)... The first area is data leak protection. What we have been doing since our foundation. This is our product for protecting confidential information and preventing its leakage beyond the organization. Over twenty years, the product has evolved into a full-fledged enterprise information security system, which, besides data leak protection, is capable of identifying intruders and disloyal employees, categorizing information within the company, and preventing information risks.

Now we are moving towards automation and want to make a security specialist's life easier so that he does not spend a lot of time analyzing suspicious situations, but can quickly understand, by using InfoWatch tools, what the problems are and think how to solve them. This is relevant both due to the shortage of personnel and the fact that tasks in the se-



At the BIS Summit 2024 conference. Moscow. September 19, 2024

curity sphere have become more complex; often security service employees simply do not have appropriate skills to conduct a deep analysis of incidents.

At the same time, we are creating an open data protection platform that can analyze data from any products, including third-party ones — national ones, of course. We currently have 87 partnerships — the largest number on the market. The openness of the platform is our fundamental point.

Another InfoWatch's area is protection of automated process control systems, that is, protection of all the software that is installed at industrial enterprises, no matter whether it is a pharmaceutical company or a brewery. This

#### InfoWatch

InfoWatch is a Russian company specializing in information security in the corporate sector. It was founded in 2003 as a subsidiary of Kaspersky Lab, and has been a separate company since 2007. According to some estimates, it controls up to 40% of the national data protection systems market, and a quarter of its clients are government agencies. Main products — InfoWatch Traffic Monitor (information data leak protection), InfoWatch Activity Monitor (incident investigation system), InfoWatch Data Discovery (data storage audit), InfoWatch ARMA (process control system protection), etc.

area appeared in Russia about eight years ago and at first it was not in great demand. But following 2022 and a series of massive cyberattacks, everyone realized how vulnerable automated process control systems are and that they require additional means of protection, because now 99% of all automated process control systems in Russia are foreign-made.

Our task is to prevent external attacks and, if possible, protect against threats from the manufacturer. Statistics on hacker attacks on industrial systems in Russia are, of course, classified, but, according to indirect signs, there has been a significant increase since 2022. And the threat model has changed: if earlier attackers were mainly engaged in extortion, now they are trying to commit sabotage, to cause highest possible damage.

One of the central elements of our security system is an industrial firewall (*note: a hardware and software system that allows to control network traffic*). After the start of the SVO, when CISCO, Check Point and other foreign firewall manufacturers left Russia, our clients began to contact us and say: "We installed your firewall in the corporate perime-

ter and we liked everything." So suddenly we found ourselves in a market we had not even thought about, and now, it turns out, a third "head" is growing — a corporate firewall. It is a new development area.

**Before the SVO, you were conducting quite a vigorous international expansion.**

Our activity in Europe didn't work right away. We started there back in 2007, "hang around" and quickly left the market because of the laws prohibiting interference in private life (let me remind you, we are making a system for intercepting and analyzing information that can be regarded as interference). Then we turned to the East: we worked in Dubai, made attempts to sell in Malaysia and India, but things didn't go well. We did not have time to bring the Dubai office "in the black" when COVID hit. And it is impossible to work with Arabs remotely, so we closed the office.

**Are you going to re-enter the foreign market?**

Now we are mainly developing the near abroad area and are thinking about moving somewhere further to Asia — to Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia. To be honest, we haven't figured out how to work with China yet.

**InfoWatch is considered one of the best employers on the market. How do you attract personnel? Have you had "relocants" ebbs and flows?**

How do we attract personnel? First of all, by offering an interesting work and salaries which we try to keep at an adequate level. We have a good social package. For example, in the office there is a cafe with free drinks, a gym, a massage therapist, a doctor. We pay for employees' lunches, support them in difficult life situations. In addition, we do our best to make life in the office interesting: we hold joint events, celebrate holidays.

As for the relocants... You know, in March 2022, we had no outflow at all, no one left. After the announcement of partial mobilization, yes, there were several who left, less than 5% of the total staff, and many of them came back soon, by the way. We parted with those who

remained abroad, because the specific nature of our work is information security, you know.

**What other problems does our IT industry face today: shortage of personnel, brain drain, low salaries?..**

Well, low salaries are definitely not about the Russian IT market! They have been growing continuously for the last twenty years and have now reached approximately the European level. But there really is a shortage of personnel, and it is caused by a number of reasons. The first and main one is indiscriminate digitalization. Today, every bank and telecom operator declares itself an IT company. Like, we will now write our own operating system or some other software, for example, with artificial intelligence. It is trendy now. But since those very banks do not know much about it, they allocate huge sums of money, hire blockheads who, except beautiful reports, do not produce anything worthwhile. It creates an illusion, an imitation of work. But it takes away enormous resources, the competition for personnel grows still more.

Another result of digitalization is a huge number of doubling developments. For example, now there are 28 messengers, 34 operating systems, seven data leak protection systems, five voice speakers in Russia. And the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media does not take any countermeasures. On the contrary, they see it as fair competition, arguing that the "hand of the market" will regulate everything. It would be fine if we had time for it. But we need solutions right now, not years later! As a result, specialists do not go to priority areas, but are "dispersed" across the same type of work.

**You mentioned the negative consequences of mass digitalization. What other risks does the widespread introduction of IT technologies and solutions entail?**

Firstly, no one wants to think about electricity. Imagine a drone flying into a power line or substation, power system collapses and so does digitalization. That is, if we, as the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media wants, completely abandon paper information carriers and switch to digital ones,

it will be impossible to work when the power goes out. The entire economy will be paralyzed.

Secondly, it is remote control and the associated risks of external intrusion. Take the same Internet of Things. On the one hand, everything is very convenient: robot vacuum cleaners with network control, TVs with Internet access. But a "smart" TV is a real spy in the house! It recognizes voices, gestures, faces, watches what you do in the room or bedroom. And it all uploads somewhere to the cloud. It's okay if you are an ordinary citizen, but what if you are a high official?

Some risks are associated with the widespread introduction of biometrics. In the context of the rapid development of deepfakes, that is, counterfeits, it is at least strange to impose biometrics on people. Let's take the idea of paying "with your face" in banks. There are currently limits on payments using biometrics, but as soon as the limits are lifted and it becomes possible to write off millions from an account "with your face", imagine what will happen?! There are already plenty of programs that make such high-quality deepfakes that it is impossible to detect them. And there is no solution to this problem yet.


Finally, total control is another meaningful aspect. Yes, it is convenient for a functionary when a citizen is wearing an "electronic collar" that allows tracking their behavior, contacts, transactions... But I am deeply convinced that total digitalization is not just ambiguous, it's harmful, first of all from the point of view of human rights and liberties. We still do not even realize many risks of digitalization. It should be implemented only where it is really necessary. 🚩

Interviewed  
by Vladislav Ilyin

« Total control is another meaningful aspect. Yes, it is convenient for a functionary when a citizen is wearing an "electronic collar" that allows tracking their behavior, contacts, transactions... But I am deeply convinced that total digitalization is not just ambiguous, it's harmful.

At the BIS Summit  
2024 conference.  
Moscow.  
September 19, 2024





Deep cover intelligence officers  
Artyom and Anna Dultsev:

“Deep cover intelligence  
officers always walk the line.  
And beyond the line. It is a  
conscious risk”

On August 1, 2024, our deep cover intelligence officers Artyom and Anna Dultsev returned to Moscow from Slovenia after 19 months of imprisonment, as well as their two children, 11-year-old Sophia and 9-year-old Daniel, who only on the plane found out that they were Russian. “Razvedchik” decided to meet this amazing family to ask them about their adaptation in their homeland and their future plans.

*Artyom, Anna, it's been more than four months since you returned home. Tell us what you're doing, how are the kids, do they like Russia and have they started learning Russian?*

*Artyom:* You know, so many things have happened during this time that I have the feeling that we have returned a year or two ago. Perhaps this indicates that our adaptation is coming to an end.

*Anna:* We visited all our relatives, went on holiday in Sochi, visited Saint Petersburg... And the children are very happy in Russia. They learned that they have a big family — they have grandparents, whom they missed so much abroad.

Now they are surrounded by constant care, love of all their relatives and feel truly at home.

In September, Sophia and Daniel went to school. They learn Russian with great interest, they study daily with an accelerated program. There are results already — they have started reading books in Russian.

*And how do you communicate with them at home? Still in Spanish?*

*Anna:* We mustn't speak Spanish, the teachers will scold us (laughs). In fact, it's all mixed up

for now. Especially if we need to say something quickly — then we speak Spanish, but when there's time for explanations — of course, we speak Russian.

*Do you ever touch on what happened in conversation or is it now a closed topic for you and the children?*

*Anna:* No, we often talk about it, remember certain moments. The children continue to ask questions, including about us and our profession. We answer everything honestly, we tell them everything openly. And, you know, the children accepted it, accepted that their parents are intelligence officers, and now they are even glad that they are Russian and proud of it.

*Not all couples of deep cover intelligence officers dare to have children. How difficult was this decision for you?*

*Artyom:* We never had any doubts about whether we wanted children or not. Of course, we planned it from the very beginning, it was only a question of time. Considering all the circumstances, I think everything went optimally for us.

*Anna:* We are both from large families and we always wanted children.

#### Artyom and Anna Dultsev

Artyom Dultsev was born in 1981 in Bashkiria and graduated from a Ural university. Anna Dultseva was born in Nizhny Novgorod and received a journalism degree there. In 2009, they received an offer to serve in intelligence, following which they got special training for three years. Since 2012, they worked abroad in special conditions. They were arrested in December 2022 in Slovenia and spent 19 months in prison. On August 1, 2024, they returned to their homeland with their children as a result of an exchange. By decree of the President of Russia, they were awarded the Order of Courage.



Nizhny Novgorod.  
December 10, 2004

Let us turn back to those difficult 19 months. What was the most difficult thing in prison and what kept you going?

**Artyom:** We were supported by the understanding that the children needed our help, that we had to get through this difficult period together.

**Anna:** The most difficult thing was the complete lack of contact with the children for the first three weeks after the arrest. We were detained on December 5 [2022], and were only allowed to say goodbye to them. The next time I was able to call them was on the 26th. All this time, the children were kept in a crisis center, where minors from dysfunctional families are usually taken in Slovenia. You can imagine what the situation was like there... Later, when it became obvious that the negotiation process for our release was dragging on, they were sent to an orphanage.

**Artyom:** About a month later, the lawyers managed to get us permission to meet in person. The children were brought to us once a week, alternately to the men's and women's prisons, since we were kept separately. Communication was limited to one hour in a specially designated room. Then phone calls were added, including video calls.

**Anna:** To support the children and each other, we came up with a motto: "Somos fuertes, somos una familia" (Spanish: "We are strong, we are one family"), which we ended all our conversations with.

Did you feel despair?

**Artem:** No, never. Only concern for the children, and only at the beginning, until we established contact with them. Overall, there was deep confidence that everything would be resolved, that we would eventually return home safely. We knew for sure that the Service would do everything to rescue us as soon as possible. So we prepared ourselves for patience, tried to achieve acceptable conditions for the children, and waited.

**Anna:** Psychologically, the support of the SVR representative in Slovenia was very helpful. He often visited us in prison, reported on the progress of negotiations on exchange, and told us that options were being worked out for how to send Sophia and Daniel to Russia.

When it became clear that this was impossible — the CIA decided to keep our children "hostage" — the Service representative and his wife took care of them as if they were their own for a year and a half. Several times a month, they took Sophia and Daniel from the orphanage for almost the entire day, walked with them, and organized family celebrations. Then they showed us photos from these events, we saw that the children were happy, and we also felt calmer. We are very grateful for this!

We were also lucky with our lawyers (there were three of them!), who turned out to be not only professionals, but also very humane people. Thanks to them, we were allowed to call and meet the children, although at first the judge forbade everything. In addition, they also often took our children for walks, understanding that there was an aggressive atmosphere in the orphanage. And all this despite the fact that, as we know, serious pressure was exerted on the lawyers, there were even designs to open a criminal case against one of them, there were searches for levers to weaken our defense.

Did they try to put pressure on you and Artyom?

**Anna:** When it became clear that a quick exchange would not take place, a woman came to the prison, introduced herself as a social services employee and started telling us that they were going to give our children to a foster family. Most of these families live in rural areas, are engaged in subsistence farming, and they really need workers. In addition, the state pays them extra, so they willingly take in other people's children, but the attitude towards them, as you understand, is almost like slaves. This is the kind of family they wanted to give our children to.

Later, the lawyers told us that adoption of foreign children is prohibited in Slovenia, so Sophia and Daniel were in no danger. But that woman, of course, knowing the nuances, still tried to intimidate us.

Did they offer cooperation?

**Artyom:** They offered, of course. But I had a strong feeling that the local special services didn't understand what to do with us. They simply said: you know what we need, if you cooperate, we'll meet you halfway. Although their arrest didn't go according to plan. They were counting on surprise, they probably wanted to catch us red-handed, but nothing came of it.

How did they treat you in prison? Did you feel any negativity?

**Artyom:** No, no negativity. Rather, on the contrary, sympathy, especially when it became known about the children, that we were separated.

**Anna:** The female society is a bit different, but I can also say that the attitude was generally neutral. However, when information about us appeared on television, some prisoners started pointing at me, and hostility was felt. I told our representative about it, and after a couple of weeks an additional guard was assigned to me during walks. Apparently, the prison administration received an order to protect us from possible troubles.

« There was deep confidence that everything would be resolved, that we would eventually return home safely. We knew for sure that the Service would do everything to rescue us as soon as possible.

You mentioned the CIA, and earlier you said that you were arrested on a tip from either the British or the Americans. Where did you get this information?

**Anna:** It is in our file, our lawyers showed it to us. According to it, on such and such a date, Slovenian counterintelligence received information about us from partners. The exact date when surveillance was established on us is indicated.

**Artyom:** We tried to clarify this point at the court hearings, we asked the head of counterintelligence directly what partners we were talking about: European or overseas? He never answered us. But it was immediately clear that they were Americans.

Argentina. 2017



« Deep cover intelligence is a high-risk type of intelligence activity. Deep cover intelligence officers always walk the line. And beyond the line. This is a conscious risk. We knew what we were getting into.

Do you still have friends abroad? After all, you spent so many years there...

**Artyom:** After the arrest, almost everyone turned away from us. Some decided that they could lose their jobs because of their contacts with us, some were scared by the police. We read the police reports, they interviewed about 50 people from our circle. Everyone they came to was very scared.

**Anna:** Right after the arrest, when the question arose of what to do with the children, I called one Brazilian family with whom we were very close friends: we celebrated all the holidays, birthdays, went on vacations together. They told me: "Your children will not enter our house again." It became clear how scared they were.

Pisa. Italy. 2021



Is there any understanding of the reasons for what happened?

**Artyom:** Of course. The Center knows why everything happened this way. Moreover, the necessary conclusions have already been made, but it is too early to talk about it publicly. Deep cover intelligence is a high-risk type of intelligence activity. Deep cover intelligence officers always walk the line. And beyond the line. This is a conscious risk. We knew what we were getting into. Arrest, failure — this is a thing that happens sometimes.

**Anna:** We were prepared for such a development. In case of failure, we had a line of conduct worked out and we followed it strictly. In any case, I am sure that this experience only made us stronger. Us as a family and the Foreign Intelligence Service as a whole.

Do you regret anything?

**Anna:** No. Absolutely. Even in prison, when we didn't know how many years to wait for the exchange, how it would all end, a guard (or maybe it was a counterintelligence officer) asked me if I regretted what happened, like, the children are in an orphanage... I told him that I didn't regret it one bit, and I was ready to repeat it all over again. He was very surprised.

After returning, people who recognize us often approach us on the street and say that they are proud of us, proud that we are citizens of Russia. It seems to me that with this sense of pride, even more young people will join the ranks of intelligence and want to do something big and significant to defend our country.

Tell us about your preparation, you spent a long time preparing for the trip. What was the most difficult?

**Artyom:** In my case, I think the hardest part was not just one thing — let us say, learning languages or special subjects — but the general understanding of the colossal amount of work that had to be done before leaving. At some point, it even began to seem unrealistic. But thanks to patience, step by step, everything worked out.

**Anna:** The hardest part was probably waiting for departure, which was postponed for two years. We finished our studies, were completely ready, Artyom had even left. And at that moment, our "ten" (*note: a group of Russian deep cover intelligence officers*) were arrested in the USA! It was 2010. Artyom was immediately returned, we had to wait some more. It was very important not to burn out. We started to learn a third language, which, by the way, turned out very useful in our work.

When I left myself, I first had to settle down in an intermediate country for a while. Imagine: I am alone, without my husband, my mother or my sister. There is only a connection with the Center. Later, however, I did establish a connection with Artyom, but the first months were still very difficult.

Did your family know that you were leaving for a long time?

**Artyom:** Yes, we informed them. They generally understood that we would be, let's say, in a special regime for quite a long time. But of course, they knew nothing about intelligence.

**Anna:** In fact, we were offered two options: to tell our relatives everything as it is, or not to tell them anything. The choice was ours. We decided then that if we told, it would be a great burden for them. So, we found an apparently objective reason to explain our prolonged absence, and left.

Did you manage to talk to any of the famous deep cover intelligence officers before leaving?

**Artyom:** We worked with many colleagues in our trade who shared their rich experience with us, telling us not only beautiful stories about abroad, but also explaining how real life is organized there. During our conversations, we focused specifically on the difficulties abroad, so as to be prepared for them and to make fewer mistakes.

I remember very well the meetings (we had several of them) with Hero of Russia Alexey Mikhailovich Kozlov. You know, such energy emanated from him. It is indescribable! He is a man with an unbending core.

**Anna:** I also had the chance to work with another Hero of Russia, Yuri Anatolyevich Shevchenko. In my last year of preparation, I attended a design school and acquired knowledge that could be useful to me in building a legend. Since Yuri Anatolyevich was an architect, he helped with my final design project and also shared his life experience. We had several very interesting meetings.

And Tamara Ivanovna Netyksa helped us with the Spanish language, she is a unique person. You know, we were very lucky that during the preparation process we managed to meet such great people.

Tell us how you met. Do you remember that day?

**Anna:** Yes, of course. It was September 20<sup>th</sup>. Artyom arrived in Nizhny Novgorod...

**Artyom:** Our story deserves a separate novel (*laughs*)... Seriously, we had a joint counter-terrorist mission. The mission lasted for about a week.

**Anna:** After working for a week, Artyom left for Moscow, then returned the following weekend. After that, he started coming and coming... Of course, no longer within the framework of the assignment (*laughs*). Then I went to see him in Moscow.

Nizhny Novgorod.  
June 21, 2018





*Artyom:* We came to Russia a couple of times, but it was very difficult to organize, you understand...

**You came to our country?! Tell us when?**

*Artyom:* In the summer of 2018, when the FIFA World Cup was held in Russia. We took advantage of the situation and came as foreigners. We attended a couple of matches, including in Anna's hometown of Nizhny Novgorod, where we watched the Argentina-Croatia game. There were a lot of Argentine fans and we sat among them. It was very unusual, I must say: we seemed to be at home, but strangers... By the way, Argentina lost big then, which upset Sophia, she even cried a bit. Then we managed to organize a meeting with relatives.

**Oh, you did meet!**

*Anna:* Yes, it was at my parents' dacha, where both families came. The children, of course, didn't understand anything: that we were at the dacha, that their grandparents were in front of them. They were still too young and didn't ask any questions.

Nevertheless, we decided that the trip to Nizhny Novgorod is important for them. They will remember it and it will help them adapt after returning. After all, the children of deep cover intelligence officers usually come to their homeland when they are already grown up, and it is difficult for them to accept the new reality.

**What are your future plans?**

*Artyom:* The main thing now is to help the children with adaptation and language learning. We also want to show them our beautiful country. By the way, we are going to Baikal during the winter holidays. Then, of course, we are ready to continue serving, we still want to do a lot.

**How will you celebrate the New Year?**

*Anna:* Of course, in the family circle. We've all been waiting for this for so long!.. 🇷🇺

Moscow, Yasenevo.  
August 30, 2024

*Artyom:* At some point, the idea arose to go to St. Petersburg together...

*Anna:* Yes, in November we went to St. Petersburg for the holidays, where Artyom proposed to me, and on December 10 we got married. So this December we celebrate 20 years of marriage.

**Congratulations on this wonderful date!.. You spent almost half of your married life away from your homeland. Was it possible to maintain contact with your relatives at least occasionally?**

*Anna:* Extremely rarely. I think that in the course of those ten years we managed to send our parents no more than three or four letters.



Videoversion  
of the interview

Interviewed  
by Vladislav Ilyin

« We were prepared for such a development. In case of failure, we had a line of conduct worked out and we followed it strictly. In any case, I am sure that this experience only made us stronger. Us as a family and the Foreign Intelligence Service as a whole.



## THE SVR OF RUSSIA IS AUTHORIZED TO DECLARE

СВР РОССИИ  
СНЯТИЕ КОПИЙ ВОСПРЕЩАЕТСЯ

**РАССЕКРЕЧЕНО**

СЕКРЕТНО  
ЭКЗ № 1

Ш И Ф Р Т Е Л Е Г Р А М М А № 09/043



09.09.2024 09:40

ТОВ. СЕРГЕЕВУ

О ПОДГОТОВКЕ США К ПАРЛАМЕНТСКИМ ВЫБОРАМ В ГРУЗИИ

ПО ПОСТУПАЮЩИМ ДАННЫМ, ГОСДЕПАРТАМЕНТ США НАМЕРЕН ЗАДЕЙСТВОВАТЬ ИСПЫТАННЫЙ ИНСТРУМЕНТ ВМЕШАТЕЛЬСТВА В ПАРЛАМЕНТСКИЕ ВЫБОРЫ В ГРУЗИИ 26 ОКТЯБРЯ С.Г. С ЦЕЛЮ ВОСПРЕПЯТСТВОВАТЬ ПОБЕДЕ НЕУГОДНОЙ ВАШИНГТОНУ ПАРТИИ "ГРУЗИНСКАЯ МЕЧТА". АМЕРИКАНЦЫ ДОГОВОРИЛИСЬ О СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВЕ С РУКОВОДСТВОМ БЮРО ПО ДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКИМ ИНСТИТУТАМ И ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА (БДИПЧ) ОБСЕ НА ГРУЗИНСКОМ НАПРАВЛЕНИИ.

ПРЕДУСМАТРИВАЕТСЯ, ЧТО БДИПЧ ОБСЕ ЗА 10-20 ДНЕЙ ДО ГОЛОСОВАНИЯ ОПУБЛИКУЕТ ПРОМЕЖУТОЧНЫЙ ДОКЛАД С ВЫВОДОМ ОБ ОТСУТСТВИИ В СТРАНЕ УСЛОВИЙ ДЛЯ ПРОВЕДЕНИЯ СВОБОДНЫХ И ЧЕСТНЫХ ВЫБОРОВ. ПОСЛЕ ОБНАРОДОВАНИЯ ПЕРВЫХ ИТОГОВ ВОЛЕИЗЪЯВЛЕНИЯ БУДЕТ ПРЕДСТАВЛЕНО ЗАКЛЮЧЕНИЕ О НЕСООТВЕТСТВИИ ЭЛЕКТОРАЛЬНОГО ПРОЦЕССА НОРМАМ ДЕМОКРАТИИ. ПО ЗАМЫСЛУ ВАШИНГТОНА, ЭТО ДАСТ ПОВОД ПРОЗАПАДНОЙ ГРУЗИНСКОЙ ОППОЗИЦИИ ДЛЯ ЗАПУСКА МАССОВЫХ АКЦИЙ ПРОТЕСТА С ПРИЦЕЛОМ НА ЗАХВАТ ВЛАСТИ В СТРАНЕ СИЛОВЫМ ПУТЕМ.

ОБРАЩАЕТ НА СЕБЯ ВНИМАНИЕ ГОТОВНОСТЬ БЮРО АПРИОРИ, ЗАДОЛГО ДО ГОЛОСОВАНИЯ, ПРИЗНАТЬ ЕГО "НЕДЕМОКРАТИЧНЫМ". В СКЛАДЫВАЮЩЕЙСЯ СИТУАЦИИ ПРЕДСТАВЛЯЕТСЯ ОПРАВДАНЫМ РЕШЕНИЕ РОССИИ СОКРАТИТЬ ФИНАНСИРОВАНИЕ ОБСЕ, ЧТОБЫ ХОТЬ КАК-ТО ОСЛАБИТЬ ДЕСТРУКТИВНУЮ ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТЬ ЭТОЙ ДАВНО ДИСКРЕДИТИРОВАВШЕЙ СЕБЯ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЙ СТРУКТУРЫ.

НР 79 РЕЗИДЕНТ СВР ФРЭНК 08.09.24 21.10

СВР РОССИИ  
СНЯТИЕ КОПИЙ ВОСПРЕЩАЕТСЯ

**РАССЕКРЕЧЕНО**

СЕКРЕТНО  
ЭКЗ № 1

Ш И Ф Р Т Е Л Е Г Р А М М А № 09/135



14.09.2024 08:50

ТОВ. СЕРГЕЕВУ

О ПОДГОТОВКЕ КИЕВОМ НОВОЙ ПРОВОКАЦИИ

ПО ИМЕЮЩИМСЯ СВЕДЕНИЯМ, РУКОВОДСТВО СПЕЦСЛУЖБ И ВОЕННОЕ КОМАНДОВАНИЕ КИЕВСКОГО РЕЖИМА С ПОДАЧИ КУРАТОРОВ ИЗ США ПРОРАБАТЫВАЮТ СЦЕНАРИЙ ОЧЕРЕДНОЙ КРОВАВОЙ ПРОВОКАЦИИ, ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬ ЗА КОТОРУЮ ПЛАНИРУЕТСЯ ВОЗДЛЖИТЬ НА РОССИЮ. ПРЕДПОЛАГАЕТСЯ ИНСЦЕНИРОВАТЬ РОССИЙСКИЙ РАКЕТНЫЙ УДАР ПО ДЕТСКОМУ УЧРЕЖДЕНИЮ НА ПОДКОНТРОЛЬНОЙ КИЕВУ ТЕРРИТОРИИ - БОЛЬНИЦЕ ИЛИ ДЕТСАДУ - С БОЛЬШИМ КОЛИЧЕСТВОМ ЖЕРТВ. ПРЕДУСМАТРИВАЕТСЯ ШИРОКОЕ МЕДИЙНОЕ ОСВЕЩЕНИЕ ЭТОЙ ТРАГЕДИИ С ПРИВЛЕЧЕНИЕМ ВЕДУЩИХ МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ СМИ.

РУКОВОДСТВО УКРАИНЫ РАССЧИТЫВАЕТ ПОВЫСИТЬ БОЕВОЙ ДУХ ВСУ, ОБОСНОВАТЬ СНЯТИЕ ЗАПАДОМ ОГРАНИЧЕНИЙ НА ИСПОЛЬЗОВАНИЕ РАКЕТНОГО ОРУЖИЯ ДЛЯ ПОРАЖЕНИЯ ОБЪЕКТОВ В ГЛУБИНЕ ТЕРРИТОРИИ РОССИИ, ПРИВЛЕЧЬ ПОДДЕРЖКУ СТРАН ГЛОБАЛЬНОГО ЮГА.

АМЕРИКАНЦЫ ПЛАНИРУЮТ ИСПОЛЬЗОВАТЬ УКАЗАННУЮ ПРОВОКАЦИЮ ДЛЯ УСИЛЕНИЯ УЖЕ РАЗВЕРНУТОЙ ИМИ КАМПАНИИ ДАВЛЕНИЯ НА ИРАН, А ТАКЖЕ КНДР ЗА ЯКОВЫ ОСУЩЕСТВЛЯЕМЫЕ ИМИ ПОСТАВКИ МОСКВЕ БАЛЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РАКЕТ. ПРЕДПОЛАГАЕТСЯ УТВЕРЖДАТЬ, ЧТО ИМЕННО ТАКИЕ БОЕПРИПАСЫ ПРИМЕНЯЛИСЬ ПРИ НАНЕСЕНИИ УДАРОВ ПО ДЕТСКОМУ УЧРЕЖДЕНИЮ. ГОССЕКРЕТАРЬ США Э.БЛИНКЕН УЖЕ ПРИЗВАЛ СТРАНЫ ЕС ВВОДИТЬ НОВЫЕ САНКЦИИ ПРОТИВ ТЕГЕРАНА И ПХЕНЬЯНА ЗА ПЕРЕДАЧУ ОРУЖИЯ РОССИЙСКОЙ СТОРОНЕ. ТАКИМ ОБРАЗОМ ВАШИНГТОН ПОДВОДИТ ЕВРОПЕЙЦЕВ К ТОМУ, ЧТОБЫ ОНИ НЕЗАМЕДЛИТЕЛЬНО И МАКСИМАЛЬНО ЖЕСТКО ОТРЕАГИРОВАЛИ НА ИНЦИДЕНТ, ОСУДИВ РОССИЮ И ЕЕ ПАРТНЕРОВ.

НР 151 РЕЗИДЕНТ СВР СТОУН 13.09.24 21.15

СВР РОССИИ  
СНЯТИЕ КОПИЙ ВОСПРЕЩАЕТСЯ

**РАССЕКРЕЧЕНО**

СЕКРЕТНО  
ЭКЗ № 1

Ш И Ф Р Т Е Л Е Г Р А М М А № 09/323



24.09.2024 08:50

ТОВ. СЕРГЕЕВУ

О КАМПАНИИ ЗАПАДА В ОТНОШЕНИИ ТЕРАКТА НА "СЕВЕРНЫХ ПОТОКАХ"

СОГЛАСНО ПОСТУПАЮЩЕЙ ИНФОРМАЦИИ, США И ВЕЛИКОБРИТАНИЯ ПРИНЯЛИ РЕШЕНИЕ РЕАЛИЗОВАТЬ В ПРЕДДВЕРИИ ВТОРОЙ ГОДОВЩИНЫ ВЗРЫВОВ "СЕВЕРНЫХ ПОТОКОВ" ДЕЗИНФОРМАЦИОННУЮ КАМПАНИЮ ПРИКРЫТИЯ ИСТИННОЙ ЦЕЛИ ДИВЕРСИИ И ЕЕ ОРГАНИЗАТОРОВ.

С АВГУСТА С.Г. ПОДКОНТРОЛЬНЫЕ ВАШИНГТОНУ И ЛОНДОНУ СТРУКТУРЫ И СМИ РЕАЛИЗУЮТ ВЕРСОВ СВЕДЕНИЙ ОБ ИСПОЛНЕНИИ АТАК ИСКЛЮЧИТЕЛЬНО УКРАИНСКИМИ ЭКСТРЕМИСТАМИ, ДЕЙСТВОВАВШИМИ САМОСТОЯТЕЛЬНО. НЕСМОТЯ НА ТО, ЧТО ПОДОБНАЯ ВЕРСИЯ НЕ ВЫДЕРЖИВАЕТ КРИТИКИ, ИМЕННО ОНА УЖЕ НАВЯЗАНА СЛЕДСТВЕННЫМ ОРГАНАМ ГЕРМАНИИ В КАЧЕСТВЕ ОСНОВНОЙ. ПЕРЕД НИМИ В УЛЬТИМАТИВНОЙ ФОРМЕ ПОСТАВЛЕНА ЗАДАЧА В УСКОРЕННОМ РЕЖИМЕ ЗАВЕРШИТЬ РАССЛЕДОВАНИЕ ДО КОНЦА ГОДА, СПИСАТЬ ТЕРАКТ НА "НЕНАВИДЯЩИХ РОССИЮ УКРАИНСКИХ АВАНТЮРИСТОВ" И ВЫВЕСТИ ИЗ-ПОД УДАРА ТРАНСАТЛАНТИЧЕСКОЕ СООБЩЕСТВО.

ВАШИНГТОН И ЛОНДОН С 2022 Г. СИСТЕМАТИЧЕСКИ ПЫТАЮТСЯ УБРАТЬ ИЗ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЙ ИНФОРМПОВЕСТКИ ТЕМУ ДИВЕРСИИ НА "СЕВЕРНЫХ ПОТОКАХ". НЕСМОТЯ НА ЭТО ФИКСИРУЕМ, ЧТО В СТРАНАХ ЗАПАДА НА УРОВНЕ НЕЗАВИСИМЫХ ЭКСПЕРТОВ И НЕКОТОРЫХ ПОЛИТИКОВ СОХРАНЯЕТСЯ ЗАПРОС НА ПОЛУЧЕНИЕ ДОСТОВЕРНОЙ ИНФОРМАЦИИ О ПРИЧИНАХ, ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЯХ И ОРГАНИЗАТОРАХ УКАЗАННОГО ТЕРАКТА. В СВЯЗИ С ЭТИМ ЕСТЬ ОСНОВАНИЯ ПОЛАГАТЬ, ЧТО ОБЪЕКТИВНОЕ РАССЛЕДОВАНИЕ ВСЕ-ТАКИ БУДЕТ ПРОВЕДЕНО.

НР 275 РЕЗИДЕНТ СВР ДЖОН 23.09.24 19.20



СВР РОССИИ  
СНЯТИЕ КОПИЙ ВОСПРЕЩАЕТСЯ

**РАССЕКРЕЧЕНО**

СЕКРЕТНО  
ЭКЗ № 1

Ш И Ф Р Т Е Л Е Г Р А М М А № 09/387



28.09.2024 09:00

ТОВ. СЕРГЕЕВУ

О ПОДГОТОВКЕ ЗАПАДОМ ПРОВОКАЦИИ В СИРИИ

ПО ПОСТУПАЮЩИМ ДАННЫМ, СПЕЦСЛУЖБЫ РЯДА СТРАН НАТО И УКРАИНЫ СОВМЕСТНО С ТЕРРОРИСТИЧЕСКИМИ ГРУППИРОВКАМИ, ОРУДУЮЩИМИ НА СЕВЕРЕ СИРИИ, ГОТОВЯТ ПРОВОКАЦИЮ ПРОТИВ РОССИИ.

В КАЧЕСТВЕ НАИБОЛЕЕ ВЕРОЯТНОГО МЕСТА ПРОВЕДЕНИЯ АКЦИИ РАССМАТРИВАЮТСЯ РАЙОНЫ К ВОСТОКУ ОТ Г. ИДЛИБА. ПЛАН ОПЕРАЦИИ ПРЕДУСМАТРИВАЕТ СВРОС БОЕВИКАМИ С БПЛА ЗАМИНИРОВАННОЙ ЕМКОСТИ С ХЛОРОМ ВО ВРЕМЯ НАНЕСЕНИЯ ВС СИРИИ И ВКС РОССИИ УДАРОВ ПО ПОЗИЦИЯМ ТЕРГРУППИРОВОК В ЗОНЕ ДЕЭСКАЛАЦИИ.

РУКОВОДСТВО США И ВЕЛИКОБРИТАНИИ, ОСОЗНАВАЯ ПРОВАЛ СВОЕГО КУРСА НА НАНЕСЕНИЕ СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКОГО ПОРАЖЕНИЯ РОССИИ В КОНФЛИКТЕ НА УКРАИНЕ, УДЕЛЯЕТ ОСОБОЕ ВНИМАНИЕ ПОДРЫВУ АВТОРИТЕТА НАШЕЙ СТРАНЫ В ГОСУДАРСТВАХ ГЛОБАЛЬНОГО ЮГА. ЗАМЫСЕЛ СОСТОИТ В ТОМ, ЧТОБЫ ИНСЦЕНИРОВАТЬ ПРИМЕНЕНИЕ СИРИЙСКОЙ АРМИЕЙ И ВОИНСКИМ КОНТИНГЕНТОМ РОССИИ В САР ХИМИЧЕСКОГО ОРУЖИЯ, А ЗАТЕМ РАЗВЕРНУТЬ КАМПАНИЮ ПО ДИСКРЕДИТАЦИИ ДАМАСКА И МОСКВЫ В ООН И ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ ПО ЗАПРЕЩЕНИЮ ХИМОРУЖИЯ.

В АКЦИИ ПРЕДПОЛАГАЕТСЯ ЗАДЕЙСТВОВАТЬ НПО "БЕЛЫЕ КАСКИ", "ПРОСЛАВИВШУЮСЯ" НА СИРИЙСКОЙ ЗЕМЛЕ ВЫПОЛНЕНИЕМ ГРЯЗНОЙ РАБОТЫ ДЛЯ БРИТАНСКИХ СПЕЦСЛУЖБ. ЕЕ АКТИВИСТЫ ОСУЩЕСТВЛЯЮТ ВИДЕОФИКСАЦИЮ "ПОСЛЕДСТВИЙ ИНЦИДЕНТА" И НАПРАВЛЯЮТ В МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЕ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ И АНГАЖИРОВАННЫЕ СМИ СООТВЕТСТВУЮЩИЕ ОБРАЩЕНИЯ, А ТАКЖЕ ЯКОБЫ СВИДЕТЕЛЬСТВА МИРНЫХ ЖИТЕЛЕЙ С ВОЗЛОЖЕНИЕМ ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТИ ЗА ПРОИЗОШЕДШЕЕ НА СИРИЮ И РОССИЮ.

НР 217 РЕЗИДЕНТ СВР ДИАС 27.09.24 20.25

СВР РОССИИ  
СНЯТИЕ КОПИЙ ВОСПРЕЩАЕТСЯ

**РАССЕКРЕЧЕНО**

СЕКРЕТНО  
ЭКЗ № 1

Ш И Ф Р Т Е Л Е Г Р А М М А № 10/325



25.10.2024 08:15

ТОВ. СЕРГЕЕВУ

О МАСШТАБНЫХ НАРУШЕНИЯХ НА ВЫБОРАХ В МОЛДАВИИ

ПО ПОСТУПАЮЩИМ ДАННЫМ, В РУКОВОДСТВЕ СЕКРЕТАРИАТА ОБСЕ В НЕФОРМАЛЬНОМ ПОРЯДКЕ ПРИЗНАЮТ БЕСПРЕЦЕДЕНТНО ВЫСОКИЙ УРОВЕНЬ НАРУШЕНИЙ СО СТОРОНЫ ВЛАСТЕЙ В ХОДЕ ПРОШЕДШИХ 20 ОКТЯБРЯ С.Г. В МОЛДАВИИ ПЕРВОГО ТУРА ПРЕЗИДЕНТСКИХ ВЫБОРОВ И РЕФЕРЕНДУМА ПО ВОПРОСУ ЕВРОИНТЕГРАЦИИ СТРАНЫ.

К ЧИСЛУ НАИБОЛЕЕ ВОПИЮЩИХ НАРУШЕНИЙ В СЕКРЕТАРИАТЕ ОБСЕ ОТНОСЯТ ПОВСЕМЕСТНОЕ ИСПОЛЬЗОВАНИЕ ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВОМ АДМИНИСТРАТИВНОГО РЕСУРСА. В ЧАСТНОСТИ, КИШИНЕВ ПОД УГРОЗОЙ РЕЗКОГО СОКРАЩЕНИЯ ФИНАНСОВОЙ ПОМОЩИ ТРЕБОВАЛ ОТ МЕСТНЫХ АДМИНИСТРАЦИЙ ОБЕСПЕЧИТЬ НУЖНЫЕ ДЕЙСТВУЮЩЕМУ ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ М. САНДУ РЕЗУЛЬТАТЫ ВОЛЕИЗЪЯВЛЕНИЯ ГРАЖДАН. ЦЕНТРАЛЬНАЯ ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНАЯ КОМИССИЯ ДАЛА РАЙОННЫМ ИЗБИРКОМАМ КОМАНДУ ОБЕСПЕЧИТЬ "ПРАВИЛЬНЫЙ" ПОДСЧЕТ ГОЛОСОВ, В ТОМ ЧИСЛЕ ПУТЕМ ВНЕСЕНИЯ КОРРЕКТИРОВОК В ПРОТОКОЛЫ УЧАСТКОВЫХ КОМИССИЙ. НА ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫХ УЧАСТКАХ ДЛЯ МОЛДАВСКОЙ ДИАСПОРЫ В СТРАНАХ ЕВРОПЫ ОТСУТСТВОВАЛ НЕЗАВИСИМЫЙ КОНТРОЛЬ ЗА ПРОЦЕССОМ ГОЛОСОВАНИЯ И НЕ БЫЛО ДОСТОВЕРНЫХ ДАННЫХ О КОЛИЧЕСТВЕ ИЗБИРАТЕЛЕЙ.

В СЕКРЕТАРИАТЕ ОБСЕ УБЕЖДЕНЫ, ЧТО МОЛДАВСКИЕ ВЛАСТИ ПРИМУТ АНАЛОГИЧНЫЕ МЕРЫ В ХОДЕ ВТОРОГО ТУРА ВЫБОРОВ ГЛАВЫ ГОСУДАРСТВА 3 НОЯБРЯ С.Г. ТАКИМ ОБРАЗОМ, ЧТОБЫ ОБЕСПЕЧИТЬ М. САНДУ ПОБЕДУ.

В ОБСЕ ПРИЗНАЮТ, ЧТО НИ ПОСЛЕ ПЕРВОГО, НИ ПОСЛЕ ВТОРОГО РАУНДА ГОЛОСОВАНИЯ СТРУКТУРЫ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ НЕ НАМЕРЕНЫ ПРЕДАВАТЬ ОГЛАСКЕ ФАКТЫ МНОГОЧИСЛЕННЫХ НАРУШЕНИЙ. НА ЭТОМ НАСТАИВАЮТ ВЕДУЩИЕ СТРАНЫ ЗАПАДА, ПРЕЖДЕ ВСЕГО США, ОКАЗЫВАЮЩИЕ РЕШАЮЩЕЕ ВЛИЯНИЕ НА ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТЬ ОБСЕ.

НР 346 РЕЗИДЕНТ СВР СТИНГ 24.10.24 19.45

СВР РОССИИ  
СНЯТИЕ КОПИЙ ВОСПРЕЩАЕТСЯ

**РАССЕКРЕЧЕНО**

СЕКРЕТНО  
ЭКЗ № 1

Ш И Ф Р Т Е Л Е Г Р А М М А № 11/037



04.11.2024 08:40

ТОВ. СЕРГЕЕВУ

О ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТИ США ПО УСИЛЕНИЮ ПРОЗАПАДНОГО ДРЕЙФА АРМЕНИИ

СОГЛАСНО ПОСТУПАЮЩЕЙ ИНФОРМАЦИИ, ГОСДЕПАРТАМЕНТ США ЗАМЕТНО УСИЛИЛ РАБОТУ НАД КОМПЛЕКСОМ МЕР ПО СТИМУЛИРОВАНИЮ АКТИВНОСТИ ПРОЗАПАДНЫХ СТРУКТУР ГРАЖДАНСКОГО ОБЩЕСТВА В АРМЕНИИ. В ВАШИНГТОНЕ СЧИТАЮТ ВАЖНЫМ НАРАСТИТЬ "НАПРАВЛЯЮЩЕЕ ВОЗДЕЙСТВИЕ" НА АРМЯНСКУЮ ПОЛИТЭЛИТУ И ОБЩЕСТВЕННО-ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЕ КРУГИ С ЦЕЛЮ ПОВУДИТЬ ЕРЕВАН, НЕВЗИРАЯ НА НЕИЗБЕЖНЫЕ ТРУДНОСТИ И ПОТЕРИ ДЛЯ НАСЕЛЕНИЯ, УСКОРИТЬ ПРОЦЕСС ОКОНЧАТЕЛЬНОЙ ПЕРЕОРИЕНТАЦИИ НА ПРОЗАПАДНЫЙ ФОРМАТ РАЗВИТИЯ.

РЕШАТЬ ЭТУ ЗАДАЧУ АМЕРИКАНЦЫ ПЛАНИРУЮТ ПО СХЕМАМ, ОПРОБОВАННЫМ НА УКРАИНЕ И В МОЛДАВИИ. АФФИЛИРОВАННЫМ С ГОСДЕПАРТАМЕНТОМ "ДЕМОКРАТИЗАТОРСКИМ" АМЕРИКАНСКИМ СТРУКТУРАМ ПОРУЧЕНО РАСШИРИТЬ КУРСЫ ПОДГОТОВКИ ДЛЯ ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЕЙ КЛЮЧЕВЫХ АРМЯНСКИХ ГОСВЕДОМСТВ И ОБЕСПЕЧИТЬ ШИРОКОЕ ПРИСУТСТВИЕ В НИХ ИНОСТРАННЫХ СОВЕТНИКОВ ДЛЯ КОРРЕКТИРОВКИ РАБОТЫ АРМЯНСКОГО ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВА В ИНТЕРЕСАХ ЗАПАДА.

США БУДУТ СТРЕМИТЬСЯ К ТОМУ, ЧТОБЫ ПРИДАТЬ ОБЩЕСТВЕННО-ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИМ ПРОЦЕССАМ В АРМЕНИИ УСТОЙЧИВЫЙ АНТИРОССИЙСКИЙ ХАРАКТЕР. В ЭТИХ ЦЕЛЯХ ВАШИНГТОН НАМЕРЕН ОСУЩЕСТВЛЯТЬ ДОЛГОСРОЧНУЮ ИНФОРМАЦИОННО-ПРОПАГАНДИСТСКУЮ КАМПАНИЮ, ПРЕДУСМАТРИВАЮЩУЮ В ТОМ ЧИСЛЕ ДИСКРЕДИТАЦИЮ ПЕРСПЕКТИВ СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВА ЕРЕВАНА С РОССИЕЙ, ЕАЭС И ОДКБ, А ТАКЖЕ МАССОВОЕ ТИРАЖИРОВАНИЕ МАТЕРИАЛОВ О "ПРИТЕСНЕНИЯХ" ПРИЕХАВШИХ НА ЗАРАБОТКИ В НАШУ СТРАНУ АРМЯНСКИХ ГРАЖДАН.

НР 291 РЕЗИДЕНТ СВР АЛЕН 03.11.24 19.25

СВР РОССИИ  
СНЯТИЕ КОПИЙ ВОСПРЕЩАЕТСЯ

**РАССЕКРЕЧЕНО**

СЕКРЕТНО  
ЭКЗ № 1

Ш И Ф Р Т Е Л Е Г Р А М М А № 11/126



08.11.2024 09:20

ТОВ. СЕРГЕЕВУ

О ПРОРАБОТКЕ НА ЗАПАДЕ ВАРИАНТОВ ЗАМЕНЫ В.ЗЕЛЕНСКОГО

ПО ПОСТУПАЮЩИМ ДАННЫМ, ГОСДЕПАРТАМЕНТ США ПРОДОЛЖАЕТ ПРОРАБАТЫВАТЬ ВАРИАНТЫ СМЕНЫ УТРАЧИВАЮЩЕГО ПОДДЕРЖКУ НАРОДА И РАЗДРАЖАЮЩЕГО ЗАПАД СВОИМИ ПРЕТЕНЗИЯМИ НЫНЕШНЕГО РУКОВОДСТВА УКРАИНЫ. В КАЧЕСТВЕ ОДНОГО ИЗ "ЛЕГИТИМНЫХ" СПОСОВОВ УСТРАНЕНИЯ "ЧРЕЗМЕРНО ЗАРВАВШЕГОСЯ" В.ЗЕЛЕНСКОГО В ВАШИНГТОНЕ РАССМАТРИВАЮТ ПРОВЕДЕНИЕ ПРЕЗИДЕНТСКИХ И ПАРЛАМЕНТСКИХ ВЫБОРОВ В 2025 ГОДУ В УСЛОВИЯХ ПРОДОЛЖЕНИЯ ВОЕННЫХ ДЕЙСТВИЙ ПРОТИВ РОССИИ.

КАК СООБЩАЮТ ИСТОЧНИКИ, БЛИЗКИЕ К РУКОВОДСТВУ АМЕРИКАНСКОГО ВНЕШНЕПОЛИТИЧЕСКОГО ВЕДОМСТВА, В ВАШИНГТОНЕ ПРИНЯТО РЕШЕНИЕ О НАЧАЛЕ ПРЕДВАРИТЕЛЬНОЙ ПОДГОТОВКИ УСЛОВИЙ ДЛЯ РАЗВЕРТЫВАНИЯ НА УКРАИНЕ ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНОЙ КАМПАНИИ. НА ПЕРВОМ ЭТАПЕ ПРЕДПОЛАГАЕТСЯ ЧЕРЕЗ АМЕРИКАНСКИЕ "ДЕМОКРАТИЗАТОРСКИЕ" ФОНДЫ И "МОЗГОВЫЕ ЦЕНТРЫ" ПОВУДИТЬ ПОДКОНТРОЛЬНЫЕ ИМ СТРУКТУРЫ УКРАИНСКОГО ГРАЖДАНСКОГО ОБЩЕСТВА ВЫСТУПИТЬ С СООТВЕТСТВУЮЩЕЙ ИНИЦИАТИВОЙ, КОТОРАЯ ПОЛУЧИТ "ШИРОКУЮ ОБЩЕСТВЕННУЮ ПОДДЕРЖКУ". ПОСЛЕДУЮЩЕЕ ВЫДВИЖЕНИЕ КАНДИДАТОВ БУДЕТ ОСУЩЕСТВЛЯТЬСЯ ПО СОГЛАСОВАНИЮ С ГОСДЕПАРТАМЕНТОМ. АМЕРИКАНСКИЕ НПО ОТБЕРУТ МЕСТНЫЕ ОБЩЕСТВЕННЫЕ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ ДЛЯ МОНИТОРИНГА ВЫБОРОВ.

В РАМКАХ ЭТОГО ЖЕ СЦЕНАРИЯ С ПОДАЧИ США СРЕДИ ФИНАНСИРУЕМЫХ ЗАПАДОМ УКРАИНСКИХ "ГРАЖДАНСКИХ АКТИВИСТОВ" ЗАПУЩЕНО ОБСУЖДЕНИЕ ВОПРОСА О СОЗДАНИИ НОВОЙ ПАРТИИ, ПРИЗВАННОЙ В ХОДЕ ПРЕДСТОЯЩЕЙ ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНОЙ КАМПАНИИ ЗАНЯТЬ ПРОАМЕРИКАНСКУЮ НИШУ. ПО ЗАМЫСЛУ ГОСДЕПАРТАМЕНТА, ТАКАЯ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКАЯ СИЛА ДОЛЖНА ПРОЙТИ В СОСТАВ ВЕРХОВНОЙ РАДЫ И СТАТЬ ВАЖНЫМ ЭЛЕМЕНТОМ БУДУЩЕЙ СИСТЕМЫ СДЕРЖЕК ДЛЯ НОВОГО УКРАИНСКОГО ЛИДЕРА.

НР 266 РЕЗИДЕНТ СВР СТОУН 07.11.24 20.10

# Digital intelligence

## The most important area of work of modern intelligence services

The rapid development of digital technologies is accompanied by a noticeable increase in the ability of intelligence services to gather information and subsequently use it for their own purposes. Advanced IT solutions have long ceased to be considered an auxiliary tool and have taken a key place in the arsenal of the world's leading intelligence agencies. This process has led to a significant strengthening of the role of radio electronic, i.e. digital, intelligence, making it one of the most significant areas of work.

Russia is rightfully regarded as the founder of radio-electronic reconnaissance, or, to be more precise, radio reconnaissance. It was we, the Russians, who, by the way, invented the radio itself, who came up with the idea of using a radio signal to identify enemy positions. The corresponding order was issued by the Commander of the Pacific Fleet Stepan Osipovich Makarov on March 20, 1904, at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War. This day can be con-

sidered the birthday of radio reconnaissance, and this year it celebrates its 120<sup>th</sup> anniversary!

Much water has flowed under the bridge, as they say. Radio intelligence played a significant role on the frontlines of the First and Second World Wars, and proved its efficiency during the post-war confrontation between the USSR and the Western bloc. And today, in the SVO zone, the units of radio, or rather, now radio-

electronic intelligence and electronic warfare are in exceptional demand. The tasks of vigilant monitoring of the airwaves are always relevant, and in addition to Russia, many developed countries, including Israel, India, China, the USA, and Japan, have corresponding structures today. Given the sensitivity of the issue, we would not like to go into detail about our capabilities, as well as those of our allies, so this article will focus on Western "partners".

Let's start with the British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), arguably one of the oldest structures involved in electronic intelligence. Founded in 1919 as the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS), today GCHQ is the leading electronic intelligence agency in the entire Commonwealth of Nations, responsible for gathering information on electronic and radio communications channels, creating cryptosystems and ensuring the protection of

the authorities from unwanted leaks. In 2017, the National Cyber Security Centre was added to its structure, taking over information security issues, while the parent organization focused on intelligence, including conducting offensive operations in cyberspace.

The British model of electronic intelligence has been adopted by many Commonwealth member states. For example, the Communications Security Establishment has been operating within Canada's Department of National Defence since 1946. A year later, the Defence Signals Directorate was established within the Australian Department of Defence with similar functions to GCHQ. There are strong and well-equipped digital intelligence units in the Israeli Defense Forces (Unit 8200), in the armed forces of France, Japan and many other countries.

It is important to understand that since the middle of the last century, that is, since the beginning of the Cold War, Western intelligence services have been closely cooperating, combining technical and other resources to create a global system of electronic espionage. The closest such cooperation has been established within

the framework of the "Five Eyes" intelligence alliance consisting of the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, which can be joined by Israel, Singapore, Turkey, South Korea, Japan and other countries if necessary.

In recent years, the alliance has evolved into a supranational body that coordinates issues of common concern on the basis of concerted approaches, unified systems and technologies. Regular intelligence sharing also takes place within the framework of such associations such as the "Nine Eyes" (the "Five Eyes" plus Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and France) and the "Fourteen Eyes" (the same plus Belgium, Germany, Spain, Italy and Sweden), better known as the SIGINT Seniors Europe.

I would like to mention the USA separately, given the fact that Washington has long been considered a leader in the field of digital intelligence due to its technological superiority. Many members of the American intelligence community are involved in this area of work, including the CIA, where the Directorate of Digital Innovation was created back in 2015, designed, as the media wrote, to over-



### The National Security Agency

The National Security Agency (NSA) is a division of the United States Department of Defense, founded on November 4, 1952. It is an independent body within the intelligence community. It deals with electronic and scientific-technical intelligence, and protection of government communications. It is considered the largest intelligence agency in the United States in terms of

staff (more than 30,000 people) and the size of the budget (according to some estimates, it may exceed 10 billion dollars). The Director of the NSA is appointed by the Secretary of Defense after the candidate has been approved by the President and the Senate. Since December 2023, the position has been held by Lieutenant General Timothy Haugh. The NSA headquarters is located in Fort Meade, Maryland.



### Edward Joseph Snowden

Was born on June 21, 1983, in Elizabeth City, North Carolina. He worked as a systems administrator at the NSA and in the CIA's Information Security Department. In 2013, he provided the media with classified information regarding the total surveillance of US intelligence agencies on foreigners and US citizens. According to the Pentagon, he stole more than 1.7 million files related to

"vital operations." That same year, he fled from America, where he was charged in absentia with espionage, first to Hong Kong, then to Russia. On August 1, 2013, he received temporary asylum, in 2020 – a residence permit, and in September 2022 – Russian citizenship.

Regarding the arsenal. Again, from the words of E. Snowden, the NSA uses special programs such as PRISM, GENIE, XKEYSCORE, which allow it to take data from virtually any communication channel and to penetrate into any device, including personal computers and personal mobile phones. Many Western IT companies cooperate with the US intelligence services, transferring encryption keys and source codes of their programs, which makes it possible to bypass protection and "build" undeclared functions into devices. Filters and intercepting stations which copy all traffic to NSA servers are installed on the equipment of American cellular operators and Internet providers. There are cut-ins with similar functions on virtually all main wire communication lines.

Taking into account the fact that the information is gathered on a truly industrial scale, enormous capacity is required to store and process it. As noted by the media, the NSA data center built in 2013 in the state of Utah with an area of 150,000 m<sup>2</sup> allows storing up to one zettabyte (10<sup>21</sup>) or one yottabyte (10<sup>24</sup>) of various information, and the Cray XC 30 supercomputer with a capacity of 100 petaflops (more than 100 quadrillion operations per second) is responsible for its processing.

the wiretapping of the phones of European politicians, including German Chancellor Angela Merkel, by the US intelligence services.

And here is a more recent example: at the end of 2020, it was revealed that the NSA had been spying on politicians in Germany, Norway, France, Sweden and other European countries from an intelligence center built in Denmark under an agreement with the local Defence Intelligence Service. After the story was publicized in the media, the head of Danish intelligence lost not only his job, but also his freedom. This episode, however, had no effect on the determination of the US to continue using the entire arsenal at its disposal.

come the emerging crisis in the field of intelligence espionage. However, the National Security Agency (NSA), founded in 1952, is considered to be the lead agency responsible for gathering information on technical communication channels.

A distinctive feature of the American approach is the emphasis on the mass collection of primary information from all available sources, followed by its analysis and processing in order to find valuable information. It should be noted that Washington is interested not only in signals about potential security threats, but also in advanced scientific and technical developments of other countries and other people's trade secrets that can be used by US companies to gain a competitive advantage. All personal information, preferably of a compromising nature, on foreign politicians and any significant public figures is also carefully collected.


Such, let's say, unscrupulousness is another characteristic feature of the work of the Americans, who do not hesitate to keep an eye not only on their potential adversaries, but also on their allies. We recall the scandal of 2013, when former NSA and CIA employee Edward Snowden told the world about



### XKeyscore

XKeyscore is one of the computer programs used by the NSA to find people of interest by analyzing intercepted electronic communications. It is capable of processing Internet traffic in real time at a speed of up to 10 gigabits

per second. More than 700 servers have been deployed in the United States and allied countries to operate it. In addition to the NSA, the intelligence services of Great Britain, Germany, Japan and other countries have access to the program.



There is no doubt that the ability of Western intelligence services to organize covert control has only increased in recent years. And as the recent incident with the self-detonation of Lebanese pagers has shown, surveillance is only one step away from physical elimination of undesirables by means of devices in which a bug or malware is installed.

Meanwhile, with the development of modern technologies, the West has ceased to be the only player in the "field" of digital intelligence, and it is difficult to say for sure who is the leader in this area today. As we have already mentioned above, there are corresponding structures, experienced and well-equipped, in the special services of many countries. At the same time, it is obvious that in the foreseeable future, the competition in this area will only increase. The United States and its allies are ready to fight to the last for control over cyberspace, well aware that the loss of positions in this area will finally undermine their global power.

It is indicative that as recently as May of this year, Washington presented a new international strategy in the field of cyberspace and digital technologies, calling on NATO allies to intensify joint efforts to counter Russia, China, Iran and other "hostile actors." The main innovation is the so-called digital solidarity, which is directly opposed to digital sovereignty.

In conclusion, we note that the imple-

Work outline of the US NSA Data Center

mentation of the outlined plans does not depend on the change of political leadership. Whoever occupies the Oval Office, the imperatives of the White House's foreign policy — unipolar hegemony and imposing on the rest of the world of its own rules, primarily favorable to American elites, — will be determinative. ♣



US NSA Data Center (photo as of 2013)

# To be, not to seem

Text by Hero of Russia, Lieutenant Colonel of the Special Operations Forces,  
Main Directorate of the General Staff, Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

I never had doubts about what I wanted to become. Thanks to my school teacher of basics of health and safety, who always said that there is only one profession for a man — to protect the Motherland. And why military intelligence of all professions, it's hard to say. I suppose, like everyone else, I got carried away by the romance of it. We grew up on films about paratroopers. We all wanted to be in the shoes of Lieutenant Tarasov's troopers.

When the Spetsnaz officers came to our school, I was among the first to be selected. I passed all fitness tests without any problems. Overall, we had a pretty good training. As they say, everything a young body needs: shooting a machine gun, driving an IFV... Though we had to pay to go parachuting with the DOSAAF. The school didn't provide any other opportunities. When we arrived at the combat unit, it turned out that you don't have to pay

for the jumps. Jump as many times as you like. And the firearms training was something else! We trained with all types of weapons. And it wasn't like in the army, but to our heart's content: always waist-deep in shell casings. Well, you need to keep developing your professional skills.

Before the start of the SVO, we traveled a lot: to the North Caucasus, where counter-terrorist operations flared up from time to time, to Syria, other countries... But as for the intensity of the fighting, all these, of course, do not compare. We've never been to such a hell. Now our Armed Forces and other units are gaining colossal experience.

Of course, we had been preparing. We knew that it would happen, it was only a matter of time. That we still needed to have the last word, because the way we parted with the opponent in 2015, as a result of the Minsk agreements, felt somewhat wrong. Therefore, I repeat, the beginning of the SVO didn't come as a surprise to us.

The essence of combat work is to always keep the enemy on their toes. It's like a game of chess, when you constantly put them in check, create a threat so that the other side cannot



act freely, but sit in passive defense. To defeat the enemy, you need to surprise them: look, we have a quadcopter, you will no longer be able to dig trenches here safely. And we also have an ATGM that hits targets ten kilometers away, and now you won't be driving here, you'll have to carry food and water on foot. And that's when we are kind...

Can you imagine what ten kilometers at the front are like? That from such a distance you can take out almost any target, even an Abrams? And how they burn! We have knocked down so many things during this time: tanks, IFVs, APCs, various wheeled vehicles. We tried to do the calculations at first, but stopped doing that long ago.

There were moments when the enemy rushed at our positions like a madman, not caring about the losses. They were literally pushing forward, full-length, in an open field. We were hitting them, they were burning, but kept going. You will never forget such things. Our ATGM operators got down so many of them then! And no one wavered! All the guys in my unit are extremely trustworthy, you can rely on anyone. When such people are around, goosebumps run down your body and you get a complete feeling of our invincibility.

And they are fortunate ones too — you can't do it without luck in war. I remember one incident. One of our mortar detachments destroyed a tank with a direct hit. A single shot, and it caught fire. It took us a while to figure out where the mortar shell had gone until we watched the drone footage. It turned out that it had hit right into the open hatch. In slow motion, you could clearly see how the mortar shell went inside, as if through a window. Of course, it needed a fair amount of skill, our mortar accuracy has always been high, but it wasn't without luck. Our guys were really lucky that day.

We have a very friendly team, there is no formal division between superiors and subordinates, as, say, in infantry units. In the special forces, everyone is equal. Our families are friends, we hang out together, celebrate holidays... Yes, in a combat situation, the commander calls the shots, of course, but I value everyone's opinion, and at the preparation stage I always consult with my comrades, try to take their suggestions into account.

Naturally, all sorts of things happened during these almost three years. There were injuries, quite serious ones, and we had to pull guys out. But I'm really proud of the fact — I can say this openly — that during the entire time of the SVO there were no irretrievable losses in my unit.

The majority of the injuries are caused by drones. Actually, I have been injured by a grenade launcher fragmentation round too. There were three of us on the mission and all three were injured. Two of us, including me, had our legs broken and we couldn't move on our own. The third member of our group had an arm injured, he dragged us to cover and provided first aid. We were lucky that a car was nearby and we quickly got to the doctors.

I had no illusions. I immediately realized that I had definitely lost my feet. I remember the thought flashing through my mind: that's it, it's all over. But only for the first ten seconds. Then my brain quickly switched: another one is coming, we need to do something, let's work... Naturally, we accomplished the task.

**In Russia, November 5 is celebrated as Military Intelligence Day, and February 27 is Special Operations Forces' Day. The editorial board of the magazine sincerely congratulates our comrades in arms, wishes new achievements in serving the Homeland. May good luck always accompany you every step of the way!**

There was nothing else on my mind at that moment, neither family, nor children, only maximum concentration on the task. Each member of our unit leaves to carry out a combat mission in full confidence that everything is taken care of at home, all loose ends are tied up. That's the only way a person can work to the full potential.

My wife and I are on the same page in this regard. We've been together since the 10<sup>th</sup> grade, it's a long story. So when I called her from the hospital, I knew she would be there for me. We have discussed this many times, she is fully aware whom she married. All this time I wasn't chasing butterflies after all. The possibility that one day I might not return or might return but, say, in a different condition has always been there.

Overall, we have a very efficient unit that achieves results. From day one, we've been working in the most difficult areas — Gostomel, Mariupol, now Kursk. And we got the job done wherever we were sent. By the way, I still don't understand why they chose me of all of them. I believe this is the award for all my subordinates. If only it was possible to take this Star of Hero and somehow divide it into parts, I would do it with pleasure. I'd give it to the guys without a second thought, they more than deserve it. They are real men! There is a good reason the motto of the Special Operations Forces is "To be, not to seem".

# How to make a good impression

Text: Daria Zotova, Natalya Vasilevskaya

We always want to be attractive, to be liked by other people, to make a good impression. Sometimes we need this not only in everyday life, but also when going through an interview, on a first date, meeting important people. The ability to win sympathy and create a positive impression on others is one of the basic and most important skills of an intelligence officer.

In this episode, we'll share with you some tips on how to develop this skill and learn how to win the favor of your interlocutor in almost any situation.

## Be friendly, polite and confident

A positive attitude and self-confidence are the bare minimum that is necessary to win someone over. When you meet someone, try to greet them with a smile, pay attention to their appearance and mood. If you notice that they are tired or depressed, it makes sense to inquire about their health and how they are doing. If necessary, offer any help you can or simply express words of support. This will show your goodwill and care.

## Take care of your appearance

"They meet you by your clothes", so you should pay attention to the right choice of clothes. Depending on the nature of the event, its location and the status of the people present, you need to choose a set of clothes and accessories to pass for "one of them". At the same time, it is important to emphasize your own individuality, because someone who wants to be liked must also be remembered. Do not forget about your facial expression and the pose you are in. Do not show nervousness — do not fidget with your hair or crumple a napkin in your hands.

**"Life doesn't give us a second chance  
"make a first impression"**

Marc Levy

## Be attentive

One of the key elements that will help you to be liked by any interlocutor is to show genuine interest in his person and the topic of conversation he has proposed. Pay attention to the details of the story, ask clarifying questions that allow you to better understand the character and emotions of your interlocutor. If he, for example, is into sports, you can ask about his personal achievements and discuss sports news. This will show your interest and create a positive impression.

## Pay compliments


In order to pay really strong compliments, it is important to understand what really attracts you in your interlocutor, what can be noted in him from the positive side and what should be praised. The right compliment should correspond to reality, that is, reflect the personality traits or personal achievements. It is best to praise the actions (deeds, decisions) and original ideas of a person.

## Don't "compete"

During communication, especially at the first meeting, do not set the task of "defeating" the interlocutor, defending your position or telling about your achievements. Listen more, talk less. An attentive listener can, firstly, discover that his vis-à-vis is not at all the one to impress. Secondly, the story about your merits will be much brighter when asked for. Endless stories from personal life are often perceived as an attempt to raise one's self-esteem.

## Address the person by name

A name is what distinguishes a person from others, gives them a sense of their own importance, and sometimes exclusivity. People like to be addressed by name, so this little psychological trick will help to arouse the sympathy of the interlocutor. *Important! Call the person as he introduced himself. Do not repeat his name too often, otherwise it can cause the opposite effect.*



## Try to be in sight more often


To win someone over, you don't always need to communicate with them directly. Sometimes it's enough to just be in the public eye for them to become interested in you. This advice is especially important if the object of your attention is selective and prefers to refrain from talking to strangers. Try to plan your route so that you occasionally end up on the same transport with them, start going to the same store or sports club. Establish contacts with their acquaintances, become a frequent guest in their company of friends. You'll be lucky if someone from the circle of the person you need casually mentions you in a conversation with them. This way, step by step, you can arouse their interest in you.

## Share a secret

Nothing brings people closer together than having a shared secret. Being open and trusting is one of the best ways to build relationships. Of course, you should start a conversation with a stranger with neutral topics. For example, discussing a new film or a theater production. Then you can move on to something more personal. For example, telling about someone who means a lot to you. When you share such information with others, people tend to feel closer and are more likely to want to confide in you in the future.

## End conversations correctly

To make your partner want to continue the conversation, it is important to end the first conversation correctly. Let your interlocutor know that you had a good time and hope to meet again. Unobtrusively inquire about possible dates and locations of a new meeting.



## Take note: proven tools to help you communicate successfully!

**The three “yes” technique** is a simple psychological technique that allows you to “accumulate agreement” in a conversation. The human brain is designed in such a way that after two positive answers, agreement is given much easier than when asked “head-on.”

Long sentences are usually more difficult to understand. **Try to build short phrases** (8–15 words), they are more visual and easier to maintain a conversation.

**Use the amazing power of your voice.** It is well known that people first pay attention to HOW a person speaks, and only then to WHAT he says. If your interlocutor has a quiet voice, reduce the volume of yours, if it is loud, increase it. If your partner speaks quickly, you should also speed up, and vice versa, since a person can be irritated by slow or fast speech. Develop your voice, this will enhance the charm of your personality.

When communicating, **pay attention to the words your interlocutor uses.** As a rule, they reflect the person's internal state at a particular moment in time. Returning speech patterns works great. Try to “reflect” the stress patterns, non-standard linking words, and your partner's terminology.

Watch facial expressions and gestures, catch the intonation and volume of the interlocutor's voice, develop other non-verbal communication skills necessary to establish rapport — **psychological adjustment to a person.** If you unobtrusively “reflect” these features of your partner's behavior, the conversation will definitely become more comfortable for him, and, therefore, the chances of its continuation will increase.

In conclusion, we note that **the best assistant in creating a good impression of yourself is your sincerity.** All the above techniques and rules should be used not for insidious “secret manipulations”, but for building a constructive dialogue and reliable personal relationships. The ability to please people is not an innate ability, but a skill that can become a useful habit.

# The man who crushed apartheid

The 90<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the birth  
of the Hero of Russia  
Alexey Mikhailovich Kozlov

Text: Pavel Smelov

**Alexey Kozlov, the Hero of Russia. The name of this deep cover intelligence officer is known all over the world, and his excellent qualifications, loyalty to the Motherland and incredible courage are honoured. Alexey Mikhailovich lived an amazing life, having done a lot for the security of not only his own country, but also of all mankind. A significant part of the missions he was involved in will remain a sealed book forever, but, remembering him today, we decided to tell about one of them.**

A bit of history to start with. In March 1965, SAFARI-1, the first research nuclear reactor built by the Americans under the Atoms-for-Peace program was put into operation at the South African's Nuclear Research Center in Pelindaba (33 kilometers to the west of Pretoria). Two years later, the second reactor SAFARI-2 — assembled by the country's own efforts this time — was also launched there. The fuel for both reactors (highly enriched uranium) was also supplied by the United States, which had been helping South Africa in peaceful nuclear development since the late 1940s.

It should be noted that South Africa was an apartheid state at that time, the country was ruled solely by whites — Afrikaners, descendants of Dutch and British colonialists. Pretoria sought to gain the status of a world power and expanded its influence on the Dark Continent actively, but it was hampered by numerous armed conflicts and independence war in

Namibia (a former province of South Africa) in 1966, which prompted the Afrikaners to begin military nuclear development.

Israel and Pakistan agreed to help South Africa, so Pretoria started actively mining uranium ore (thankfully, South Africa had large deposits of uranium) in the late 1960s, studying methods of enriching it and creating its own atomic bomb, which would allow them to control the entire continent. The work was carried out in the utmost secrecy under the guise of a peaceful nuclear program. By the mid-1970s, concerns about South Africa acquiring nuclear weapon became so serious that not only in the USSR, but even in the West they began to worry about it. The apartheid regime was actually getting out of control, the “hotheads” in Pretoria began to brandish the “nuclear bludgeon.”

In an attempt to “cool down” the Afrikaners, the world community made appropriate calls, threatening Pretoria with sanctions, but their imposing

## Aleksey Mikhailovich Kozlov

Born on December 21, 1934, in the village of Oparino in the Kirov region (now the Kirov Oblast) to a large family. In 1943, he entered Vologda School No. 1, which he graduated with a silver medal. His favorite subject was German. Alyosha mastered it almost perfectly thanks to a talented teacher. Arriving in Moscow, he amazed the selection committee with his knowledge and, beating many others applicants on the exams, managed to enter the prestigious Moscow Institute for International Relations. In his final year, he was sent for an internship to the consular department of the USSR Embassy in Denmark. After completing his studies in 1959, he was invited to work in foreign intelligence. After special training he became an illegal intelligence officer and went abroad. In 1965, he remarried his own wife in West Germany (this time as a foreigner), and his son and daughter were born there. Successfully pretending to be a German living in Algeria, he managed to obtain German citizenship for himself and his wife. He worked under the cover of a businessman selling new-generation dry cleaners in Europe, Africa and Asia. After his wife's death (she died of cancer in the mid-1970s), he left the children in a boarding school in Moscow and continued his illegal work until his arrest in South Africa.



required uncontested facts. To obtain them, foreign spies from all over the world flocked to South Africa. Considering that Moscow did not have diplomatic relations with the apartheid regime, the only way to penetrate this country was to send an illegal there. Colonel Alexey Kozlov was singled out for this mission.

In 1976 he arrived in South Africa for the first time. Having a reliable I. D. in the name of Otto Schmidt, a German businessman living in Italy, Alexey Mikhailovich did not arouse suspicion at the South African consulate in Rome and got an entry visa without delay.

It should be noted that the first information about secret nuclear weapon development work in South Africa had reached the headquarters of Soviet foreign intelligence back in 1974. Moscow was also aware that the airfield Vastrap, located in the Kalahari Desert, had been chosen as the testing site, and that Israel, under a secret agreement concluded with South Africa in 1975, intended to transfer eight Jericho-2 missiles adapted for special warheads to Pretoria. Therefore, our intelligence officer was well-prepared and knew what to look for. As they say, chance favors the prepared ones.

In those years, the point of attraction for foreigners in southern Africa was the small state

of Malawi, which was one of the few that had diplomatic relations with the apartheid regime. In early 1977, Alexey Mikhailovich made the acquaintance of an elderly German-speaking woman, a former employee of the research center in Pelindaba, in a bar in the Malawian city of Blantyre. Being delighted at the opportunity to chat in German, the overly talkative retiree told the charming man that South Africa had started practical work on creating nuclear weapon back in the early 1970s, and that preparations for initial tests were underway at the time in the Kalahari Desert.

During a skillfully constructed conversation our intelligence officer established that South Africa was just about to have its own atomic bomb, although the South Africans lacked uranium for the final refinement of the "product". In addition, interim "cold" tests were required, and they were planned to be carried out in the near future in one of the underground mines of Pelindaba. True to the principle of double-checking the information received, Kozlov immediately returned to Pretoria, where he staged a trip to the area where preparatory work for the explosion was supposedly to be carried out. Playing a lost and not quite sober German tourist, he managed to see a lot behind the barriers. And then, in a pub, he overheard a conversation between tipsy Boers discussing what was happening in the "forbidden zone". Only after he made sure that the information about preparations for the tests was not just an idle talk, a detailed message was sent to the Center.

In Moscow, his telegram caused a great stir. Late at night, the employees who were monitoring the South African nuclear program and the intelligence officer's supervisors were summoned to the intelligence headquarters. The data obtained, after correlation with information from other sources, was recognized reliable and worthy of very close attention. In the morning information about Pretoria's nuclear tests preparation in the form of urgent dispatches landed on the desk of the USSR's top leadership. A decision was made almost at once: to immediately acquaint Western "partners" with A.M. Kozlov's "loot" via closed communication channels. And as an addition, to present photographic materials from Soviet space intelligence.

It didn't take long for Washington to react. Having publicly complained about the "arbitrariness" of Pretoria, the Americans decided to double-check the information received and sent Lockheed SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft to the area of the supposed tests. Having flown over the Kalahari Desert, it received indisputable proof of the warnings received from Moscow.

By demonstrating zeal and organizing aerial reconnaissance, the Americans played cunning since they undoubtedly knew about Israel and South Africa's nuclear related cooperation. Moreover, the United States and other Western countries, considering Pretoria as an ally in the fight against communism on the African continent, secretly supported the Afrikaners in their desire to possess nuclear weapons. However, the West did not want a raging scandal, that could uncover evidence of its involvement in the nuclear adventure, and therefore it was decided to give South Africa an exemplary penalty.

On August 28, 1977, the media published a sensational statement by an official US representative that preparations for full-scale nuclear tests were in full swing in the South Africa and the American administration did not intend to put up with it. At Washington's instigation, the West intensified pressure on Pretoria, demanding that the planned nuclear explosion be cancelled. On November 4, 1977 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution No. 418, which imposed an embargo on arms supplies to South Africa and called on other states to refrain from nuclear related cooperation with South Africa. However, not all countries complied with these demands. That same year, Israel secretly passed 30 grams of tritium to South Africa in exchange for 50 tons of enriched uranium ore. In addition, Tel Aviv, under a secret agreement, pledged to supply Pretoria with the technology and materials enough for assembling at least six A-bombs.

All this was known in Moscow from the reports of Alexey Mikhailovich, who continued to visit South Africa, collecting the necessary information through his connections in the German diaspora.

On September 22, 1979, the South African authorities, despite external pressure, decided



GDR. Late 1980s

to conduct full-scale nuclear tests. Due to a leak of information organized by Moscow, the world community quickly learned about this, and the Americans had to demonstratively increase pressure on Pretoria in order to force it to abandon the continuation of dangerous games. However, even after this the South African nuclear program was not curtailed. Moreover, due to the support of Tel Aviv again, Pretoria began to think about creating an intercontinental ballistic missile that could be used as a delivery vehicle.

Nuclear centre in Pelindaba (South Africa)



In an African tribe. Late 1970s



Realizing that the events in Pelindaba were threatening world peace, the foreign intelligence leadership decided to clarify the situation urgently on the spot, and Colonel Kozlov once again got ready for a long journey. He left Moscow in January 1980 and after a while arrived on the Dark Continent. In our intelligence officer's schedule literally every minute was busy with trips or meetings. Having completed some of the planned tasks in Johannesburg, he visited Durban and Cape Town, and then noisy and dirty Windhoek in occupied Namibia. And at every turn he was solving the main task — he was looking for accurate information about the South African nuclear program, while collecting data on the current political situation in the country and the region.

Explaining his visits to the aforementioned countries by business interests (by that time, Alexey Kozlov, aka Otto Schmidt, held the position of a representative of a large Western company producing dry cleaning equipment),

our intelligence officer moved in local business circles and among foreigners working there. He did not know that local counterintelligence had already put him under observation. As it turned out later, the tip-off to the South Africans was given by the Americans, who had been informed about our illegal by the defector Oleg Gordievsky. Alexey Mikhailovich himself later admitted that on those days he had had bad feelings, but brushed off them as groundless.

It could be called a miracle, but Kozlov managed not only to get confirmation of the information obtained from other sources about the nuclear test conducted by South Africa together with Israel, but also to transmit this data to the Center. The information he had collected about intensification of atomic bombs production by South African specialists was also extremely important. In Namibia he acquired further proof: he learned about a sharp increase in the volume of uranium ore mining at local deposits and its export to South Africa, although previously it had been exported in full to the USA.

Perhaps the South African counterintelligence agents were afraid of frightening Kozlov away, or maybe they thought that he had nowhere to go, and relaxed supervision for a while. Therefore, he worked in relatively calm conditions and only in the last days in Windhoek he discovered that he was being closely followed, which was conducted quite skillfully. He could not escape surveillance, nor did he try. After all, in those years occupied Namibia had no direct connections with the outside world and all contacts were carried out through South Africa. The situation turned out to be practically hopeless; it was impossible for him not to go back. The only alternative route was to walk three and a half thousand kilometers through the scorched desert to Angola. Intelligence officers are brave people, but by no means reckless, and Alexey Mikhailovich could not allow himself to face inevitable painful death.

Kozlov was arrested on July 28, 1980, immediately upon his arrival in Johannesburg. Counterintelligence agents were waiting for him right on the airfield, after that our illegal was held in South African prisons for almost two years. We will not describe in detail the torments that

fell to Alexey Mikhailovich's lot. He was interrogated by representatives of almost all Western intelligence agencies. They threatened him, beat him, starved him, kept him in a cage in the blazing sun, deprived him of sleep, completely isolated him from the outside world. But he put a brave face on it, which was later acknowledged even by his enemies, who allowed him to take a number of "souvenirs" as a keepsake during the exchange (read more about this in the "The History of One Object" section).

There was a tough fight for Kozlov's release. In less than a month Moscow learned of his arrest from our agent in the US intelligence services. However, the South African authorities were hiding this information for a long time. Only in January 1981 in his address to parliament the country's Prime Minister Peter Botha acknowledged the arrest of the "Soviet spy", calling his exposure "an outstanding example of counter-intelligence work."

On May 1, 1982, Alexei Mikhailovich was exchanged for ten agents from West Germany and a South African army officer captured in Angola. During almost two years of imprisonment, our intelligence officer lost half his weight and seriously ruined his health, but the main thing was done. His efforts can be assessed as nothing less than a peacekeeping mission not even on a continental, but on a global scale. One can only guess what would have awaited humanity if the fragile nuclear parity had been violated by a pro-fascist state that held 26 million of its citizens in slavery.

The data collected by Kozlov enabled Moscow to persuade the United States and other Western countries to tighten international sanctions against Pretoria. As a result of the tough embargo, the apartheid regime fell. In 1990, even before the African National Congress led by Nelson Mandela came to power in South Africa, President Frederik de Klerk decided to voluntarily renounce nuclear weapons and destroy all their stockpiles, which was confirmed by IAEA inspections in 1994.

As for Alexey Mikhailovich, upon returning to his homeland he did not leave intelligence service. On the contrary, having worked in the Center for some time he began to ask persis-



Unveiling of the bust in his home town of Vologda. November 2, 2024

tently to return "to the field." Despite the fact that he was exposed, the head of the "S" Directorate (illegal intelligence), General Yuri Ivanovich Drozdov, supported his request. Having gone abroad again in 1986, Colonel Kozlov worked for more than ten years under "special conditions," visited almost 90 countries with secret missions.

In 2000, Colonel Kozlov was awarded the title of the Hero of Russia by the decree of the President. In 2005, Alexey Mikhailovich's consent was obtained and he was made public and began communicating with the press. His incredible fate served as the basis for numerous publications, as well as a fascinating novel and a script for an action film.

The outstanding illegal passed away on November 2, 2015, but he dwells in our memory. On December 21, 2024, Colonel Kozlov would have turned 90 years old. He did not live to see this date, his health being affected by the consequences of imprisonment. But just as the light of a distant and, perhaps, long-extinct star continues to shine in the Universe for many years, so the memory of our Hero will illuminate and inspire many generations of Russian intelligence officers. 🚩



Film "For the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Foreign Intelligence Service. Without the right to glory"

Presentation with the Star of Hero. Moscow. 2000



# African souvenirs of Alexey Kozlov

Text: Alexandra Khakimova

The museum collection of the SVR of Russia contains many unique items that embody the courage and fortitude of intelligence officers, their loyalty to the path once chosen. And these are not always orders and medals. Even the most ordinary things can tell us touching stories. Here we see a piece of government furnished soap and a cigarette rolling machine — this is all that Hero of Russia Alexey Mikhailovich Kozlov was able to take with him after two years of staying in an African prison.



On July 28, 1980, a snow-white airliner was landing at Johannesburg Airport. One of the passengers, an unremarkable middle-aged German, was peering out the window. On the airfield, he immediately noticed a tinted black SUV driving swiftly onto the runway. Strong guys in dark glasses began to dismount slowly from the open doors. There was no need to hurry: about ten minutes would have to pass before the engines stopped. "It's for me," the sixth sense, that never failed the passenger, suggested. Otto Schmidt, aka Soviet intelligence service's colonel Alexey Kozlov, was arrested by South African counterintelligence as soon as he descended the ramp and stepped onto the scorching concrete.

The man who dismounted from the jeep onto the field with the guys, as it turned out later, was the deputy director of counterintelligence of South Africa,

Colonel General Broderick. "A nice, civilized bloke," Kozlov recalled, "he showed me his ID, said that I was under arrest, and they drove me to prison."

However, the attitude in prison was far from civilized. During the first week, Kozlov did not sleep for a minute: he was either beaten or interrogated endlessly. During one of the interrogations, he was shown his own photograph and managed to read the inscription on the back: "Alexej Kozlov". He read it and immediately received a slap on the back of the head from an annoyed South African: the detainee should not have seen this mark. It became clear to Kozlov that if the South Africans knew his real name, then someone had given him away, and there was no point in denying. Alexey Mikhailovich admitted that he was a Soviet intelligence officer, but besides that he did not utter a word.

Exhibits from the Hall of History of the foreign intelligence

Thus started his almost two-year imprisonment. Kozlov was charged with terrorism, which, according to local laws, meant no right to a lawyer and a ban on communication with the outside world. He had been "lost" by the Center for six months, during which the intelligence officer had to endure real torture. The investigator who was in charge of the case had a portrait of E. Kaltenbrunner on the wall of his office, and he practiced the corresponding measures of influence on those under investigation. From the memoirs of Alexei Mikhailovich: "He had a game: all the chairs in his office had curved backs. They would handcuff prisoner's hands behind the chair back, the prisoner's back would become convex, and it was enough to poke a finger

for him to fall. And the floor there was made of concrete. On the fifth time you would faint."

This is just one example of how successful the South African secret services were in multiplying the Gestapo's experience. Kozlov was not allowed to sleep, bright lights were turned on, and recordings of the screams of tortured prisoners, women's cries and children's sobs were played. They did not allow him to sit: once he spent 26 hours standing, and at the same time, as usual, he was beaten. How could a man not break down?

They tried to push him into despair, arguing that the situation was hopeless: no one knew that he was there, in South Africa, where the human life was pennyworth. To prove it, they took him to executions, pretending that he also was about to die; they fed a random prisoner to the crocodiles in front of his eyes, so that the "German" would understand that he could easily become the next one. Every Friday, at five in the morning, the dead bodies of those who had been executed — hanged on the floor above — were carried past his cell. Alexey Mikhailovich's endurance was amazing.

In December 1981, the Prime Minister of South Africa Pieter Botha publicly announced Kozlov's arrest. Our intelligence officer's fortitude quickly became known among the inmates of the prison where only whites were kept (apartheid extended even to places of imprisonment). After spending six months on death row, Alexey Kozlov was transferred to a regular solitary confinement cell and allowed to take walks. For the first time in a long while, he saw other people, not the jailers, who showed unexpected sympathy for his fate. "They took me out for a walk

in the prison yard, and from all sides I heard: "Hold on, dude! We heard that soon you will be exchanged!" Well, really they hadn't heard anything, no one had written about it anywhere, but for me it was such moral support! Enormous!" Through the guards, as a sign of respect for his unwillingness to cooperate with the authorities, Kozlov was given a gift. It was a cigarette rolling machine that became one of the symbols of his resilience.

At the end of April 1982, the prison warden suddenly came to Kozlov's cell and told him that he needed to pack urgently: he was going to be exchanged. On the one hand, it was a surprise, hard-won and happy; on the other hand, he never doubted that the work had been going on in the Motherland all these months. Intelligence never abandoned people of their own, either before or after Alexey Kozlov. He was supposed to change his prison uniform for a suit, but none of the things taken away during his arrest would fit him. Only his boots suited him, the rest turned out to be several sizes larger. Instead of his previous 90 kg, he now weighed 57! They brought him a new suit, a shirt and a tie, and gave him a small bag — he was allowed to take with him only the things that would go into it. And there was nothing to take

out, really: Kozlov put into the bag that cigarette rolling machine and a piece of government furnished soap — dirty green, smelling of carbolic acid.

Kozlov was not driven to the airfield right away, but first he was taken back to the building of the counterintelligence service of South Africa, where his "adventure" had begun. General Broderick met him there again. He apologized to Alexey Mikhailovich, adding: "We didn't know whom we were dealing with. Now we know that you are a normal man and a real guy."

Two years later, Alexey Kozlov was back at Johannesburg Airport, walking on the scorching concrete to the plane's ramp, but the huge 300-seat Boeing 747 hosted only nine passengers. There was now no point or desire to peer out of the window: he was saying goodbye for good to South Africa which had held him in its steel embrace for two years.

Alexey Mikhailovich was exchanged at the "rate" of 1:11. Ten employees and agents of the West German secret services detained on the territory of the GDR and one South African officer captured in Angola were given for him. People like Alexey Kozlov are like unique diamonds. They are priceless! 🇷🇺



Death row in the prison in South Africa

# Who are you, colonel "K"?

On the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the birth of the deep cover intelligence officer Vladimir Iosifovich Lokhov

Text: Yury Danilin

Thanks to the head of the Soviet illegal intelligence, Yuri Ivanovich Drozdov, this deep cover agent was known as Colonel "K". At the same time, General Drozdov, who highly appreciated his professionalism and personal qualities, believed that the real name of this intelligence officer would never be revealed. Nevertheless, in 2020, on the occasion of the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the SVR of Russia, he was mentioned in the media along with other declassified agents. And today, in connection with the anniversary of our hero, we are ready to tell you some episodes of his biography and even demonstrate you extracts from his personal operational file which clearly show us what an exceptional personality was hiding under the pseudonym "Colonel K".

So, meet Vladimir Iosifovich Lokhov, an Ossetian. He was born on December 22, 1924, in the village of Pichidzhin, Okon district (now Znaur district), South Ossetian Autonomous Region of Georgia (now the Republic of South Ossetia), in a miner's family. His father, Iosif Rostomovich, was on a merit pension for his services to the revolution. His mother, Evdokia Georgievna, kept house and raised children. Besides Volodya, the Lokhov family raised three more sons — Iosif, Shota and Zaur, and a daughter, Vera.

Vladimir graduated from Secondary School No. 45 in Tbilisi just before the war. In September 1942, he was drafted into the Red Army. He guarded trains and especially important objects, and was involved into the liquidation of bandits and enemy saboteurs hiding in the mountains. After demobilization, he entered the faculty of Law of the Azerbaijan State University in Baku, from where he graduated cum laude. In April 1952, upon a recommendation, he entered the state security organs.

While studying at the university, he met his future wife, Nonna Vladimirovna Tolstaya. Speaking about the circumstances of their meeting, Lokhov's son, Igor, recalls: *"My mother was a first-year student, and my father was in the fourth year. At first, she didn't like him, and she regu-*



With father, brother Iosif and sister Vera. 1930s

*larly made him wait for two hours. But then, of course, she fell in love. Sometimes it happens that young people seem almost like children — fragile and immature. But if you look closely, you can see an unbend-*

*ing internal ramrod. Perhaps it was this true wealth of my father that my mother eventually noticed. In 1953, my parents got married and lived together the whole life. They had neither disagreements nor serious conflicts. My mother always showed an amazing patience, realizing the importance of my father's work."*

Lieutenant Lokhov began his operational work as an assistant to the operational officer of the 5<sup>th</sup> Department of the MGB of the Azerbaijan SSR. In a short time, he gained experience in conducting intelligence activities, achieved noticeable results, and proved himself to be a conscientious and proactive officer. In March 1957, he was given an offer to enter foreign intelligence, or more exactly, its illegal division, which he received with great enthusiasm.

Initially, it was assumed that the Lokhov family would travel abroad together, but due to Nonna Vladimirovna's medical contraindications,

*"During the training period, "Streltsov" [note: operational pseudonym of V.I. Lokhov] is characterized exceptionally positively. He has focused on learning the language, studying with two teachers. During the period from July 1957 to January 1958, he acquired the skills of fluent conversational speech on political and everyday issues. He can freely express his thoughts and understand his interlocutor; he has an active vocabulary of 2,000 words and phrases, successfully learns the language, has a good visual memory."*

*From an operational report*



With beloved wife Nonna. Mid 1950s

Upon returning, in his final report he stated: *“I consider myself ready to carry out missions abroad in illegal conditions. With the knowledge of the language, life and religion of Muslims, operational and other skills that I managed to acquire with the enormous help of my comrades from the Center, as well as with the appearance that nature has awarded me, it seems that I will be able to do a lot of useful things in the countries of the East.”*

In May 1964, Vladimir Iosifovich traveled through a number of Asian countries on an operational mission to the country of destination. His initiative and persistence allowed him to legalize himself in a short time and to create the necessary conditions for conducting fruitful intelligence work from illegal positions. At first, he organized a small company for mining operations on a sharing basis

they had to abandon these plans. After consulting with his wife, Vladimir Iosifovich decided to work independently and began an intensive training, which lasted for several years. In just six months of language studies, he managed to master the basic level of one of the Eastern languages “from point zero”, after which he was sent to Dushanbe to improve his language skills.

From April 1958 to July 1959, our hero lived in Tajikistan in a family of immigrants from the Asian state

which was of interest to the foreign intelligence, honing his language skills. At the same time, he mastered the professions of photographer and driver. In November 1960, he went on an internship in a country with a strict counterintelligence regime, where he spent a year and a half studying customs and traditions of the local population and mastering their way of life. He paid no less attention to clearing the intelligence and operational situation and learning the specific methods of conducting intelligence work from illegal positions.

“The agent situation is very complicated. Surveillance follows me everywhere, without disguise. Everyone with whom I have had at least a short conversation, is immediately interrogated and intimidated. And this is being done by the people from the NN brigade aimed at watching me which consists of five or six people daily, and sometimes this happens right in my presence. Almost all foreigners are watched like this in this country, where a regime of strict dictatorship reigns. But I have to work, I have to adapt somehow. There is no time to relax. I will look for other ways of communication with the locals.”

From the operational report of “Streltsov” of January 1961

V.I.Lokhov (third right) at a business dinner in on of the Middle Eastern countries. 1960s



with a local partner. Later, he founded his own film distribution company, bought a taxi, and opened an inconspicuous auto repair shop.

His own business gave our hero personal independence and legal sources of funding which are so necessary in the work of an intelligence officer. Taking advantage of his position as a successful foreign businessman and his innate communication skills, V.I. Lokhov managed to establish a number of useful connections in local business circles and among prominent representatives of foreign diasporas in a short time, after which he began to send to Moscow important and sometimes very sensitive information.

When the counterintelligence situation in the host country became even more tense, and the work with valuable sources available to intel-

ligence from the position of a legal residency became risky, the Center decided to transfer these agents to V.I. Lokhov for communication. For several years, Vladimir Iosifovich successfully led the group of agents transferred to him, ensuring a regular and uninterrupted flow of classified documentary information which invariably received high marks when it was implemented by the government agencies.

In May 1967, for security reasons, V.I. Lokhov had to be withdrawn from the host country, and the work with valuable sources was temporarily suspended (later, contacts with them were restored, but that’s a completely different story). Upon his return, our hero was awaited by his first well-deserved award — the medal “For Battle Merit”. Considering the valuable experience that he had acquired, a decision was made to leave him in a special reserve, from time to time sending him abroad on short-term missions.

Vladimir Iosifovich received a new important assignment in December of the same 1967. As a deep cover agent, he went to one of the Western countries with which the USSR had no diplomatic relations, with an aim to collect intelligence information about the operational, political and economic situation. Subsequently, he had many trips of this kind, including for the work on and the recruitment of promising foreigners. V.I. Lokhov always coped with all the tasks successfully, and the information obtained by him was invariably



Somewhere in the Middle East



With his son Igor and daughter Alla. Moscow. Mid 1960s

Gohar Levonovna, whom our hero treated with truly paternal care. He worked in this post for more than 12 years, and trained a considerable number of professionals. We should also note that it was at the instigation of V.I. Lokhov that deep cover intelligence officers were, first in peacetime, awarded the star medal of the Hero of the Soviet Union.

Personally, Vladimir Losifovich preferred to remain “in the shadows” and never bothered about awards or high ranks for himself. He lived in full accordance with the motto of the illegal intelligence service: “Without the right to glory, for the glory of the State!” He retired in July 1991, but continued to participate in the life of the Service, passing on his rich life and operational experience to younger generations. Until the end, he maintained a cheerful spirit and clarity of mind. He died in 2002, and was buried with military honors at the Troyekurovskoye Cemetery in Moscow.

The professionalism, courage and endurance of V.I. Lokhov are still legendary. Many were amazed by the story told by Y.I. Drozdov about how Colonel “K”, using documents of a foreigner who had died long since in a foreign land, went to a mountain village to confirm the legend. There, the elderly and half-blind mother of the “double”, who had lost all hopes of seeing her missing son, recognized our intelligence officer as her child. It is noteworthy that Vladimir Losifovich treated the old woman as his own mother: he was affectionate, gave her generous gifts, money, helped with the housework and,

reported to the highest leadership of the USSR. All this time, Nonna Vladimirovna, who lived with their children in Moscow, treated her husband’s work with understanding, providing him all the necessary support.

In January 1979, Vladimir Losifovich, who had great authority and respect

among his colleagues, headed the 1<sup>st</sup> Section in the S Department of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, which coordinated the work of the most valuable and most deeply covered intelligence agents. Suffice it to say that among the people he supervised were the legendary Vartanyan spouses — Gevork Andreevich and

“The first step in my work in this field has been taken. This step may be small in the general context of the tasks which face me, but it is of great importance to me personally. As can be seen from the description of my actions to legalize and, especially, to obtain a passport, I had to personally participate in all stages of the preparation of this document. Therefore, I am especially glad that the work of the people who gave me language skills was not in vain. Moving in the group of drivers, among the neighbors, communicating for almost two months with officers of several police stations, the passport department and many other people, I never experienced any difficulties in the language. Not a single person from these circles felt that I was not a native local resident.”

From the operational report of “Streltsov” of January 1964

“...During the period of work in special conditions, V.I. Lokhov proved himself to be a proactive, thoughtful, mature and courageous operative with good organizational skills. In difficult and critical situations, he maintained composure, calm and workability. He was able to correctly assess the situation, distribute forces and develop the necessary operational measures.”

Extract from the service certificate

even after going away, did not leave her without attention and care for a long time: the “mother” received gifts for the holidays until her very death.

No less remarkable is the story of Vladimir Losifovich rescuing one of our deep cover agents who was unable to return home on his own due to health reasons. He suffered a nervous breakdown from the stress — his mentality cracked up (unfortunately, this sometimes happens), and all attempts to take him out of the host country ended in failure, as he refused even to talk to anyone. When V.I. Lokhov, who knew the diseased personally, was informed about this, he volunteered to help at once and immediately flew to the place. The agent remembered his comrade and agreed to go home together. But returning by plane was too risky, and Vladimir Losifovich decided to go by car. For a week, day and night, he drove his sick colleague across Europe and eventually safely delivered him to Moscow. After recovery, the agent always remembered with gratitude Vladimir Losifovich and the helping hand that the latter had lent to him in a difficult time.

This year, on the occasion of the anniversary of the outstanding intelligence officer, at the initiative of his compatriots, his bust was installed

*their duty to preserve memory and history. We are obliged to do everything so that the younger generation grows up on our examples, lives with the same spiritual and moral values that our elders have left to us.”*

And we would like to finish the story with the words of the intelligence officer’s son, Igor: *“I am happy that the memory of my father is alive. I remember him as a man who was always self-confident and outwardly looked fit, although inside he had many worries. He did not show weaknesses and inspired those around him that as long as a person is alive, he is capable of achieving everything that is destined for him by Fate.”* 🇷🇺



Son Igor and daughter Alla at the unveiling of the bust. Tskhinval. South Ossetia. May 8, 2024



Text: Nikita Andreyevich Lomagin, Ph.D. in History, professor

On the 85<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the outbreak of the Winter War, the SVR of Russia has declassified a big volume of documents of that period testifying that the Soviet leadership for over two years had been undertaking persistent attempts to come to a mutually beneficial agreement with the Finnish side on security issues. The archive documents shed light on the specifics of Helsinki's domestic and foreign policy of the time, underlying Finland's eventual rejection of the Soviet Union's proposals, thereby leaving the Soviet authorities with virtually no choice.

Soviet-Finnish relations were extremely strained throughout the interwar period. In the report for 1935, the USSR envoy in Finland Erik Asmus noted: "Finland continued to give cause for concern for the Soviet Union as a

country invariably inclined to support any anti-Soviet gamble... 1935 showed that the most cautious attitude toward Finland on our part and taking preventive measures were entirely justified and dictated by the need."

The fact that the negotiations between the parties were conducted "in ascending order" in three formats reflects the Soviet leadership's desire to reach an agreement with Finland. During the first stage (from

April 14 to September 28, 1938), confidential negotiations, by Stalin's order, were conducted between the Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs Eino Rudolf Holsti and Boris Yartsev (Boris Arkadievich Rybkin — the chief of the foreign intelligence station in Helsinki, codename "Kin"). During the second stage (March 1939), the contacts switched to an official level to include the plenipotentiary representatives (ambassadors) of both countries. Finally, during the third stage (from October 12 to November 9, 1939), the Soviet Union conducted the dialogue at the highest possible level, and the Finnish side — at a defiantly low one.

Speaking on April 17, 1940 at a conference to summarize military operations with Finland, I.V. Stalin noted, "The war was necessary, since peace negotiations with Finland had not yielded results, and the security of Leningrad had to be ensured unconditionally [...] not only because Leningrad represents 30–35% of our country's defense industry, and therefore the fate of our country depends on the integrity and safety of Leningrad, but also because Leningrad is the second capital of our country [...]. It was clear that since peace negotiations with Finland had not yielded results, it was necessary to declare war in order to organize and consolidate the security of Leningrad and, therefore, the security of our country by military force."

The election of Kyösti Kallio as president in early 1937, the rise to power of the "dark red" government and Holsti's appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was considered an opponent of Germany, as well as the benevolent position taken by the Soviet leadership in relations with Helsinki, contributed to the beginning of the thaw. Yet the ruling Finnish circles of the time were not unanimous concerning development



E. Holsti, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland (1936-1938)

nomat, who, according to E. Järnefelt, was one of those who opposed Foreign Minister Holsti's policy of rapprochement between Finland and the Soviet Union. Holsti, in fact, had no liking for the USSR, as evidenced by his work as head of the Finnish Foreign Ministry (1919–1922) and as envoy to Estonia. However, unlike his predecessor Antti Hackzell, Holsti didn't want Finland to become a battlefield in the event of a pan-European conflict, and to this end he tried to ease tensions in relations with the USSR.

of ties with the USSR and other leading European powers, which is well illustrated by the declassified SVR archives.

In particular, the Finnish envoy to Washington Eero Järnefelt's (1934–1938) information is interesting for its assessment of the essence of Finnish policy and its main actors, as well as their relations with external forces (see Document 1 in the "Declassified archives" section). Thus, according to the Finnish envoy to Sweden, Juho Paasikivi (1934–1939, President of Finland in 1946–1956), to whom Järnefelt refers, one of the most important figures in the Finnish establishment was considered the director of the State Bank of Finland Risto Ryti who "conducted his course through the Minister of Finance Tanner and the Minister of Defense Niukkanen". As for R. Ryti himself, he "was guided by the directives of the Defense Council, which included two lines: the German and the British General Staff, represented respectively by General Walden and Marshal Mannerheim".

The document also mentions Juho Erkkö, the editor-in-chief of the leading Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sa-

In February 1937, E. Holsti visited Moscow together with the Director of the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Pajula and held talks with the Soviet leadership, which led to a warming in the relations between the two countries. The Soviet Union, namely, met the wishes of Helsinki regarding the Finnish fishermen who lived on the islands of Seskar and Lavansaari in the Gulf of Finland and gave them an opportunity to communicate with the coasts of Finland and Estonia in winter across the ice of the territorial waters of the USSR.

However, as soon as in the second half of 1937, Germany increased political pressure on Finland. Holsti had to pay a visit to Berlin, where his counterpart Konstantin von Neurath took pains to set him against the Soviet Union, urging him to remember that "Russia is always Russia, the color — black, white or red — means very little."

The pressure was complemented by an expansion of intelligence activities of German agents, a transition from sending them as tourists and journalists to collect sensitive information to the creation of perma-

agent cells in Finland and other northern European countries in order to influence domestic policy and to struggle against socialist organizations. A special report of the 7<sup>th</sup> Department of the USSR NKVD GUGB on the German agent Otto Wittek, a representative of the "Nordische Gesellschaft", who began to work in Helsinki in October 1937 and was connected with the German Foreign Ministry, reveals the specifics of the new stage of Germany's activities in Finland (see [Document 2](#)).

In April 1938, Boris Rybkin (Yartsev) arrived in Helsinki to negotiate with the Finnish authorities. The Soviet leadership wanted to receive guarantees that Finland would not assist Germany in the imminent war against the USSR. Rybkin's mission were not unexpected for the Finns. What was new was the proposal for mutual assistance on a bilateral basis. It was also important for Finland that the USSR did not object to maintaining Finland's Scandinavian orientation in peacetime. Therefore on the first stage the talks went fairly successfully which can be seen from Rybkin's reports sent to Moscow (look up for those documents on the [SVR of Russia web-site](#)).

However, the real position of Helsinki was much more complicated. The Finnish side distrusted the Soviet proposals: the Finnish officials argued primarily about where they should seek help to oppose the USSR — in the League of Nations or from the Scandinavian neighbors. The possibility of resolving the security problem within the framework of bilateral relations with the Soviet Union was not even seriously considered. According to the memoirs of Arvo Inkil, personal secretary to Finland's Prime Minister Aimo Cajander (March 12, 1937 — December 1, 1939), who took part in the negotiations with Rybkin as an intermediary, the USSR mainly



B. A. Rybkin (comrade Kin), chief of the Soviet intelligence station in Finland

sought to ensure that Finland would not become a springboard for a German attack against the Soviet Union. In return there were guarantees of independence for Finland and assistance in strengthening its defense capabilities, including the fortification of the Aland Islands. Thus, protracting negotiations became the most important means for Finland to maintain the status quo and prevent escalation in relations with the Eastern neighbour. In this regard, it becomes clear why the Finnish side undertook the maneuvers trying to narrow the scope of the future military agreement as much as possible, as well as to obtain a favorable trade agreement.

Stalin, on his part, was ready to soften the terms of the possible Soviet-Finnish agreement, consenting only to Helsinki's written commitment to repel the Germans in the event of their invasion of Finland. At the same time, the USSR wanted to obtain the right to build a naval base in the Gulf of Finland on the island of Gogland, which had a decisive importance for the safety of Leningrad. In exchange, it was proposed to open the Soviet

market to Finnish dairy products and timber. In addition, the USSR was ready to cover Finland's needs for sugar, tobacco and a number of other goods that Finland imported from other countries, primarily Germany. Moscow counted that those gestures would facilitate further rapprochement of the two countries and strengthen the positions of the Finnish government, relatively moderate at that time. The growth of the international prestige of the USSR due to the victory over Japan was also considered a key to the success of the negotiations. The station chief in Helsinki comrade Kin received information about all this in the form of detailed instructions from the Center (see [Documents 3 and 4](#)).

Sharp strengthening of Germany, which, following the annexation of Austria, also took over Czechoslovakia as a result of the Munich agreement with England and France, significantly influenced Finland's position by the end of 1938. Had Hitler concluded similar agreements with other major powers, the USSR could have found itself in complete isolation. Under those circumstances, Holsti's course towards maintaining neutrality was becoming ever less relevant, especially since Berlin insisted on his resignation as a prerequisite for establishing good relations between the two countries. As a result, instead of Holsti, oriented toward the League of Nations, the position of the head of the Foreign Ministry was taken by his long-time opponent, the above-mentioned owner of Helsingin Sanomat, Juho Erkkö. He broke off negotiations with the member of the Soviet delegation to the League of Nations Boris Stein, who had replaced Rybkin, and pro-

posed to begin a partial strengthening of the Aland Islands together with Sweden. Moscow was categorically opposed to that, understanding that, in case of a war with Germany, those fortifications would be used by Hitler.

The policy of delaying negotiations or disrupting them by leaking information to the press about the content of the political part of the dialogue became most apparent at the end of March 1939, when the Finnish trade delegation left without any results (see [Document 5](#)). Nevertheless, Helsinki kept on playing for time pretending that the negotiations were about to moved forward. For example, the government expressed its readiness to sell three islands in the Gulf of Finland to the USSR, including Gogland, but "for such a good price that [it] could justify itself before the public opinion of the country" (see [Document 6](#)).

In fact, after the end of this stage of the negotiations, the Cajander government hastily began to build defensive fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, attracting thousands of nationalistically minded students and young people of draft age.



A. Cajander, Prime Minister of Finland (March 12, 1937 – December 1, 1939)

On June 29, 1939, the Chief of the German General Staff, Franz Halder, arrived in Finland. He flew in his plane with a retinue of officers all along the Finnish-Soviet border and inspected fortifications and military installations. Erkkö held a gala reception in his honor, a number of German generals were awarded the highest orders of Finland. In August 1939, large-scale maneuvers were held on the Karelian Isthmus. All military attachés accredited in the country, with the exception of the Soviet one, were invited.

From April 26 to August 29, 1939, Finnish Air Force Captain Eskola, on an English Bristol Blenheim aircraft, made 13 flights at the altitude of 9,000 meters over the territory of the USSR, taking pictures of Kronstadt, Leningrad, Petrozavodsk, Olonets and the whole Karelian Isthmus. Those activities led to a sharp escalation of tension in Soviet-Finnish relations. The Finnish border service was not informed of Eskola's secret mission and could not identify the aircraft's nationality. A priori considering it to belong to the USSR, the Finns sent notes of protest regarding the violation of their airspace. The Soviet side, in turn, considered the German or British Air Force responsible for border violation to, becoming increasingly convinced that Finnish territory was being used by third countries as a springboard for a future attack on the USSR. In response, the command of the Leningrad Military District carried out a number of defensive measures on the Karelian Isthmus interpreted by Finns as preparations for aggression.

As it is known, the third attempt to bring the Finns to a reasonable compromise was also unsuccessful. Stalin and Molotov, at the negotiations in Moscow (October 12 — November 9, 1939), offered to the members of the Finnish delegation, headed by the Minister of Finance Väinö Tanner and the Finnish Ambassador to Sweden J. Paasikivi, various options for breaking the deadlock. The Soviet side, in order to ensure the security of Leningrad, proposed for discussion the possibility of renting the Hanko Peninsula, as well as joint exploitation, rent or sale of several islands in the Gulf of Finland, or exchanging them for larger Soviet territories in Eastern Karelia. There was also an idea to move the Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus further from Leningrad for a substantial compensation also in Eastern Karelia. The Finnish side rejected all those proposals.

The result is known. On November 30, 1939 hostilities started ending on March 12, 1940 with the victory of the USSR. According to the peace agreement, the Soviet-Finnish border was shifted 120–130 kilometres to the North of Leningrad, the Soviet Union received parts of the Rybachy and Sredny Peninsulas, as well as the Vyborg Bay islands. The Hanko Peninsula was leased for 30 years. The main strategic goal — make the North-Western border safe — was achieved.

At the same time, the West launched a fierce anti-Soviet campaign: the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations, sanctions were introduced (they were called embargo then). Historic parallels are self-imposing. The historic lesson is evident: the unwillingness of one side to take into account legitimate security interests of another one forces the latter to take measures. Sometimes rather tough ones. ♣



ИЗВЛ СССР  
Г У Г Б

**\*РАССЕКРЕЧЕНО\***  
Служба внешней разведки РФ 10

СОВЕРШЕННО СЕКРЕТНО.

7-ой ОТДЕЛ.

"21" августа 1937г.

№ 3523/8

СПЕЦСОБЩЕНИЕ.

ФИНЛЯНДСКИЙ ПОСЛАННИК В ВАШИНГТОНЕ -  
О ВНЕШНЕЙ ПОЛИТИКЕ ФИНЛЯНДИИ.

1. г. Ежову.  
2. г. Фриновскому.  
3. г. Бельскому.  
4. г. Баковскому.  
5. 8 сектор 7 ОГА.  
6. 7 сектор 7 ОГА.  
7-8 в дела.

НАЧ. 7 ОТДЕЛА

НАЧ. 5 СЕКТОРА

Возвратившийся 28.07 из Гельсингфорса в Вашингтон финляндский посланник в Вашингтоне Эро ЯРНЕФЕЛЬД, говоря о своих личных настроениях, а также о внешней политике финляндского правительства, заявил, что он последние годы отошел от друзей своего отца, хорошо настроенных к СССР, но, тем не менее, он "всем сердцем" связан с СССР и восхищается достижениями СССР. При этом Ярнефельд сознавал, что он несколько обивался с японцами потому, что очень любит свою жену [дочь японского агента - проф. Рамотедта], но никогда ничего против СССР не делал; наоборот, он по мере своих сил старается изменить политику Финляндии по отношению к СССР в смысле обличения и оторвать Финляндию от Гитлера.

Коснувшись политики финляндского правительства Ярнефельд заявил, что он недоволен внешней политикой; будучи 11/2 месяца в Финляндии он пытался выяснить - кто же фактически руководит политикой внешнего финляндского правительства, но этого узнать ему не удалось. Во время своей остановки в Стокгольме, Ярнефельд виделся с финляндским посланником в Швеции - ПААСИКИВИ и перед ним также

я.

поставил вопрос - кто правит Финляндией? Паасикиви ему ответил, что и прежде и теперь Финляндией правит РЮТИ [директор финлянд. гос.банка]. Если при прежнем правительстве Рюти проводил свою политику через бывш.премьера КИВИНИКИ и бывш.министра ин.дел ХАКЦЕЛЯ, то при нынешнем союзе правительства Рюти все проводит через министра финансов ТАННЕРА и министра обороны НИУККАНЕНА.

По мнению Ярнефельда, если это и верно, то Рюти, в свою очередь, выполняет директивы Совета Оборона, а, как известно, в Совете обороны имеются две линии: линия германского генштаба - через генерала ВАЛЬДЕНА и линия английского генштаба - через маршала МАННЕРГЕЙМА.

Далее Ярнефельд рассказывал, что ему приходится ежегодно вносить американскому правительству 18 миллионов финмарок - в погашение финляндского военного долга, в то время, как население севера Финляндии голодает. В Америке просто смеются над "аккуратностью" Финляндии, тогда как никакие другие страны долгов не платят.

Ярнефельд ежегодно предлагает финляндскому правительству прекратить платить этот долг, но из этого ничего не выходит.

Ярнефельд находится в натянутых отношениях с главным редактором "Гельсинггин Саномат" - ЭРККО, играющим видную роль в реакционной политике Финляндии. По мнению Ярнефельда, Эрко не только ничего не делает для укрепления престижа Колота, а, наоборот, старается всякими способами повредить ему за его политику обличения с СССР.

**\*РАССЕКРЕЧЕНО\***  
Служба внешней разведки РФ 10

176. оп-5

НКВД-СССР  
ГУГБ

УП-1 отдел

"21" марта 1938г.

№ 429171

1. тов. Ежову
2. тов. Ериповскому
3. тов. Минаеву
4. УНКВД-г. Ленинград
5. В дело.

НАЧ УП ОТДЕЛА ГУГБ НКВД СССР  
НАЧ 1У С КТОРА УП ОТДЕЛА ГУГБ

~~СОВЕРШЕННО СЕКРЕТНО.~~

~~СОВЕРШЕННО СЕКРЕТНО.~~

О немецком агенте ВИТТЕК  
в Финляндии.

В октябре месяце пр. года в Гельсингфорс из Германии прибыл представитель "Нордшне Гезельшафт" (Либек) — Отто ВИТТЕК. У него имеются рекомендации от министерства иностранных дел.

По прибытии в Гельсингфорс, Виттек заявил широкому кругу лиц, что прибыл сюда для организации выставки немецкой книги и что такую же выставку он недавно организовал в Копенгагене. Кроме того, он имеет задачу — обследовать книжный рынок скандинавских стран и отобрать все, что подходит для перевода на немецкий язык.

Полнее узкому кругу лиц ВИТТЕК рассказывал следующие свои планы: он уже целый год раз'сказает по скандинавским странам, чтобы создать активные боевые ячейки "Нордшне Гезельшафт". С внешней стороны они будут заниматься культурными вопросами, но эти учреждения будут иметь главной задачей через доверительную информацию сообщать обо всем важном происходящем в полити-

-2-

ческой жизни этих стран, а особенно о работе социалистических организаций.

"Нордшне Гезельшафт" намерено создать в каждом северном государстве особое бюро с постоянным секретарем. Это бюро должно будет марксистской пропаганде противопоставить свою работу.

В Швеции и Дании имеются шведско-немецкие и датско-немецкие общества, которые по существу выполняют только чисто шведские или датские интересы, секретарями их являются соответственно датчанин и швед, но работают они по инструкции Германии. Для Дании в качестве секретаря сейчас назначен редактор Саннеберг из какой то датской газеты в окрестностях Копенгагена.

Такого же секретаря Виттек сейчас подыскивает в Финляндии.

Кроме того Виттек рассказывал, что немцы в этом году решили отказаться от помощи "туристов" и "журналистов" для сбора информации, а приступят к созданию ячеек по всему Северу для изучения этих стран во всех направлениях.

ВИТТЕК тщательно наблюдает за местным книжным рынком, чтобы не появились какие-нибудь книги анти-нацистского направления. Он, например, упрекает местную германскую миссию и руководителей местной нацистской колонии Бринка, за то, что они терпят наличие здесь некоторых книг, неподходящих для фашистской Германии.

-3-

Ведя наблюдение в различных кругах, Виттек особенно наблюдает за связями, идущими в СССР. Недавно Виттек, заметив в пансионе "Централь" человека читающего датскую газету "Социал-Демократ" сейчас же выяснил — кто этот человек.

Помимо шпионажа, Виттек занимается здесь также распространением антисоветских провокаций. Недавно он сообщил в Германию, что в Гельсингфорс приехал тов. ДМИТРОВ и организовал здесь отдел германской компартии.

Document 2.  
Special report on the German agent Wittek in Finland.  
March 21, 1938

Document 2.  
Special report on the German agent Wittek in Finland.  
March 21, 1938

**АСЕКРЕЧЕНО\***  
Служба внешней разведки РФ 10

Гельсинки Полпред  
Лично КИНУ.-

Ваши последние сообщения по делу "7 апреля" показывают, что Финны недвусмысленно пытаются сузить рамки будущего военного соглашения.

Судя по последним высказываниям, они хотят ограничиться обязательством о соблюдении нейтралитета и отпоре агрессору, а взамен требуют торговый договор и наше согласие на бесконтрольное вооружение Аландских островов.

Наши интересы требуют большего и надо этого добиваться в следующем порядке:

1. Заявите финнам, что мы согласны на приезд в Москву их торговой делегации, включая в нее специально уполномоченных финправительства.

2. Однако, крайняя ограниченность их предложений заставляет нас опасаться, что военно-политические а следовательно и торговые переговоры могут остаться безрезультатными.

3. Для достижения желаемого и несомненно полезного для них соглашения мы снова рекомендуем им обсудить условия на которых мы готовы пойти им навстречу:

Эти наши условия таковы:

а) если финны опасаются заключить с нами полное тайное военное соглашение, то мы согласны ограничиться их письменным обязательством об отпоре немцам, и согласием принять нашу вооруженную помощь (хотя бы в смысле поставок оружия всех видов);

б) Мы дадим согласие на милитаризацию аландских островов, но при условии нашего, участия вооружением и наблю-

дателями (конечно, все это в засекреченном виде).

в) Мы хотим получить право на создание укрепленной воздушно-морской базы на острове Гохманд, в финском заливе;

г) На этих условиях мы согласны гарантировать неприкосновенность Финляндии в ее теперешних границах, помогать им вооружением на выгодных основаниях и заключить такой торговый договор, который позволит сильно укрепиться нынешнему финскому правительству (покупка сельхозпродуктов, сделки по лесу, продажа им сахару, табаку и пр.).

Учтите, что нынешний рост нашего престижа в результате победы над японцами создал очень выгодную обстановку для переговоров с финнами.

Намекните финнам, что это не могло не повлечь изменения отношения к нам ряда стран. Не только японцы, почувствовав на себе нашу твердость и военную мощь, запросили мира, а и сами немцы им всячески советовали утихомириться, поскольку увидели, что мы разобьем японцев, это лишнее доказательство тому, что финнам выгодно заключить соглашение с нами.

О результате доложите.

№ 2056 15.VIII.

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
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Document 3.


Special message to comrade Kin (B.A.Rybkin) with additional instructions for negotiations. August 15, 1938

Document 3.

Special message to comrade Kin (B.A.Rybkin) with additional instructions for negotiations. August 15, 1938



Document 4.  
Letter of Beria to the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Central Committee about the opening of Finnish Mission in Moscow.  
December 1938



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Letter of Beria to the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Central Committee about the opening of Finnish Mission in Moscow.  
December 1938

ЛВ4 НКВД СССР 395  
 ГЛАВНОЕ УПРАВЛЕНИЕ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ  
 5-й ОТДЕЛ

**\*РАССЕКРЕЧЕНО\***  
 Служба внешней разведки РФ 10

СОВЕРШЕННО СЕКРЕТНО

1939 г.

РАЗОСЛАТЬ: \_\_\_\_\_  
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Нач. 5 отдела ГУГБ НКВД СССР  
 Комиссар Гос. Безоп.  
 3 ранга  
 (Деканозов)

**СПЕЦСООБЩЕНИЕ № \_\_\_\_\_**

О настроениях в правительственных и общественных кругах Финляндии, в связи с возвращением из Москвы финской торговой делегации.

5-м Отделом ГУГБ НКВД из Финляндии получено следующее телеграфное сообщение:

Несмотря на указания министра иностранных дел ЭРККО, председателю торговой делегации САВОЛАХТИ в связи с временным прекращением торговых переговоров оставаться в Москве, 27-го вся делегация вернулась в Финляндию.

В беседе с сотрудниками министерства иностранных дел САВОЛАХТИ заявил, что с СССР торговать можно, торговые переговоры очень хорошо развивались вначале, и вдруг застопорились в связи с неразрешением каких-то политических вопросов. Кроме этого САВОЛАХТИ рассказал, что ЭРККО ругал его за самовольный приезд в Финляндию и даже ставил вопрос об его отставке. ЭРККО сообщил ему, что переговоры между СССР и Финляндией по политическим вопросам налаживаются.

По непроверенным сведениям, финское правительство для продолжения торговых переговоров, намерено в скором времени послать торговую делегацию в другом составе.

Document 5.  
 Special report  
 of the of the 5<sup>th</sup>  
 Department of the  
 USSR NKVD GUGB.  
 April 1939


396  
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Несмотря на заверение Финского правительства о сохранении в секрете переговоров по политическим вопросам, их содержание стало достоянием многих лиц. Фашистская газета "Аян-Суунта" 28-го марта поместила следующую заметку: "Финская торговая делегация вернулась из Москвы ввиду того, что торговые переговоры зашли в тупик из-за политических вопросов. В городе циркулируют слухи о том, что СССР требует передачи острова Хогланд. Если эти слухи неправильны, то правительство должно об этом заявить, чтобы эти слухи прекратить!"


30-го марта все финские газеты по поводу указанной заметки поместили опровержение министерства иностранных дел. Однако, газета "Аян-Суунта" поместив опровержение министерства иностранных дел, настаивает на правильности своей заметки и "раз"ясняет, что ей известно, что СССР действительно предъявил Финляндии наглые требования.-

НАЧ. 6 ОТДЕЛЕНИЯ 5 ОТДЕЛА  
 СТ. ЛЕЙТЕНАНТ ГОС. БЕЗОП.  
*Деканозов*

Document 5.  
 Special report  
 of the of the 5<sup>th</sup>  
 Department of the  
 USSR NKVD GUGB.  
 April 1939




Document 6.  
Letter of Beria  
to the All-Union  
Communist Party  
(Bolsheviks) Central  
Committee.  
April 1939



More documents on  
the web-sites of the  
SVR and the Russian  
Historical Society

Document 6.  
Letter of Beria  
to the All-Union  
Communist Party  
(Bolsheviks) Central  
Committee.  
April 1939



**Director of the Hermitage  
Mikhail Piotrovsky:  
“Museums educate a complex  
person, without whom our  
civilization has no future”**

Mikhail Borisovich, in September of this year, the anniversary 10<sup>th</sup> International Forum of United Cultures was held in Saint-Petersburg, with the participation of representatives from 80 countries. The event was held under the motto “Culture of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Sovereignty or Globalism?” How would you answer this question yourself and do you think it is necessary to strive to preserve the unity of world culture in modern conditions?

Every nation has a culture, but it should and can only exist as a single world culture. And this is a very practical thing. Every national culture is wonderful and absolutely self-valuable, but on its own — without world cultural recognition — it can disappear. If a culture belongs to one nation, it can be destroyed. I have repeated many times: national cultures are valuable because they are important for other nations.

Today, people are well aware of this and want to protect their cultural sovereignty. But the question arises: where does the freedom of one end and the freedom of another begin? How, given all the cultural sovereignties, can we preserve the unity of world culture? In the Government Expert Council of the Russian Federation, in which I have the honor to be a member, I have prepared materials on the topic: “Ways of overcoming the consequences of vulgar globalization and the mechanism of interaction of cultural sovereignties; a system of guarantees for the security of cultural herit-

age.” They were partially presented at the September forum.

In the multipolar world that we are creating and that is built on the sovereignty of cultures of different peoples, it is very important to find mechanisms for these sovereign cultures to perform the function of part of the world culture. Museums are one of such effective mechanisms. Museums are called upon to show the unity, differences and interaction of different sovereign cultures. The advantage of the museum format is that the difference in historical views is shown in a respectful way and never turns into “memory wars”.

**With the beginning of the SVO, cultural ties with the West were the first to fall down. What do you attribute this to? How did the Western policy of “cancellation” affect the activities of Russian museums?**

I am deeply convinced that Russian culture cannot be “cancelled”. Not because it is good, but because it is an integral part of world culture. The West has launched a process of cancelling Russia, not Russian culture. Western politicians are trying to “cancel” Russia as a state, to create a blockade in the information field, as if our country does not exist at all. But this is not so. Russian culture is still widely present everywhere, Russian people are everywhere. Tchaikovsky is not going anywhere. This is the first thing.

#### Mikhail Borisovich Piotrovsky

Mikhail Piotrovsky was born on December 9, 1944 in Yerevan in the family of archaeologists Boris Piotrovsky (Director of the Hermitage from 1964 to 1990) and Hripsime Dzhanpoladyan-Piotrovskaya. He graduated the Oriental Faculty of the Leningrad State University (Department of Arabic Philology). From 1967 to 1991 he worked at the Leningrad branch of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences (now the Institute of Oriental Manuscripts of the Russian Academy of Sciences), rising from a lab assistant to a senior researcher. Participant in numerous archaeological expeditions in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Yemen. Head of the State Hermitage Museum since July 1992. Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor.

« In the multipolar world that we are creating and that is built on the sovereignty of cultures of different peoples, it is very important to find mechanisms for these sovereign cultures to perform the function of part of the world culture.

The second thing is more serious: the world is now in the process of “cancelling” culture as such. Its level is falling, and many believe that it is no longer particularly needed. A striking example is the promotion of the idea of “cancelling” museums. They say that museums are the keepers of the spoils, exhibiting what was not created for them. This creates the ground for new demands for restitution. Abroad, this issue is actively discussed by the media and museum guides. Unfortunately, the issues of restitution are also being raised in our country. In our country, this process is led by the Rus-

sian Orthodox Church, followed by museums with claims to each other, there are also descendants of private owners... In my opinion, however offensive it may sound to some, all this is also an element of the “cancellation” of culture, because museums are one of its highest categories. Museums save and study what is created by man to preserve the common memory of mankind.

After the political and economic reorientation, Russia has also started a cultural turn towards the East. Do you sense a reciprocal interest on the part of Asian museums and the public? Does the Hermitage have any plans to create exhibition centers in friendly countries, and what is the current situation with cultural centers in Europe?

The East is present in the world to the same extent as the West. Moreover, it has always been present here, in the Hermitage, so we don't need to turn anywhere. Come and we will explain what the East is. The cultures of the East are as remarkable and important as those of the West. And museums in Eastern countries are perhaps even more interesting now. All the best modern art is collected there, and all the latest technologies are also there.

We like to organize Hermitage Days in Russia and abroad. As a rule, we bring a small exhibition, one masterpiece, and show our technologies and inclusive programs. We give lectures about our museum, talk about the Hermitage as a living organism. Nowadays, however, it is very difficult to take large exhibitions even to friendly countries. What we are doing today in Serbia, China, Oman is also being built as a story about the Hermitage and its collections, with a few things added.

Nevertheless, scientific contacts with the West remain. We exchange letters regularly, our people can still go there. And they continue to go there to study in libraries, for example. But what we had in the last 15–20 years is certainly not there. Everything is officially prohibited, colleagues travel and work individually.

By and large, neither they nor we really need each other now. The Western world has changed cardinally, and our story about Russia (and all

our exhibitions are stories about Russia) is not on their agenda today. We recently opened an exhibition of works by the Flemish painter Frans Snyders. If we decided to do a similar project in Amsterdam, in the current intellectual situation in the West, we would have to talk about the fact that the wealth of Flanders was based on the exploitation of people in the colonies. We should also mention that the Great Geographical Discoveries marked the beginning of the era of colonialism. There might also have been protests from environmentalists about the fact that the Petrine drawings were made on parchment. A significant number of people there are convinced that the main thing is to advance the socio-political agenda.

What is the proportion of foreign tourists visiting Hermitage?

We have sociologists who carefully study and analyze everything, but we don't like to divide visitors into Russians and foreigners. It is important to us how many of them are residents of St. Petersburg, and their number is steadily increasing. The number of people coming alone, in couples, and with their families with children is also growing. At the same time, there are noticeably fewer of those who come just to “tick off” with tourist groups, and the tourists themselves have changed, they have become more intelligent, one would say, in appearance.

Given that you are not only the director of the Hermitage, but also the president of the Union of Museums of Russia, can you tell us how the process of restoring the destroyed museums of Novorossiya is going? Can we say that the integration of the new Russian regions into the common cultural space of Russia is complete or is there still a lot of work to be done?

The Hermitage is actively working with the museums of Novorossiya as part of a programme to integrate them (along with other museums of the south of Russia) into the common museum space of the country. We are establishing a professional dialogue, exchanging experience in reconstruction and restoration. We have prepared an internship programme for museum workers of the new regions, within the framework of which representatives from Donetsk and Lugansk have already visited us.



The Big Kolyvan Vase  
Author: A.I. Melnikov

We are expecting colleagues from Mariupol soon. It is a sister city of St. Petersburg, so we pay special attention to contacts with Mariupol's Art Museum. Its employees can regularly come to us to get additional knowledge, and our specialists are ready to go to Mariupol to assess the possibility of carrying out a full reconstruction of the damaged cultural monuments.

One of these monuments is the mosaic panel Conquerors of Space with an area of about 100 square meters. It was created in the 1960s by the muralist Viktor Arnautov on the facade of the House of Communications in the city center, but in 2022 many of its elements were lost due to intense fighting. Now we are working together to restore it.

In early September, the award ceremony for the Hermitage Prize laureates was held for the second time in St. Petersburg. The prize is awarded annually to two cultural figures —

« The Western world has changed cardinally, and our story about Russia (and all our exhibitions are stories about Russia) is not on their agenda today.

Hermitage halls







The ceremony of awarding the Hermitage Prize. Saint-Petersburg. November 18, 2023

**a Russian citizen and a foreigner (note: in 2024, its laureates were Boris Eifman and Polad Bülbül-ogly). Tell us how this idea came about and what is the main mission of the prize?**

The Hermitage Prize is an innovation that strengthens the museum's presence at the United Cultures Forum and on the world information agenda. The award ceremony takes place in the Georgievsky Hall, the Great Throne Hall of the Winter Palace, i. e. the main ceremonial hall of the Russian Empire. The ceremony is also imperial in scope: with a procession through the palace, a military orchestra — just

### The State Hermitage Museum

The Imperial Hermitage until 1917. One of the largest and most visited museums in the world. It was founded in 1764 as a collection of works of art acquired by Empress Catherine II since the beginning of her reign. The main museum complex is located on the Palace Embankment in Saint-Petersburg and consists of the buildings of the Winter Palace, the Small, Large (Old) and New Hermitage, as well as the Hermitage Theatre. The collection contains more than three million exhibits. The museum is visited annually by 2.5 to 5 million people.

like it used to be. We try to preserve traditions, and I believe that this is one of the missions of the Hermitage.

The prize itself is a replica of the Kolyvan vase, a symbolic thing for us. We put it on a par with other symbols of the Hermitage: The Scythian Deer, Madonna Litta by Leonardo da Vinci and The Return of the Prodigal Son by Rembrandt. For the 300<sup>th</sup> anniversary of St. Petersburg, a copy of the vase was made from the same stone in Altai, members of the State Council of the Russian Federation signed it, then the vase was presented to the Hermitage and now it stands in the Restoration and Storage Center in Staraya Derevnya. It was decided to award small copies of it as Hermitage prizes. Such a symbolic chain was created.

**This year, the Hermitage celebrates its 260<sup>th</sup> anniversary, while continuing to actively develop, implement modern technologies, and launch new projects. Tell us more about them and, if possible, share your plans for the future.**

Our main strategic line is the “Great Hermitage” project. It is based on the idea of expanding our exhibition space and creating open Hermitage storage facilities. This is a “down-to-earth” project, and I would say that today this is precisely what the revolution in museum affairs is, not the “digitalization”. The project also provides for the opening of Hermitage satellite centers around the world. Now, however, this process has noticeably slowed down, but this helps us to work more in Russia. In this way the museum is present everywhere, including with its authentic museum pieces.

Another interesting project, in our opinion, is the creation of a “heavenly” Hermitage, i. e. a Hermitage that is in the “cloud” and, thanks to cloud technologies, can come to everyone's home through our programmes, media and social networks. The basis of the “heavenly” Hermitage is the virtual educational tour available on our website, which allows you to see all the exhibits and give you, so to say, a “preview” before your real visit.

We are currently discussing what else might be inside this online tour. So far, clicking on a pic-

ture, a person gets basic information — what it is, who the author is. I would like it to be followed by a more detailed story. If it is a painting — it might be an analysis of the composition and the possibility to examine it in detail — so as to see all the artist's brushstrokes.

**You once said that museums and culture in general have an important function — to help educate a complex person. In your opinion, to what extent is this function in demand today, including among young people?**

Museums educate a complex person, without whom we, our civilization, have no future. Culture is accessible and should remain so for everyone. However, the word “accessibility” has many meanings. Yes, it includes the physical possibility of seeing all that has been created over centuries of creative work. But in the high sense of the word, accessibility means that a person must understand what he sees, and this is not always easy.

Museums help people to do this, help them to understand a lot, but this requires constant work of an individual. Only in this way can a complex person be formed — a person capable of intellectual surprises, creative approach and anticipation of future needs of society. And this is also one of the most important missions of the museum.

To do this, we have come up with the programmes we talked about. And, of course, we try to build relationships with young people. We regularly organize intellectual marathons, discussions, round tables, meetings with artists... Recently, together with students and teachers of the Institute of Performing Arts, we prepared a promenade performance, “The Golden Light Sutra”. All tickets for it are sold out a month in advance.

**Next year our country will celebrate the 80<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Great Victory. Are any new exhibitions and exhibition projects being prepared for this occasion?**

It so happened that the Hermitage is closely connected not only with the war and the Leningrad blockade, but also with the way in which the living memory of those events was revived.

« Museums educate a complex person, without whom we, our civilization, have no future. Culture is accessible and should remain so for everyone.

There was a moment when it could have disappeared forever, but the museum did everything to prevent this from happening. Today we try to come up with different ceremonies, installations, performances so that this tragedy will never be erased from our memory and will become part of our DNA.

We are currently preparing a memorial and historical project, “The Hermitage During the War Years”, about the life of the museum and its staff during the blockade. The exhibition is being created in the basements, where there were shelters for several thousand people. The walls there preserve the memory of the people who lived, worked, and died there. And we try to strengthen this memory by various museum means. Our website offers virtual 3D tours based on drawings by architect Alexander Nikolsky and theater artist Mikhail Grigoriev, who lived and worked in the bomb shelter. Another online tour, “Wounds of the Hermitage,” shows the places where shells hit the museum buildings during the war.

And we will traditionally celebrate Victory Day itself in the Hermitage style — with solemn ceremonies and a display of unique items.

**And finally, what would you like to wish to the young readers of our magazine who have yet to decide on their life path?**

There is no need to look for your place in life, it will find you itself. You just need to live actively, know and do everything you can, do not listen to anyone's advice, including mine. Combine what you can with what you like and develop your talents. Everyone has them.

What can I wish for young people on the way to self-discovery? To come to the Hermitage as often as possible. 🚩

Interviewed by Anna Michurina



# The life and feat of Nadezhda Troyan

Schoolchildren from Moscow and the Belarusian town of Verkhnedvinsk took part in a historical quiz about the legendary intelligence officer

Strong ties between the fraternal peoples of Russia and Belarus have a deep history, and there is nothing surprising in various joint events at the interstate level or in business. But when the heroes of past years and their stories unite very young guys who live thousands of kilometers away from each other, this involuntarily causes admiration.

The picturesque, cozy town of Verkhnedvinsk (Drissa until 1962) is located in the northern part of Belarus, in the Vitebsk region. Well-kept lawns and playgrounds are filled with children, pensioners relax by the fountain near the Palace of Culture. The local dairy plant and plastics factory supply their products throughout Belarus and even export them to Russia. A decent

life of people who know the value of a peaceful sky above their heads.

The current generation of Verkhnedvinsk residents remembers well the names of their heroes who liberated their native land from the fascist invaders. The memory of sufferings and sacrifices of the Belarusian people during the Great Patriotic War is felt especially keenly here. If in the whole of Belarus every third resident died at the hands of the Nazis, in Verkhnedvinsk every second one perished. The pre-war population of the Verkhnedvinsk region, which measured 20 thousand people, has not been restored till now!

It was here that Nadezhda Troyan was born on October 24, 1921. At the age of 22, the fragile girl, aspiring

medic and brave intelligence officer was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. Nadezhda Viktorovna received the highest state award for her fearlessness, will to victory and personal courage. Together with two other young patriots, Maria Osipova and Elena Mazanik, she took part in the Operation Retribution to eliminate Wilhelm Kube, the Fuhrer's deputy in the occupied Belarus.

The biography of our Heroine is rich in achievements. Her path in medicine both at the national and international level is well known to the children who study at Nadezhda Troyan Verkhnedvinsk School No. 2. In 2012, Moscow School No. 1288 in the Khoroshevsky District of the capital was also named after her. Nadezhda Viktorovna lived here for many years, heading the Soviet branch of the International Red Cross and working as the vice-rector of the I.M. Sechenov First Moscow Medical Institute.

Strong friendships have developed between the students of the sister schools. Every year on the eve of May 9, the Moscow landing party of "Troyanovtsy" goes to the intelligence officer's home land. Their Belarusian peers traditionally pay their

visit in the fall, on the eve of the next anniversary of her birth. This year, a historical quiz called "The Life and Feat of Nadezhda Troyan" was organized for young patriots of the Union State in Moscow, with the support of the SVR of Russia.

The quiz began with short greetings, in which its participants artistically played up their names: "Memory" and "Patriots" (Belarus), "Doctors" and "Operation Nadezhda" (Russia). During the competition itself, the children demonstrated not only a thorough knowledge of Nadezhda Viktorovna's biography, but also a quick reaction. Questions of increased complexity were asked to the quiz participants by members of the jury which, besides veterans of the SVR of Russia and representatives of the education sector, included the Minister-Counsellor of the Embassy of Belarus in Moscow Alexander Shpakovsky and the Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the "Rossiyskaya Gazeta", the author of a biographical book about Nadezhda Troyan Nikolay Dolgoplov.

Perhaps one of the most difficult tests for the participants was that with the questions in the format of a video

conference, asked by the Ambassador of the Republic of Belarus in Moscow Alexander Nikolaevich Rogozhnik and the Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation Sergey Yevgenievich Naryshkin. Not all participants of the quiz were able to answer them correctly (*you can also check yourself by watching the video question from S.E. Naryshkin. Look for the answer on the pages of this issue.*)

As a result of a tense struggle, the team "Patriots" from Belarus took the first place, but, of course, friendship won. The main thing that schoolchildren from both countries have taken away from this exciting meeting is that the fate of the Hero, an outstanding personality and a wonderful woman has become for all of them an excellent example and a model of dedication, high professionalism and selfless service to the Fatherland. 🇷🇺

Video question from the Director of the SVR of Russia



# Back in Paris

Text: V. G. Fisher (R. I. Abel), Soviet illegal intelligence officer  
Drawings: Sergey Dorozhenko

## ENDING

In Berlin, everything went as planned, except the maneuvers of the taxi driver, who wound his way around the city quite a bit before taking Max and Agafya to the apartment in Siemensstadt. Half an hour later, Sasha arrived with two suitcases.

Having picked up Max and Agafya, he headed to Stettin. There, one by one, they boarded the ship and were placed in a small cabin. Soon they heard footsteps, German speech, then the footsteps faded away, and fifteen minutes later the ship's engines began to work...

Three days later, the ship docked at the Leningrad port, and they were met at the pier by Sergei, Max's friend from Moscow.

"Welcome!" he said, holding out his hand.

"Hello. Meet my wife, Agafya Iraklievna!"

"Nice to meet you. Congratulations on your return home."

"Thank you very much. I am infinitely happy... there are no words!"

"Now about business. For now, we'll stay in Leningrad until the evening, and then take the express train to Moscow. Your parents are wait-

ing for you there, Agafya Iraklievna."

"My God! How wonderful! All these days have been like a fairy tale! I've never expected to be here again!"

"It is not Paris here, it's still a bit difficult."

"What does Paris matter to me? What difference does it make that the stores there are bursting with goods if you don't have the money to buy them? Here at least you know that everyone is struggling. And what about there? The poor can't get out of poverty."

"Well, let's go, I have a car here. Let's go have breakfast, then I'll take Vanya from you for a few hours — we need to discuss some business. And, Agafya Iraklievna, I will introduce you to a very nice woman who will show you the Hermitage and other sights of Leningrad."

Max gave the addresses and names of Edmonds' agents to the Counter Intelligence Department of the Leningrad Directorate. According to the card index, Vlasov had been subjected to repression back in 1926, and Sverchkov had worked as a legal adviser at the Leningrad port, but had already left for Odessa for permanent work a year ago.

"So," the head of the Department summed up, "you have nothing to do in Leningrad!"



"On the contrary," Max objected. "I need to go to the Leningrad addresses! It's not entirely clear whom exactly Edmonds imposed upon me. The English aren't babies, they've been doing intelligence for a long time. Maybe he included the names of flatmates among these people. For example, he knows that Andrei Timofeevich Vlasov has been arrested, but his agent lives in Vlasov's flat, and we don't know his name. If I come and ask for Vlasov, the flatmate will hear, maybe even open the door himself and tell me that Vlasov has been taken. But he'll know that I came from Edmonds. I'll tell him that Vlasov isn't there, but Edmonds will know that I was looking for him! I guess my current trip is just a trial, a testing one! No! I'll definitely visit these flats. Just not today, but in a week. I beg you not to frighten the tenants. Don't go there right away! I think we should check the flatmates first."

"Perhaps you are right," the head of the Department agreed.

"I will give you the information about the flatmates. I advise you to talk to the janitors and the building managers if the addressee is not there."

Max and his wife left for Moscow to report.

The center discussed Max's messages and proposals for a long time, and it was decided to continue communication with Edmonds to find out the areas of his activities, and concerning his agents to act as Max had suggested.

It was decided to begin Max's visits on Edmonds' instructions with Arkhipov. According to the terms of communication received from the English intelligence officer, Max was to convey greetings from Anton Pavlovich to the agent as soon as he was sure with whom he was dealing. Perhaps they would answer that they did not know such a person. After this, Max would pass on the object received from the Englishman to his interlocutor, and only when the "talismán" was recognized by the interlocutor and Max was invited into the room, it would be possible to pass on the note. After reading the note, the agent was to ask: "Are you from Larionov?" Max would answer: "Yes, expect a letter soon." But before leaving he had to get the "little thing" back from the agent.

Around seven o'clock in the evening (it was still light) Max knocked on the door of apartment No. 21. An elderly man answered the knock.

"Who do you want?" he asked rudely.

"I need comrade Arkhipov, Ignaty Leonidovich."

"Just a minute!"

The door closed in front of Max. A few minutes later it opened again and a man of medium height with a friendly face appeared. Blue eyes and a thick light moustache were especially noticeable on that face.

"Ignaty Leonidovich?"

"Yes."

"I'm from Anton Pavlovich."

"Which one?"

"Anton Pavlovich Suchkov," Max came up with it on the fly.

"I don't know him," Arkhipov answered smiling.

"He asked me to give you this little thing."

Max handed him a small silver disc, inside which was the silhouette of a woman's head, attached to the circle with thin curls.

Arkhipov turned the piece of silver over, gave it to Max and muttered:

"I don't know anyone, neither you nor your Anton Pavlovich," and closed the door.

Max stood there for a minute, then slowly went down the stairs to the street, crossed the passage and found himself on the boulevard. There he sat down on a bench.

About five minutes later, the man who opened the door to his apartment sat down next to him. He was smoking a cigarette. Having cleared his throat, the man turned to Max:

"Are you from Larionov?" Max looked at him intently.

"No."

"In that case, I apologize."

"What is your last name?"

"It doesn't matter now, since you're not from Larionov."

The man stood up and went back into the house. Max carefully studied his figure and gait.

Arriving home, Max called Sergey, who immediately came to him.

"Listen, Max, don't go, I'll come to you now," Sergey answered him.

After a short dialogue with Agafya, Sergey, tête-a-tête with Max, said:

"Funny things happened," Sergey began. "First, we put you under surveillance. When you left the house, a man approached you — Trubin, by the way. Then, after a short conversation, he went back into the house. You went to the Nikitsky Gate, and our colleague saw Trubin following you. You jumped on the moving tram at Nikitskaya, but he didn't manage. That's not all! Before you called, I received a call from the pass office. Arkhipov came there and made a statement about your arrival and also added that he recognized the little thing you showed him. It's a medallion from Trubin's snuffbox. Once his, Arkhipov's, daughter was playing in the hallway, found the box there, and Arkhipov noticed that on the lid there were distinct traces of a circle with a silhouette of a woman inside — apparently, something had been glued to the lid and it had bounced off. Arkhipov asked the neighbors whose thing it was, and Trubin said that the box was his."

Max told how he was met at Arkhipov's apartment and about his conversation with Trubin on the boulevard.

"What a clever idea," Sergey smiled. "They give the correct address, but the flatmate's last name. But this trick failed. Trubin himself spoiled it. Tomorrow you will go to the vet... By the way, don't go to your friends. Maybe Trubin will look for you and will follow you. There is no need for him to know that you are our employee."

In the evening Max went to Seleznev. The vet himself came out to answer the door.

"Anton Pavlovich asked me to say hello to you." Max gave him his "talisman".

"Tell Larionov," Seleznev said dryly, "that he can forget about me. And I advise you: don't get involved with them! Don't come to me again — you'll have bud luck."

Seleznev slammed the door, and Max left.

In the morning, Seleznev came to the commandant's office and left a written statement there, in which he told about Max's visit, gave a clear description of his appearance, and explained under what circumstances he met Larionov.

During the First World War, Seleznev was a veterinarian in cavalry units. After the revolution, he remained in Moscow, and when the Red Army began to form, he offered his services and was enlisted in Budyonny's corps. He fought well, his service record included letters of gratitude, and he received awards — a sabre with an inscription, a revolver with a silver plate on which was engraved by an inept hand: "For service to the revolution, to comrade Seleznev, Oleg. 19. VI. 20". There was no place for his patronymic. At the end of 1920, he was transferred to Minsk, where the fifth cavalry division was stationed. He met the squadron commander, Anton Pavlovich Larionov, a former officer in the tsarist army. Larionov was a good commander, his squadron was always in good standing. He himself was an educated, and sociable person, light drinker. Seleznev liked him, but his cynical statements about the Soviet government and the Red Army grated on him (as he wrote in his statement). True to be told, he scolded the tsarist government and the Whites even more. Seleznev admitted that at that time he did not rebuff Larionov's statements and did not consider it necessary to report them to the special department, since he did not attach much importance to them. After demobilization in 1922, Seleznev moved to Moscow and did not meet with Larionov again. In the winter of 1923, Larionov came to him several times. During these meetings, he vaguely talked about some new Russia — Soviet, but not Bolshevik. Seleznev was little interested in politics and considered it the business of others.

During their last meeting in December, on New Year's Eve, Larionov gave him a lighter, saying

that he had a second one and that Seleznev could be visited by an acquaintance from him who would show him the second lighter. He asked Seleznev to receive this man and help him. Not suspecting anything reprehensible, Seleznev agreed. Later, he learned from a colleague from the 5<sup>th</sup> Division that Larionov had allegedly fled abroad. After that, he heard nothing more about Larionov until the arrival of the man with the lighter.

Before receiving Seleznev's statement, Max and other INO employees believed that Anton Pavlovich Larionov was a mythical person, invented as a password with agents. However, he turned out to be a real person and lived in Leningrad. Larionov was not listed in the card indexes.

They began to look for Larionov in Leningrad, and at the same time they raised the archives of the Special Department of the Gaev Division. After painstaking searches in the archives, it turned out that during the campaign through Poland and during internment in Germany, Larionov, as a German speaker, was often called upon to translate conversations with the German authorities and sometimes went outside the camp. An interesting detail came to light: during the internment, there were attempts by the White émigrés to recruit people among the division's servicemen who did not want to return to the RSFSR. The name Brestsky was mentioned among the Whites.

Brestsky, interrogated on this matter, admitted that he had recruited a certain Anton Pavlovich Larionov, but that he had nevertheless returned to the RSFSR. When asked to whom he had reported on the recruitment of Larionov, Brestsky replied that he had informed General Kutepov about it. He further testified that he had concealed from the investigation Edmonds's order to contact Larionov, explaining his "omission" by the fact that his arrest had prevented him from doing so. Larionov's address: Leningrad, Fontanka, 35, apartment 11.

In response to a request from Leningrad, they reported that Larionov had left in 1925 and his last address was unknown. Requests and orders to search for Larionov were sent out to all regions. After this, Max headed to Leningrad to visit the addresses of Edmonds's agents.

First of all, Max went to Vlasov in the evening. A man of about fifty opened the door for him.

“Vlasov? He’s not here... Maybe you’ll come in?”

Max entered the apartment. The man who opened the door looked at the landing and then closed the door.

“Let’s go in here,” he said, opening the door of the room. “Sit down! You’re not from Anton Pavlovich, by any chance?”

“No,” Max answered.

“You see,” the owner of the room continued. “Vlasov was arrested two years ago.”

The owner stood by the bookcase and sorted something out in a box. Then he put a turquoise cufflink on the table in front of Max.

“Don’t you recognize this thing?” asked the owner.

“No!” Max answered. “Sorry to disturb you.”

He put on his hat and headed for the exit.

The owner, opening the door, said to him:

“Say hello to Larionov!”

Max didn’t answer and didn’t even say “Good-bye,” quickly went down the stairs and went out into the street. Walking swiftly to Nevsky, he got on a tram and went to Palace Square. There he walked around the Admiralty and, getting on another tram, went to his apartment.

The last address was on Lesnaya Street. He decided that he would go there while he was around.

Having climbed up to the fifth floor along a dirty, neglected staircase, he rang the bell four times. The door was opened for him.

“Does Ignatij Lvovich Sverchkov live here?”

“Yes, it’s me,” the little man in glasses answered him. “What do you want?”

“Anton Pavlovich asked me to say hello to you,” Max replied.

“So what?” Sverchkov answered him calmly.

“He asked me to give you this little thing.” Max handed him a small key to the box.

“That’s good!” Sverchkov rejoiced. “I’ve been waiting for a long time! Did Anton Pavlovich pass on anything else?”

Max silently handed him a piece of tissue paper.

“Excellent! Thank you, goodbye!” — and, having thrust some object into Max’s hand, Sverchkov closed the door. Max shrugged his shoulders and carefully trudged downstairs...

Arriving home, Max found Teplyakov, an employee of the Department of the Leningrad Directorate, at his place. He quickly outlined the results of his meetings.

“We know Vlasov’s neighbor,” said Teplyakov, “but Sverchkov is not on our caseload, although we know about him as someone who works at the port. He is a specialist in legal issues related to foreign shipments. I wonder what will happen next? Will they inform us about your visit or not? Tell me, did they make an examination of these papers and things in Moscow that you were supposed to hand over to Edmonds’ agents?”

“They did,” Max answered. “The answer to the ‘talismans’ is negative, that is, no messages were found in them or on them. The notes on the tissue paper were checked only by means that do not leave traces. The results are also negative. I can give you the two pieces of paper that I had, and this one, Vlasov’s. If you like, check them yourself or send them to Moscow. Now explain one thing to me. When I first came here, they told me that Sverchkov had left for Odessa, and now, it turns out, he is here. How did this happen?”

Teplyakov was embarrassed.

“Our information turned out to be outdated. He stayed in Odessa for three months and then returned. He went there on a business trip, and

our man was simply told that he had left, and he decided that Sverchkov had gone there for good. You remember that he wasn’t our target for cultivation — there was no need. So, we missed his business trip!”

“Okay then,” Max noted. “Now there will be something to work on!”

“Absolutely right!” Teplyakov agreed. “Tell me, what do you intend to do now?”

“I’ll report the meetings to the Center, and then I’ll go to Pskov to pick up my wife.”

(Max and Agafya got married at the Moscow registry office).

“Good! We’ll get you a ticket for the express train. You can leave tonight!”

“Excellent!” Max agreed.

Returning to Moscow, Max found Agafya still there.

“You didn’t leave?”


“No. Your colleagues decided that it would be better for me not to go there. They agreed to extend my father’s business trip, so we will stay here for another two weeks.”

“That would be really better,” Max said. “In Pskov, it is easier to discover that you were there.”

An examination of Edmonds’ notes established that they all had the same address written in secret writing: “Paris, on demand, to Edmonds.” There were no other marks.

Before returning to Paris, a general plan for the report to Edmonds was outlined, as well as Max’s further line of behavior during meetings with the Englishman. One of the leaders became interested in Sverchkov’s “talisman.”

“Listen, Max,” he said. “Let me make you a copy of this ring. First, give Edmonds the copy, and if he doesn’t notice anything, send the original back. If he notices the fake, you can haggle with him some more.”



The other colleagues laughed at him, but he still made a copy. To avoid confusion, Max wrapped one in blue paper and the original in red.

The way back lay through Turkey and Italy. From Italy, Max and Agafya headed to the Riviera, and from there to Paris.

Three and a half weeks after leaving, Max and Agafya were back in their apartment. The Englishwoman had already left. An artist's family lived in her place.

Max dropped in on the jeweler Meer Abramovich the next day. He was very happy. Max gave him a string of pearls.

"Remember, we talked about it and somehow forgot about it."

"I haven't forgotten," the jeweler remarked reproachfully. "I didn't want to bother you with this while you were busy with Mr. Edmonds. Are you still involved with him?"

"Of course! After all, you have the envelope in your safe."

Meer Abramovich hesitated:

"He came a few days ago and said you weren't coming back and took the envelope."

Max looked at the jeweler for a minute in silence.

"Oh, so that's what you're like!" he thought of Edmonds.

With an effort, Max made his voice sound carefree.

"Well, to hell with him! Tell me, Meer Abramovich, is this little thing worth anything?"

Max took out of his pocket the ring that Sverchkov had given him. It was made of gold, and a circle of white metal with a red stone in the middle was attached to the ring. In the depths of the spherical stone was a symmetrical cross. The metal plate was deeply cut with an intricate design of leaves and branches.

"This stone is a ruby," said the jeweler, examining it carefully through a magnifying glass.

"What is the price?"

"The frame is very original, probably platinum... the stone is good, the cabochon is of antique workmanship, and the ring is also not modern... About a thousand dollars," the jeweler said after thinking. "Don't you know," he added, "if there is a secret in the ring?"

"Look for it!" Max answered him.

Meer Abramovich twisted the ring in his fingers, pressed the plate, and the cabochon popped out. A round piece of paper was under it.

"Don't touch!" Max shouted. "Fix the stone in place!"

Max took the ring and put it in his pocket.

"When you see Edmonds, tell him that I will give him this ring upon payment of ten thousand!"

"And the string of pearls?" the jeweler asked quietly.

"Here you are!"

The money and the string of pearls exchanged places, and Max left.

He entered the restaurant where he had been twice with the Englishman, not because he hoped to see Edmonds there, but because he wanted to eat and think. After the indignation caused by the jeweler's story, Max calmed down, having learned that he had something valuable to Edmonds. It was a pity that neither he nor his comrades in Moscow had thought to properly examine the ring. They decided that it was just a "talisman", and they calmed down. And the possibility of a "secret" didn't even occur to them!

"Well," he thought, "we must study and study. But it's good that they made me a copy there!"

He decided to leave the ring with the secret with Chernik, who was unknown to Edmonds as Max's contact. Max considered it unsafe

to take the ring home, remembering that Edmonds had spoken of his connections in Paris.

And indeed, soon after Max returned home, there was a knock on the door and two people entered: Edmonds and another gentleman.

"May I come in?" asked the Englishman. "I have a prosecution investigator with me."

"Come in!" said Max.

Agafya, looking frightened, cleared away her embroidery, which she had been doing before their arrival.

"Meer Abramovich told me that you have my ring!" the Englishman declared. "If you don't return it to me, I will instruct the investigator to initiate a criminal case against you!"

"Mr. Edmonds!" Max answered him in a harsh voice. "I believe that I have the right to a lawyer to consult on legal matters. But you are in a hurry! What proof do you have that the ring is yours? You didn't see it yourself, you recognized it from the jeweler's description. And (Max switched to French) Mr. Investigator does not speak Russian?"

"No," answered the second man.

"I have just told Mr. Edmonds that his action, that is, his address to you, is somewhat hasty. Firstly, I believe — although I am not sure of this — that I could require the assistance of a lawyer to protect my interests."

"We haven't reached that point yet," the investigator replied.

"Good! Now pay attention to the following circumstances. Firstly, the gentleman declares the ring to be his property in absentia, although he has not seen it and only has a description of the jeweler to whom I showed the ring. Secondly, I told the jeweler that I would give the ring to Edmonds if he paid me ten thousand! What kind of theft can we talk about?"

Edmonds took his wallet out of his pocket. From it he pulled out an old, tattered receipt. On it was the royal coat of arms and the jewel-

er's name — Faberens. It was written in Russian that for the payment of three thousand rubles, Mr. Edmonds was sold a ring with a ruby cabochon in a platinum frame. The date was July 13, 1912.

"Here is my proof!" said the Englishman.

"Under what circumstances did you come into possession of this ring?" the investigator asked in a soft voice.

"Mr. Sverchkov gave it to me!"

"And who is this Mr. Sfer... Sver... Excuse me, I can't pronounce it."

"It would be best to ask Mr. Edmonds, since he left the ring in the custody of Mr. Sverchkov. I had an order from Mr. Edmonds to bring this thing. We agreed that the payment for my services would be kept by the jeweler Meer Abramovich Jacobson. However, a few days ago, Mr. Edmonds took the envelope with the money back. Naturally, I am interested in receiving my fee."

The investigating magistrate stood up and said:

"I have nothing to do here! Forgive me for disturbing you, Mr. Tarutin. Please excuse me, Mrs. Tarutina. Goodbye, Mr. Edmonds!"

He bowed and left.

Agafya saw him out and closed the door.

When she returned, she saw Max angry and frowning. She had never seen him like this before.

"You know, Mr. Edmonds, I didn't think you were such a petty swindler! Report to your chief — and you undoubtedly have one — that I don't want to have anything to do with you anymore! Bring him to me, and then I don't want to see you again! And now — get out!"

Edmonds, trying to hide his embarrassment, backed away and left the room. Agafya went to see him off again. The Englishman, leaving, whispered to her:

"Is he always so angry?"

'Only with you!' she replied, closing the door behind him.

'Ugh! Damn it!' Max cursed.

Agafya sat down opposite him and suddenly laughed.

'What are you laughing at?'

'I can just imagine Edmonds reporting his failure to his chief!'

Max's mood noticeably improved.

'Let's go to the cinema after dinner!' he suggested.

On the way to the center, Agafya asked her husband:

'Aren't you afraid that the ring will be stolen while we're in the cinema?'

'No, I'm not afraid! That would be absolutely wonderful!'

'Why?' Agafya asked, puzzled.

'We'll see!' Max answered mysteriously.

Returning home, they found the apartment in the same condition as it had been before they left. However, the ring was missing.

The next day it was raining, and Max did not go anywhere. Agafya, clearly upset by the incident with the ring, was nervous. The bell rang.

Agafya let in a plump gentleman dressed in a good suit. Edmonds followed him.

'My name is Groves,' the stranger introduced himself in French. He extended his hand to Max.

'Tarutin,' Max answered.

'Excellent! Now Mr. Edmonds can leave.'

Edmonds turned silently and left.

In the hallway he put on his cloak and, as he left, whispered to Agafya:

'Your husband is not like the previous one. Take care of him!'

There was a peaceful conversation in the living room. Groves was speaking to Max:

'I am very pleased with your work, your foresight and your skill. I believe that we will not scold Mr. Edmonds too much. He carried out my orders, although he objected to them. I am a cautious man and like to test people with whom I wish to deal. You have done a brilliant job. Tell me, where did you order the copy of the ring?'

'Mr. Groves,' Max answered him, 'I have told Edmonds several times that he is too curious. For now, I am a free man, I do not owe anything to anyone. Your question is one of those that I do not consider necessary to answer.'

Groves looked attentively at Max.

'Yes, Edmonds told me so. Forgive my curiosity. The copy is excellent! Now let me get down to business. It is already clear to me that you have fulfilled our task, and although I have not yet received the ring, I am sure that you will give it

to me at the first opportunity. The matter is not urgent! Here, get the rest — five thousand in all! Now tell me about your adventures.'

'The first person I went to was Arkhipov. He flatly refused to acknowledge his acquaintance with Larionov. However, his flatmate, an elderly, rather heavysset man of medium height, with a grey moustache, brown eyes, and sparse hair, followed me out onto the boulevard and asked me if I had come from Larionov. I answered him, "No," and left.'

'Well-well!' — Groves smiled.

'Seleznev literally drove me away with threats. I am sure that he reported to the Cheka. In Leningrad, I was at Vlasov's apartment. He was arrested two years ago. His neighbor — he did not give his last name, but judging by the list of tenants, his name is Sergei Yakovlevich Filipov — invited me into his room and told me about Vlasov's arrest, and then asked if I had come from Anton Pavlovich. I answered: "No." He showed me a cufflink with turquoise and asked if I was familiar with this thing. I again said: "No" — and left.'

'Why didn't you say you were from Larionov?' Groves interrupted him.

'It's very simple. You ordered me to find Vlasov. He's under arrest. How do I know that his neighbor isn't a Cheka agent who's just waiting for a messenger from Larionov to Vlasov? Why should I put my head in a noose?'

'Right, right!' Groves replied. 'Although we needed Filippov. And did you get the ring from Sverchkov?'

'Absolutely right,' Max confirmed. 'Everything went smoothly with him. I was with him for no more than two minutes.'

'Do you think you were being followed?'

'No! This Arkhipov's neighbor followed me, but I got away from him very easily.'

'Yes!' the Englishman said thoughtfully. 'I am very pleased. Very! By the way, let me keep the copy of the ring!'

'Sure!' Max answered him. 'But keep in mind that I'm buying a dog today or tomorrow. Next time it will be more difficult to come to me.'

'Yes!' laughed Groves. 'That's probably our only mistake.'

'Not at all!' Max objected with a smile. 'I went to the cinema on purpose to give you the opportunity to take the ring. I was interested in how far you would go along the path of deception.'

'Mr. Tarutin,' said Groves, standing up. 'Leave the ring with Meer Abramovich, and I will talk to the local authorities for my part. You will be given every opportunity to work and live here in peace. I will come to you soon with a new proposal. Once again, allow me to thank you for your efforts. Mrs. Tarutina, you can be proud of your husband! Goodbye.'

Groves was not seen or heard of for about three months. Max went to the prefecture, formalized his registration and received the right to work. However, the crisis in the European economy caused an increase in unemployment, and Max had to think about opening some kind of "business". But this was not easy, since he did not have a specialty, and he did not really want to engage in trade.

Money was no problem, so Max could delay the time needed to open some kind of "business".

When Groves finally came to him, Max was busy studying catalogs of various types of radio receivers.

'Good afternoon, Mr. Groves,' said Agafya, opening the door for him.

'Good afternoon, Mrs. Tarutina,' the Englishman smiled affably. 'Is your husband home?'

'Come in! He's still looking for something to do. You know how difficult it is now!'

'Yes, yes! Maybe we can come up with something.'

'Hello, Mr. Groves,' Max greeted the guest.



'How are you? Mrs. Tarutina told me that you are looking for something to do.'

'Yes! I'm thinking of opening a radio store.'

'Hm! I have a different kind of proposal for you. How would you feel about moving to Soviet Russia?'

'What will I do there?'

'Be our man!'

'A spy?'

'You have a great penchant for sharp expressions, Mr. Tarutin. I prefer to see you as our future trusted representative. It sounds better, more pleasant to the ear.'

'Let it be as you wish! How are you going to carry out your intention? It is one thing to travel around the country without staying anywhere for long, and another to stay there permanently.'

'But do you have any connections, acquaintances who could help you?'

'There are some, but I don't know if they will be able to provide me with documents for a long stay in the country. What do you suggest?'

'We will open a current account in your name in any bank in Western Europe, into which we will deposit sixty pounds sterling monthly.'

'And that's all?'

'We will give you the equivalent of forty pounds in rubles.'

'I didn't mean the financial aspect, but specific opportunities to gain a foothold in the country. How I can get a passport, a birth certificate, register, and so on.'

'Hm! We thought you could arrange it yourself!'

'I'm not sure about that. You understand that I can do something here, even go to another country. But in Russia... It's a serious matter, especially for a family man. Would you like to have a person there for a long time?'

'Yes! We are counting on several years.'

'Therefore, we need to set things up solidly. It's not easy! We need to think about it. Besides, your offer is not very tempting from the monetary point of view.'

'Is it bad to have a hundred pounds a month?'

'I will talk to my wife and we will decide the question in principle: to go or not to go. If the answer is positive, I will have to check the practical possibilities of implementing your proposal. Only after that will we be able to conduct business negotiations. But you will have to finance this work. Before your arrival, I was not going to go to Soviet Russia. You are the initiator, you are to pay. I will not insist on a personal study if your information is sufficiently complete. That's all!'

'It's difficult to work with you, Mr. Tarutin!'

'Will it be easy for me there?! I am quite familiar with the upcoming difficulties. There will be many more of them in life.'

'Your demands are difficult to fulfill,' Groves told him.

'Let's consider our conversation over, Mr. Groves.'

'Don't rush! It's better if we leave this question open. It's in your interests. Understand that your current position is not very stable.'

'And please, Mr. Groves, mind you that such threats cannot contribute to a businesslike solution to the problem that interests you. Goodbye!'

'Goodbye, Mr. Tarutin. Goodbye, Mrs. Tarutina.'

A week later, Groves appeared again.

'I am authorized by our firm to offer you the following terms,' he began. 'For preliminary study you will be paid one hundred pounds, for the arrangement, moving and fixing you and your spouse you will get three hundred and fifty pounds and monthly maintenance in the amount of one hundred and twenty pounds

from the moment you give consent to cooperate with us. The way of providing you with maintenance will be determined by mutual agreement. These conditions meet your wishes, which are considered reasonable by our directors. What is your decision?'

'You must understand our situation, Mr. Groves. You are asking us to go to a country where the conditions of life are very different from those here. We are not accustomed to them; they are new and alien to us. Naturally, we believe that we should receive good compensation for the inconvenience and risk. I will go and find out the way things are.'

'Good! Here's the money — on one condition: you give us a full and detailed report on the trip.'

'I can do this only with the consent of the people I will be meeting. I have already had trouble with Kraskov and company. My connections were extremely worried at the time and were reluctant to help me during my trip on your business. No, that is impossible! I understand you, you would like to check me out. From my point of view, this is a path to failure. I don't want to!'

'You're as prickly as a hedgehog! It will be difficult for us to work together.'

'I think it's better to be so prickly than a docile lamb that a wolf can easily eat. What good is such a worker?'

'But still, you can't raise objections all the time!'

'Difficulties must be foreseen! One can act blindly only in extreme cases. What you are planning cannot be started without studying the situation! What is there to talk about! If you cannot understand this, we have nothing more to talk about!'

'Okay, let it be so. But understand our position too!'

'I understand you well! You want to protect yourself from blackmail, from aimless spending of money and energy, and to ensure the fulfillment of your plans. Your business is such that nothing will come of it without risk. You risk

money, I risk my head. You will make money again, but I will not restore my head.'

Groves laughed, handed Max the envelope with money, said goodbye and left.

Max hugged Agafya.

'You see, Agafya, we have outwitted the English after all. And now, finally, we will go with you to live in Mother Russia! Now for good!'



### Rudolf Ivanovich Abel

Real name — William Genrikhovich Fisher

Soviet deep cover intelligence officer. Born July 11, 1903 in England in a family of Russian immigrants who returned to the USSR in the 1920s. In 1927, he was hired by the INO OGPU. From 1948, he led the

network of Soviet "atomic intelligence officers" in the United States, worked with the Cohen couple and many other prominent deep cover intelligence officers of that era.

In 1957, he was arrested owing to a betrayal. In order to let Moscow know about his arrest and that he was not a traitor, upon his arrest he gave his name as R. Abel — the name of his late friend. During the investigation, he categorically denied his affiliation with intelligence, refused to testify, and rejected the FBI's attempts to persuade him to cooperate. By the court's decision, he was sentenced to 30 years in prison, but in 1962 he was exchanged for the American pilot F. Powers, who was shot down in 1960 over the USSR.

After treatment and rest, W. Fisher worked in the central office, took part in the training of young deep cover intelligence officers.

He died on November 15, 1971, and was buried in Moscow at the Donskoye Cemetery. For his outstanding services, he was awarded the Order of Lenin, three Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of the Red Star and many other awards.

The head of the CIA, Allen Dulles, once gave a high assessment of the professional significance of V. Fisher: "Abel was a rare person. He felt equally confident in art and politics, he was not only a talented artist, a good musician and an excellent photojournalist, but also an exceptional linguist, a capable mathematician, physicist and chemist. His ideal was knowledge."



# The Victory Wind club is already 5 years old!

Text: Anatoly Grigorievich Pshenichny, head of The Victory Wind club, secretary of the board of the Union of Writers of Russia, veteran of the SVR

This autumn, the Victory Wind club of the author's military song has turned five years old. During this time, the public organization, which is registered and located in the Victory Museum on Poklonnaya Hill and stages its performances there, has become a real combat creative unit in the military-patriotic work carried out in our country. The goal of the activity is quite clear: to carry out patriotic education and consolidation of the correct understanding of our leadership actions to protect our native state: *«Fatherland, like a patronymic, is the only one And we are responsible for it forever!»*

The participants of the club's events are mostly combat veterans, "singers from the Russian soldiers" camp», who have been through trouble spots with a machine gun on one shoulder and a guitar on the other: Dmitry Yurkov, Alexey Shorokhov,

Sergey Pestov, Sergey Kuznetsov, Oleg Bazhanov, Mikhail Kalinkin, Anzhelika Polyukhovich — the military environment's favorite singer-songwriters and poets. Some of them are still in the SVO zone.

By their side there are "singing artists" and poets of standing reputation with songs and poems of a civic and patriotic nature. The bright and talented voices of Gennady Ivanov, Vera Klimkovich, Dmitry Darin, Nina Popova, Sergey Yegorov and Lyudmila Chezganova, Vladimir Patrusev, Andrey Galamaga, Dmitry Pogora, Nadezhda Kolesnikova, Vladimir Skobtsov, Anna Averina and other performers oppose the enemy's dirty, but targeted propaganda.

Igor Slutsky, Alexander Marshal, Vika Tsyganova, Sergey Kuprik, Mikhail Nozhkin and many other stars of the Russian stage, participating in the

club's patriotic events, including visiting ones, as well as in poetry collections and music albums of Victory Wind are standing side by side with them.

I would also like to mention Ivan Ivanovich Grishanov, another permanent member of the club — a prominent Russian poet and front-line soldier, the son of regiment that marched with his comrades from Bryansk to Vienna, and who became member of the Writers Union of Russia at the age of 90.

Over the past five years, the Victory Wind club has organized over 500 patriotic concert events at the Victory Museum and in various halls throughout the country, including Siberia and the Urals, where our artists regularly perform for defense industry employees. D. Yurkov, S. Pestov, S. Kuznetsov, V. Skobtsov, A. Averina and other club members gave more than 200 concerts for the SVO fighters in the combat zone directly.

Agreements have been concluded on the participation of the Victory Wind club in the military-patriotic work of a number of educational institutions (MTUCI, MIREA) and military-industrial holdings. The club is supported by such large structures and public organizations as Rosatom State Corporation, JSC Concern VKO "Almaz-Antey», JSC Russian Helicopters, Uralskoye Zemlyachestvo LLC, Poryadok-Shchit LLC, as well as veteran organizations of the SVR and the FSB of Russia, the Soglasie charity foundation, the Strategic Initiatives Fund at the Victory Museum

and many others. Thank you all for understanding the importance of our work, especially in such a difficult time for our Fatherland!

We are marching on, are trying to reach new horizons, now international ones. In November, at the invitation of the Main Directorate for Ideological Work of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus, The Victory Wind club held a series of performances in Minsk dedicated to the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Union State. Concerts and meet-the artist events with participation of leading Belarusian poets took place within the walls of the famous 72nd Guards United Training Center of the Ministry of Defense, in the Military Academy of the Republic of Belarus, in the Minsk Suvorov School and at many other venues.

The stunning reaction of thousands of grateful listeners surprised even seasoned artists. It seemed that such concerts, where each performance affirmed the unity of the two peoples, the readiness to jointly defend the Union Fatherland, had been



long awaited here. Songs about the Russian World, about the common Victory over fascism, about the determination to defend the common Motherland were sung in chorus to packed halls.

«Why do we need a world in which there is no Fatherland!» — the title of concerts united Russian performers and Belarusian listeners. Old front-line songs, with which our fathers and grandfathers fought and won,

found their second lifetime due to the works of the members of The Victory Wind club. Vasily Lebedev-Kumach, one of our poetry teachers, was the author of the right words: *He lies who said that we must say no to our songs because of war! "Cause the heart, right after the battle, asks for music even more!*

And it asks for music not only after the battle, but also when you need to be ready for one... 🚩



## Intelligence officer's library

In 2024, a number of new books about intelligence work were published; they could be interesting both to specialists and to a wide range of readers.



# Victory Wind

## Victor Verstakov

What the hell is their Ukraine?  
When there is a Kievan Rus —  
A primary source, a core, a key,  
Our Slavic dear dream and grief.  
It was the outskirts for the Poles,  
It didn't resist and fell in fight,  
But then we loved it even more —  
Our Russian Foremother and Light.  
We won back Kiev and other sites,  
Its sacred cities and dear places,  
Which tell our hearts just so much,  
Though them be sometimes absurd.  
The Great Russians and the Little ones —  
Nobody is really little or great.  
Yes, we have slightly different noses,  
Yes, our languages differ a bit.  
They were once spoiled by the Tatar Yoke  
And the Polish Yoke in its time,  
But when we meet, we are quick to know:  
It is the Russian who comes by.  
And if we disperse for a while,  
We suddenly look back on our way:  
There are Dnieper and Volga behind us —  
We have no other place to stay.

## Vladimir Skobtsov

### Do not betray your own land

In the new times, in a dawn haze  
A siren's howl will wake you up.  
Do not betray your own land,  
And all the rest will come what may.

When darkness wipes off the light,  
When soul goes deaf from roar,  
Do not betray your own land,  
And all the rest will come what may.

When your country is on fire,  
And tears can't cool down your grief,  
Do not betray your own land,  
And all the rest will come what may.

And those of you who will survive,  
Let them just not condemn our fates.  
I will be sincere and open to you,  
And all the rest will come what may.

## Valery Latynin

### Nuremberg waits

It doesn't matter where the devil hides,  
The god will find him, even under ground.  
The same with Junta: for the bloody Maidan  
The Nuremberg Court will give them their due.

No matter how many forces there are  
Which cover those dirty tricksters' backs,  
Still on heavenly tables is being written  
The chronicle of our earthly history.

Let there be a court! The fair retribution  
From both people and mighty heaven force  
Will hit them for starting manslaughter and fire  
In the cradle of our Holy Kievan Rus!

## Anatoly Avrutin


### Grushevka

Some women were washing at Grushevka,  
With their hems a little tucked up.  
With chilly and cold autumn water  
They washed war away from the clothes.

From an old water pump leaning down  
Which once was arranged near the bridge,  
A faltering and thin thread of water  
Was seeping down filling their tubs.

Not hiding their work from fast glances,  
They were only mumbling their curses  
While washing the rags of their children  
And some small worn things of their own...

And all they, with their eyes full of grief,  
Looked through the damp chilly air  
At her, who was washing a man's shirt,  
Twisting it into a tight wisp.



## Vera Klimkovich

### You are alive!

Everybody says: "Don't wait!"  
But I wait!  
Everybody says: "Off you go!"  
But I stay!

The lightning sends me a signal,  
The thunder shouts —  
I don't believe my own eyes,  
I hardly hear.

If down the sky water flows —  
It just rains.  
Someone tells it's a trouble.  
No! Fake!

If the sun goes down the horizon —  
It is not a stop!  
It will come back the next day —  
There will be a dawn!

If I thoroughly close up my eyes —  
Dreams are better seen.  
And if winter becomes the fiercest,  
Then spring is near.

No matter what, I wait for you,  
To spite the death.  
Because it just can't be the other way —  
You are a lucky man!

A message to me, who have waited for you,  
Will be brought by the rise.  
Because only this way it can be:  
You are alive!

### Across:


- Operational pseudonym of the intelligence officer Africa de las Heras
- This is what the intelligence officer V.I. Likhov was informally called for a long time
- Headed the domestic foreign intelligence service in the difficult 1990s
- Pseudonym of one of the leaders of the antifascist organization "Red Orchestra"
- Deep-cover agent, before going abroad, she worked as a medic in a Siberian outback for several years
- Former CIA employee who told the world about the total surveillance of American intelligence agencies
- The award given to the wives of intelligence officers is made in the shape of this flower
- A married couple of illegal spies who were released from a Slovenian prison in August of this year

- The city in Belarus where the partisan scout Nadezhda Troyan was born
- The continuation of this operation was "Couriers" and "Berezino"
- We knew him as "Heine", the fascists knew him as "Max"

### Down:

- A gemstone in the title of a modern series about intelligence
- Entered the book of records as the youngest grandmaster in the world
- At the airport of this South African city in the summer of 1980, our illegal intelligence officer was arrested
- One of the names of the foreign intelligence service of the Republic of Kazakhstan
- A small town in Belarus where the "encircled" German unit led by Lieutenant Colonel Scherhorn hid in 1944

- The permanent head of the "forge" of diplomatic personnel of Russia
- The pseudonym of the creator of the Cambridge Five
- An intelligence officer and an artist, in his everpresent beret he traveled half the world
- The bust of this courageous intelligence officer, Hero of Russia, was unveiled this year in his native Vologda
- Technical device built into the wallet of the intelligence officer Gohar Vartanyan
- A nuclear intelligence officer whose name was given to a mountain peak near Krasnaya Polyana
- The informal leader of the "Cambridge Five", in operational correspondence he was referred to as "Sonny" and "Söhnchen"
- Soviet intelligence operation to extract atomic secrets
- This tanker was the final resting place of the Soviet intelligence officer Arnold Deutsch



Drawing by Vladimir Mochalov

The foreigner refused further treatment, and doctors were already telling him to sharpen his shovel.

# Selected moments of operational correspondence

The host country's president and his team are trying to cover their vulnerable rear from political opponents.

The candidate traditionally began preparations for the election campaign by "feeding" the journalists.

His face, furrowed by a crooked smile and a scar, looks sinister, although he clearly sympathizes with Russia.

"K" explained that he learned to drink vodka in the "Russian style," that is, in one gulp from a full glass, from his father, who happened to visit our country in his youth (tank unit, loader).

Since childhood, the foreigner moved among the inhabitants of the city's underworld, where he became familiar with progressive ideas.

Inside, the subject basically agrees with us, but outside, he doesn't yet.

During all the time "T" was studied, he never joined any more or less sober party.

As a gift for the national holiday, "S" was presented with a bottle of alcohol. In response, the very pleased subject wished peace and prosperity to our country, its leadership, people, the Russian representative, all his relatives and friends.

## In the next issue:

**Vyacheslav Niconov, historian and political scientist:**  
"The defense of historical memory is the top priority task"

**The role of intelligence in the Great Patriotic War**

Part I. Women — intelligence officers and guerillas

**From the saboteur N°1 to the collective farm chairman**

The 130<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the birth of the twice Hero of the Soviet Union Kirill Orlovsky

**Charles de Gaulle and the Soviet Intelligence Service**

Declassified documents from the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service archives



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